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Abstract 
Tarawera Volcano is cl8 ka, and has experienced 5 eruptive episodes in that time. The last 
eruption occurred in 1886, dispersing more than 1.3km3 of ejecta over the Bay of Plenty 
region, in what was the largest basaltic eruption recognized in the 1.6 Ma history of Taupo 
Volcanic Zone. Despite Tarawera's violent history, several urban centres are located 
within a 25km radius of the volcano. These centres, along with more distal towns such as 
Whakatane and Tauranga will be vulnerable to future basaltic activity at Tarawera. 
The 1886 eruption killed over 120 people, and devastated large areas that are now 
inhabited. Using that eruption as a model of a probable worst-case scenario, potential 
hazards can be identified that may affect contemporary communities; The vulnerability of 
the region to these hazards is assessed on both effects of the 1886 eruption and the effects 
of recent eruptions from other volcanoes on lifelines, infrastructure and agriculture. The 
2002 eruption of Mount Etna has also provided an opportunity to closely examine the 
effects of basaltic volcanism on a modem community. 
Several types of infrastructure have been identified as being particularly vulnerable to an 
1886 type eruption. These include buildings near the volcano, roads, and electrical 
distribution networks. Rotorua would be extremely vulnerable during a worst-case 
scenario, as up to 300mm of tephra could fall on the city. Whakatane's water supply will 
be likely to fail during an eruption, but more distal areas such as Tauranga will survive 
without sustai~g much damage. Base surges from likely phreatomagmatic activity in the 
Rotomahana-Waimangu geothermal field may destroy houses, a large section of State 
Highway 2 and several kilometers of220kV transmission lines. 
Recommendations are presented of measures that will decrease the vulnerability of the 
region to an 1886 type eruption. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Objectives 
To the residents of the Bay of Plenty region, Tarawera Volcano is perhaps most famous for 
having destroyed the renown "Pink and White Terraces" during the 10 June 1886 eruption. 
An eruption which devastated a large part of the Bay of Plenty region. New Zealand was 
relatively undeveloped then, little infrastructure existed. Today the same region is 
intensively cultivated, with many farms and commercial forest plantations .. It is home to c 
240,000 people, most of whom live in Rotorua, Tauranga or Whakatane (Statistics New 
Zealand, census 2001). While most of those people will be aware of the destruction of the 
Pink and White Terraces in 1886, their willingness to live close to the volcano indicates 
that it would be hard for many of them to imagine an eruption happening again. Yet 
although quiescent, Tarawera is still an active volcano. An eruption of the magnitude 
experienced in 1886 would be extremely hazardous to the Bay of Plenty Region. 117 years 
of development since the last eruption has seen the level of lifelines and infrastructure 
increase by orders of magnitude. By this same token, the vulnerability of the area has 
increased as more property has been put at risk. Previous studies have looked at the 
possible effects of a future large rhyolitic eruption from Okataina Volcanic Centre ( e.g. 
Johnston, 1997; Johnston et al., 2000b, 2002). Only one previous study has attempted to 
determine some of the effects of basaltic volcanism on the part of the Bay of Plenty region 
(Johnston & Nairn, 1993). This study offers a more detailed examination of the. probable 
effects of basaltic volcanism on the whole of the region. Thesis objectives are thus: 
• To identify possible hazards associated with a future basaltic eruption of Tarawera 
• To determine probable effects of those hazards on the Bay of Plenty region, 
including the identification of vulnerable lifelines and infrastructure. 
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1.2 Geographical Setting 
Tarawera Volcano is located in the Bay of Plenty region, approximately 25 kilometres in a 
direct line east-south-east of Rotorua. It stands at 1111 m above sea level at it's highest 
point (Ruawahia dome) (figure 1.1). 
Figure I. I The Bay of Plenty, North Island, New Zealand. Tarawera is located slightly to the left of the 
centre of the map (NZ topomap 1: 1 million series, Terra/ink 2001) 
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Tarawera Volcano is bounded along its northwest margin by Lake Tarawera. To the north 
of the mountain are commercial forest plantations managed by Fletcher Challenge 
Forestry. Similarly forest plantations lie to the west, although some of the land in the 
immediate vicinity of the volcano is used for farming. Farmland is also to be found to the 
southwest and south of Tarawera, and around Lake Rotomahana. Rotomahana lies to the 
immediate southwest of Tarawera, occupying part of the rift that extends from Wahanga 
dome in the northeast of Tarawera, southwest to Waimangu (figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2 The immediate surroundings ofTarawera. Included are the villages of Te Ariki and Moura, 
destroyed in the 1886 eruption (NZ topomap 1:250,000 (262) series, Terra/ink 2001) 
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Land use on the mountain itself is restricted to tourism. However, several farms, forests, 
lifelines, settlements and towns are close enough to the mountain to be placed at risk in the 
event of an eruption from Tarawera. These include the towns of Rotorua, Whakatane, 
Tauranga and Kawerau as well as various smaller settlements. Associated with each of 
these towns are various services and industries, each of which may be susceptible in 
different ways. The closest sizeable settlement to the volcano is that of Spencer Road. This 
road follows the western shore of Lake Tarawera, and has over 600 properties scattered 
along its length; both holiday homes and permanently occupied dwellings. Similarly Lake 
Okareka is inhabited by both permanent dwellers and holidaymakers. On the night of the 
last census (Tuesday 6 March 2001) inhabitants in the Tarawera area - (most of who live 
in the settlements beside Lakes Okareka and Tarawera) numbered 1581 (Statistics NZ). A 
further 2820 people were recorded as inhabiting the Tikitere area. Permanent residents 
within a 10 km radius of Tarawera only number 240, within 20 km this increases to 12000 
residents, including Kawerau, (Johnston et al., 2002). The number of people in the lakes 
region increases dramatically in the summer, due to the influx of holidaymakers. Many of 
the houses in the area are baches or holiday homes, and camping is popular in several 
locations in this region. Blue Lake Holiday Park is the nearest sizeable camping ground to 
Tarawera. The 150 tent/camper/caravan sites and 26 cabins or tourist flats of this park are 
well patronised in the summer, (HAPNZ, 2002) The Department of Conservation (D.O.C.) 
administers small campsites on Lake Tarawera at Humphries Bay, Hot Water Beach (these 
two sites are accessible on foot only) and at the lake outlet. Two more D.O.C. campsites 
are found beside Lake Rerewhakaaitu, but these sites only cater for a small number of 
people. 
In the greater Bay of Plenty region ( defined as the area administered by Environment Bay 
of Plenty) farmland and plantations of exotic timber cover the bulk of the land area east 
and north of the lkawhenua Ranges (which are clad in native bush). As of June 1999, 2020 
farms covered a total of 312,140 hectares in the B.O.P. region (Statistics New Zealand 
agricultural production survey, 1999). The same survey recorded 2595 hectares as 
horticultural land, and 13564 hectares as exotic timber plantations. Forestry accounts for 
most of the land use to the south of the Rotorua lakes area down to the south east of Lake 
Taupo. Eastwards of Tarawera, beyond Rotorua both native bush and forestry plantations 
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cover the Mamaku Plateau. Further farmland exists to the northwest towards Tauranga and 
Te Puke. 
1.3 Geological Setting 
Tarawera Volcanic Complex, located within Haroharo Caldera, forms the southern margin 
of the Okataina Volcanic Centre, (Cole, 1970; Nairn & Cole, 1981). Okataina Volcanic 
Centre is one of 8 rhyolitic caldera centres that make up part of the Taupo Volcanic Zone 
(hereafter referred to as TVZ) (Wilson et al., 1995). These caldera centres, along with the 
andesitic Tongariro volcanic centre, and White Island Volcano (also andesitic) represent 





Figure 1.3 Outline of Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ) and the structural boundaries of calderas. (J)Rotorua; (2) 
Okataina; (3) Kapenga; (4) Reporoa; (5) Mangakino; (6) Maroa; (7) Whakamaru (8) Taupo. Inset: North 
Island of New Zealand and the division of TVZ into segments dominated by andesite-dacite (A) and rhyolite 
(R) volcanism. Caldera locations after Houghton et al., (1995) 
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Cole (1990) suggests TVZ can largely be classified as a back-arc basin, the arc itself being 
represented by Tongariro Volcanic Centre and the andesite-dacite volcanoes of the east 
side ofTVZ, the ensialic basin by the central TVZ. Wilson et al. (1995) argue however that 
TVZ is a unique type of rifted arc. Yet both of these types of basin are extensional. The 
splitting or rifting of the volcanic arc is necessary to form back-arc basins; the rifting 
progresses to become a back-arc spreading centre (Taylor, 1995). Whichever label is 
applied, the fact remains that TVZ is in a state of extension and crustal thinning. Rifting 
rates of 7-18 mm a-1 have been measured (Walcott, 1987), and crustal thickness is thought 
to be only 15 km (Wilson et al., 1995). This extension allows for the emplacement of 
basalts as well as more silicic magmas - more evolved magmas are found in ensialic 
backarc basins than in those typically found on oceanic crust (Saunders &Tamey, 1984). 
In the arc itself a spectrum of magma compositions may be erupted. This includes calc-
alkaline andesitic to rhyodacitic types, often preceded by island arc tholeiite basalt · or 
basaltic andesite (Hawkins et al., 1984). Similarly, a range of volcanism from basalt to 
rhyolite is found in TVZ, with rhyolitic rocks making up the bulk of the volume of the 
deposits (total volume> 10,000 km3) (Cole, 1984; Wilson et al., 1995). 
The most recent volcanic activity in TVZ (excluding hydrothermal activity) has been 
andesitic; at White Island ( currently at a low level of activity - scientific alert level one 
usually) and at Tongariro Volcanic Centre (notably the 1995-1996 Ruapehu eruptions). 
These centres have also been the loci of activity throughout the 20th century. 
The thin crust and extensional environment of TVZ has a high heat flow associated with it, 
most of which is transferred by geothermal systems. Seventeen such systems are identified 
as having natural heat outputs of over 20 MW (Bibby et al., 1995). The total crustal heat 
transfer amounts to c. 2600 MW / 100 km (Hochstein, 1995). This rate of heat transfer is 
anomalously high, even when compared to other active arcs (Hochstein, 1995). An average 
modem geothermal heat flux of 700 m W/m3 is measured in TVZ, with a total geothermal 
output of 4200 ± 400 MW (Bibby et al., 1995). The source of this extremely high heat flux 
is generally accepted to be the emplacement of magma into the crust (Wilson et al., 1995). 
Geologically speaking, the crust ofTVZ is an extremely active area. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 7 
1.4 The evolution of Tarawera Volcanic Complex 
Activity began at Tarawera 18ka (the Okareka eruptive episode). This eruptive episode 
began with a subplinian eruption of basalt scoria, but largely produced rhyolite lavas and 
pyroclastics (Nairn, 1992). The lavas mark the beginning of the growth of the Tarawera 
massif. The mountain itself consists of 11 rhyolite domes and flows, and one plug (Cole, 
1970). These domes were all extruded during four of Tarawera's five eruptive episodes: 
the Okareka, Rerewhakaaitu, Waiohau and Kaharoa eruptions (Nairn, 1989). The 
Rerewhakaaitu and Waiohau are dated at 15 ka and 1 lka respectively (Nairn, 1992), the 
Kaharoa at c. 1305AD (Hogg et al., 2000). Like the Okareka eruption, the Kaharoa 
eruption included a basaltic component. In fact basalt intrusion of a rhyolite magma 
chamber is thought to have triggered the Kaharoa eruption (Leonard et al., 2002). It was 
this eruption that created the prominent domes of Wahanga, Ruawahia and Tarawera that 
shape the current skyline of the mountain. The Kaharoa eruption also created 5 km3 of 
pyroclastic material (Leonard et al., 2002). 
The 1886 basaltic eruption differs in that it was the first eruption at Tarawera solely of 
basaltic material; it did not trigger a rhyolitic eruption. It's duration was only about 4 hours 
(Cole 1970), but in this time a fissure opened from the northeast end of Tarawera to 
Waimangu, 17 km to the southeast. From this fissure basalt was erupted during 
strombolian explosions and fire fountaining. Phreatic and phreatomagmatic explosions 
took place to the southwest as the rift intersected the geothermal field at Lake Rotomahana. 
As a result over 1.3 km3 (Pullar & Birrell, 1973) to 2 km3 (Walker et al., 1984) of material 
was erupted, making this the largest basaltic eruption recognised in Taupo Volcanic Zone 
in the last 1.6 Ma. (Wilson et al., 1995). 
All of Tarawera's rhyolitic vents, and the 1886 basaltic fissure strike at 057°N, slightly 
offset from the 040°N strike of the regional fault pattern, (Nairn & Cole 1981). This vent 
lineation probably results from a deep-seated crustal fracture, termed by Nairn (1981) the 
"Tarawera Vent Lineation". It extends from Waimangu in the southwest, 38 km northeast 
to Mount Edgecumbe (Nairn & Cole 1981). Within the 1886 fissure, individual dikes trend 
between 073° and 080° (Nairn & Cole, 1981; Cole, 1990). This occurs irrespective of near 
surface geology, indicating control at depth. The dextral shear indicated by this en echelon 
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pattern mirrors evidence of dextral shear seen elsewhere in Taupo Volcanic Zone, the 
extension and dextral movement a consequence of the transtensional tectonics of the North 
Island (Cole, 1990). (Tectonic controls on volcanism are also evident for other basalts in 
Okataina, Marna and Taupo calderas). In fact most TVZ basalts occur in lineaments 
consistent with the NNE regional fault pattern of TVZ (Cole, 1973). The intersections of 
these faults ( e.g. the Paeroa Fault) and the calderas provide areas of weakness for 
ascending magmas to exploit (Cole 1972). 
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Figure 1.4 Structure and lava types of the Taupo-Rotorua area (Cole 1990). Note the occurrence of lavas 
along lineaments, indicating tectonic controls on volcanism 
1.5 Prognosis for future basaltic volcanic activity in Taupo Volcanic Zone 
For hazard mitigation, the likelihood of an eruption, i.e. if and when it might happen, the 
type of eruption (magma type/source, eruption style), and where it may occur need to be 
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considered. The possibility that future basaltic volcanism will occur somewhere other than 
Tarawera cannot be discounted. Twenty-one different basaltic deposits have been 
recognised in the central TVZ (Houghton et al., 1987). The ages of many of these basalts 
are not well constrained, however none are older than the Late Pleistocene. The ages of 
those with better age control range from the 290 ka Karangahape basalt (Houghton et al., 
1987) to the 3200 year old Rotokawau basalt (Nairn, 1992). Most types of sub-aerial 
basaltic activity styles are represented by these deposits, as well as phreatomagmatic 
deposits. The distribution of these deposits through time and space does make prediction of 
future activity difficult to constrain on the basis of past activity. No particular pattern is 
observed in regards to the timing of events. Though largely confined to the lineaments 
consistent with the NNE fault pattern, the abundance of faults in this region makes it 
difficult to predict where the next basalt may reach the surface. However, the last two 
occurrences of basalt have occurred at Tarawera - that associated with the rhyolitic 
Kaharoa eruption of 1305 AD and the 1886 eruption. This fact combined with the fact that 
the largest known volume of basalt in TVZ is at Tarawera, indicates that it is most likely 
that Tarawera will be the site of the next basaltic activity in TVZ. 
1.6 Prognosis for future basaltic volcanic activity at Tarawera Volcano 
The tectonic control of volcanism at Tarawera provides constraints for the location of 
future volcanic activity in this area. The crustal fracture that has supplied a conduit for 
magma in the past will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore the amount of basalt at 
Tarawera has increased with each eruption to date (Leonard et al., 2002). As rifting and 
crustal thinning progress, it is to be expected that the volume of basalt extruded will 
increase. It is possible that future activity may occur at any point along this fracture, 
however the point at which it rises will have a large influence on the style of volcanism to 
be expected. Whether a rhyolite magma chamber is intersected or not will be the most 
profound influence on eruption style, but also important is whether water is intersected by 
ascending magma. This interaction would be unavoidable for a quarter of the length of this 
fracture, as Lake Rotomahana and the geothermal field at Waimangu are situated along its 
southwest end. To the north end of the crustal fracture lies the dacitic cone of Mount 
Edgecumbe. Although small springs are located at the base of this volcano, the level of 
hydrothermal activity in this area is considerably less than that to the southwest of 
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Tarawera. The Tarawera - Rotomahana section is the most likely site for a future eruption, 
given activity along the lineation to date. No extrusion of magma has occurred between the 
north end of Tarawera and Mt. Edgecumbe. The dikes that fill the fracture here provide 
another plane of weakness for ascending magma to exploit. An implication of the change 
from rhyolitic to basaltic activity is that the rhyolitic magma body beneath Tarawera that 
supplied the previous eruptions has been depleted. This furthers the probability of future 
eruptions at Tarawera being basaltic (Leonard et al., 2002). The fact that with each 
successive rhyolite eruption the amount of basalt has significantly increased also indicates · 
a change in style to basaltic volcanism. 
While parameters can be identified for constraining the location of a future eruption in the 
Tarawera area, defining when the next eruption will occur is more problematic. Prior 
activity has taken place at 18 ka, 15 ka, 11 ka, 1305 AD and in 1886. Intervals between 
eruptions preserved in the geologic record are thus approximately 3000, 3000, 9700 and 
600 years. The lack of any consistent pattern in eruption interval makes determining 
probable timeframes for future activity almost impossible. However given the potential for 
disaster resulting from a future eruption, preparedness for such an event is essential. 
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Chapter2 
A Brief Account of the 1886 Eruption of Mt Tarawera & Effects Thereof 
2.1 Precursory activity 
On 10 June 1886, New Zealand experienced its first major volcanic eruption since 
European settlement, its first eruption recorded as having caused death and damaging 
property. With little prior warning of activity, Tarawera Volcano entered a short-lived but 
extremely violent eruptive phase. The eruption was completely unexpected. Some unusual 
phenomena were noted prior to the eruption, but not recognised as being precursors to 
volcanic activity. After all, Tarawera was not regarded at the time as an active volcano. 
Contemporary accounts describe occurrences that at the time were unexplained, but 
subsequent to the eruption took on more significance. These included unusual geothermal 
activity, earthquakes, and disturbances in Lakes Tarawera and Rotokakahi (Green Lake). 
S. Percy Smith, the then assistant surveyor-general reported sudden unaccountable rises in 
Rotokakahi in 1881 and 1883. The 1883 rise was said to be in the order of 4ft (1.2 m), and 
was accompanied by muddying of the waters of the lake (Smith, 1887). These may not 
necessarily be connected with the eruption. However, closer to the time of the eruption, on 
1 June 1886, an unusual wave, or series of about three waves were seen to cross Lake 
Tarawera. A renowned local Maori guide of the time, guide Sophia of Te Wairoa, reported 
seeing the creek near the lakes edge dry, water then came running in, and out again three 
times (Thomas, 1886). A member of a tourist party that was to venture out on the lake that 
day, Dr T. S Ralph, also wrote of an inundation of water prior to boarding the boat to cross 
Tarawera. He noted that the flattened sedges along the lakeshore indicated the wave had 
been 9 inches to 1 ft in height (22.5-30 cm) (Smith, 1887). He also noted that "The weather 
was calm, and there was no agitation of the surface of the lake." Local Maori also observed 
this occurrence (Smith, 1887, p.24-25). Given the timing of these waves, it appears likely 
they were caused by a submarine debris flow or similar movement; no earthquake was 
reported as accompanying the waves. Alternatively there is a possibility of a small 
hydrothermal eruption occurring somewhere within the lake. Kearn (1988) suggests this 
may have happened beneath the Te Tapahoro arm. 
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Dr Ginders of the NZ Meteorological Service noted earthquakes to have been frequent in 
the months preceding 10 June. Slight shocks were observed on 26 January, and 30 March, 
sharper shocks on 22, 28 and 30 April (Ginders, 1886). Comparisons with previous years 
are difficult to establish however, as the meteorological station (which recorded such 
events) was only established on 1 January 1886 (Kearn, 1988). The Taupo Volcanic Zone 
as a whole is very active tectonically; earthquakes are not an unusual happening. 
Newspaper reports from 1886 also describe a few shocks from this period, but fail to 
mention the early 1886 tremors, inferring that they were nothing significant (Kearn, 1988). 
Some unusual occurrences in the geothermal system of the region were also noted prior to 
the eruption. These could perhaps have been more tangibly linked to the eruption than the 
earthquakes, they represented more of a change from past activity than the seismic activity 
that was noticed. In early May 1886 an eruption of water being thrown up to "several feet" 
was said to have taken place in Lake Rotorua (Evening News & East Coast Business 
Advisor, 10 May 1886, p.2, col.4). Later in May a "mud spring" was reported to have 
erupted in Rotorua, in the middle of the road near the Palace hotel, (at Ohinemutu, on the 
south shore of the lake). The Waikato Times account (29 May, 1886, p.2, col.8) described 
this eruption as throwing mud up to 120ft (36m) for a short time, while other springs were 
unusually quiet. However the Otago Daily Times reported the same event, and in this 
account the eruption reached a more plausible 12ft (3.6 m) (Otago Daily Times, 16 June 
1886, p.5, col. 7). 
Dr T. S. Ralph ventured to the Pink and White Terraces on the same day that the unusual 
waves were noted on Lake Tarawera (1 June). His report of that day was reproduced in S. 
Percy Smith's 1886 account of the eruption (p.24-25). On this visit Dr Ralph observed that 
mud from one of the geysers had recently been projected 20-25 yards from source (18-22.5 
metres), an event that was said to be quite unusual (Smith, 1886). 
These events, while unusual were not sufficient to alert anybody to the imminent eruption; 
earthquakes were neither noticeably more violent nor frequent. Furthermore geothermal 
anomalies had occurred at other times, and taken alone would certainly not portend that 
Tarawera was about to erupt. The unusual wave or waves in Lake Tarawera on 1 June may 
have suggested something unusual was happening, but for anyone to even consider that the 
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mountain was becoming active it would have taken more than this; Tarawera had not been 
active in centuries. 
2.2 A description of the eruption 
Accounts of the time of the start of the eruption of Tarawera vary according to the 
geographical location of the observers. The earliest time of the morning that unusual 
activity was recorded as occurring at is 1.15am, when the Haszard family of Te Wairoa 
were woken by an earthquake (NZ Herald, 14 June 1886, p.5, col.5). The earthquakes 
continued, and by 2am a number of the residents of Te Wairoa had noticed "an immense 
column of smoke ... charged with what seemed to be electricity. The edge of the cloud was 
quivering with flame ... " (Blythe, 1886). At a similar time, to the north of Lake Tarawera, 
and east of Lake Okataina, violent shaking of the ground awaked a party of pigeon 
shooters, including Alfred Warbrick. Warbrick estimated this as occurring at around 
1.40am ( earlier than most estimates), whereupon "a terrific roar burst throughout the night" 
(Warbrick, 1934, p.40-41). The slab hut in which they were encamped was fortunately well 
constructed. Tremors were violent enough that it was necessary for the men to hold on to 
the walls to remain standing. 
This close to the volcano the earthquakes accompanying the eruption were extremely 
violent, however their intensity would have decreased markedly over a short distance; in 
townships further away (e.g. Rotorua, Te Puke) many people were not even woken by the 
early earthquakes. The amount of shaking experienced varied depending on exact location. 
Most of those that did notice them described them as slight. For example the surveyor 
Henry Roche was camping with his survey team at Te Puna-a-Tuhoe, (Kawaha point) and 
could not at first decide whether the tent poles were moving because of ground movement 
or wind, deciding after a while he was feeling slight earthquakes (Roche, 1948). Other men 
in the camp were not even woken. In Rotorua itself, descriptions of the intensity of the 
earthquakes differed somewhat. This would be partly due to the different perspectives of 
those describing the earthquakes, but also to the differences in bedrock geology and type of 
sediments in different areas around the lake. Close to the lakeshore, in Ohinemutu, 
earthquakes were described by B. F. J. Edwards as having woken him at 1.30am. These 
were said to have rattled crockery, made doors squeak and set the clock swinging to and 
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fro (Thomas, 1886). Two severe shocks were also described, along with a rumbling noise. 
Postmaster R. D. Dansey also provided an account of the early hours of the morning of 10 
June 1886. He and his wife lived a few hundred metres away from Mr Edwards on the 
comer of Arawa and Fenton St (Kearn, 1988). They described many slight tremors, which 
gradually grew stronger until the windows of the house rattled. The intervals between the 
earthquakes lessened until "the whole place was quivering. There was no noise except the 
constant vibration of the house" (Kearn, 1988, p.117). However in Ohinemutu and central 
Rotorua, the substratum consists of loosely consolidated caldera sediments, whereas the 
bedrock under the surveyors' camp at Kawaha point is composed of rhyolite lavas (Milner, 
2001). Situated upon these loose sediments, both Edward's and the Dansey's houses would 
be prone to a lot more movement than the surveyors' camp sited upon solid rhyolite 
bedrock. 
Shortly after 2a.m. (Smith, 1887, p.27) reports "2.10 or 2.20",.though the exact time varies 
slightly according to different reports) the rumbling noise heard accompanying earthquakes 
increased to "a tremen,dous roar" (Roche, 1948). Anyone left sleeping would have been 
woken at this time. Tarawera had in no uncertain terms started to erupt. A more violent 
shake was described by many people at this time. Earthquakes continued throughout the 
night, however contemporary accounts of the eruption as viewed from Rotorua do not 
describe these in any detail once the eruption had begun. People were still able to move 
around without difficulty, and the shaking was not of a large enough magnitude to cause 
damage to buildings (Auckland Evening Star, 16 June, 1886). It is possible that the 
occasional china plate may have been lost - though even damage on this small scale is not 
reported (Kearn, 1988). 
The descriptions of the earthquakes given by residents ofRotorua infer that the intensity of 
the earthquakes would correspond to about MM4, in some places for short intervals 
possibly even MM5. The movement at Kawaha point would be less, at MM3 to MM4. This 
interpretation is based on descriptions of the effects of earthquakes given in the revised NZ 
1996 Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (Dowrick, 1996) (refer appendix 1 ). 
Th~ eruption column was visible from Rotorua, and the summits of Tarawera (Wahanga, 
Ruawahia and Tarawera) were able to be seen from the survey camp at Kawaha point. 
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From there a high thin column of black smoke, charged with lightning, was evident over 
the eastern end of Ruawahia, soon to be accompanied by "showers of red hot scoria and 
great masses of rock, at white heat... thrown up to about 1500 feet" ( 450 m) (Roche, 
1948). Postmaster R. Dansey described "an immense column of fire ... 300 to 400 yards in 
width ... Huge streaks of yellow, red, black and grey ran straight up the column" (Kearn, 
1988, p.1.19). Panic ensued amongst much of the populace, causing many inhabitants of 
Rotorua to flee, either on foot or by horse (Kearn, 1988). 
Closer to the volcano, Alfred Warbrick and his companions witnessed the eruption from 
just north of the lake. "It sent up sheets of flaming matter to an enormous height, great 
quivering masses of fire. The flames went up in quick spasms of expulsion. White-hot ash 
and stones and debris were hurled far into the sky." (Warbrick, 1934, p.41-42) The slab hut 
that Warbrick sheltered in, although frighteningly close to the activity, offered an 
unparalleled vantage point to the eruption of Tarawera. "Wahanga was the first centre of 
volcanic explosion, then came two distinct points of eruption on Ruawahia... and on 
Tarawera there also developed a flaming crater ... I saw the south end of Tarawera peak 
split right down and open up, vomiting forth an immense volume of flame" (Warbrick, 
1934, p.42-23). Other accounts also describe this sequence of events, as the fissure 
gradually opened from the Northeast to southwest of the volcano. Within half an hour of 
the first eruption of magma, by approximately 2.30am, craters along the entire 8 km length 
of Tarawera were erupting basaltic ash, lapilli, scoria and bombs (Cole & Nairn, 1976). 
Scoria up to 64 mm in diameter has been found 12 km from the vent source (Walker et al., 
1984). Ash and lapilli blanketed a large proportion of the Bay of Plenty region (Cole & 
Nairn, 1976). The height of the ash cloud was estimated to be approximately 9500m from 
the top of the mountain, as measured from Gisborne, (Williams, 1886). From Auckland, 
where the ash cloud was also visible, a height of 14500m above sea level was estimated 
(Smith, 1886). Walker et al., (1984) calculate a much higher eruption cloud height - almost 
28 km for the paroxysmal part of the eruption, based upon estimates of the quantity of 
material dispersed over the Bay of Plenty during the eruption. 
The event was explosive as opposed to effusive, i.e. there were no lava flows. While some 
observers thought they had seen lava flows, these are supposed to have been welded scoria 
and bombs from strombolian type activity sliding down the face of the mountain (Cole & 
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Nairn, 1976). No lava flows are visible today, nor were any seen by S. Percy Smith on his 
survey of the Tarawera area in July/August 1886 (Smith, 1886). As the eruption continued 
the centre of activity shifted to the southeast. It had started at Wahanga dome, then an 8 km 
long fissure opened along the top of the mountain, splitting the domes of Ruawahia and 
Tarawera. However the fissure did not stop there, craters continued to form to the southeast 
until the creation of a final explosion crater at present day Waimangu. The total extent of 
the fissure was 17 km from Wahanga dome to Waimangu (Cole & Nairn, 1976). However 
the style of eruption was to differ to the southwest of Tarawera Mountain. · Lake 
Rotomahana was situated here, above what was an intensely active geothermal field prior 
to the eruption. The ascending magma intersected this geothermal field, and consequently 
interacted with groundwater, causing large phreatomagmatic explosions (Nairn, 1979). The 
eruptions here were thus much more explosive than those on Tarawera Mountain. Lake 
Rotomahana, as it then existed, was completely destroyed, the explosions formed a line of 
craters up to 180 m deep, ejecting 5 x 108 m3 of material in total (Nairn, 1979). Lake 
sediments (mud and sand) were dispersed over a wide area, burying the villages of Te 
Ariki, Moura and Te Wairoa (figure 1.2). A large eruption column generated by the 
eruption reached from 10-13 km high, carrying ash beyond the coast of the Bay of Plenty 
(Nairn, 1979). Pyroclastic base· surges formed, probably from both primary lateral blasts 
and from collapse of the eruption column, travelling up to 6 km from source (Nairn, 1979). 
These destroyed or buried everything in their path. Only small amounts of basalt were 
erupted in these phreatic explosions, however the presence of some large basaltic blocks at 
Waimangu suggests that it was the interaction of basaltic magma with groundwater that 
caused these eruptions, as opposed to it being a purely hydrothermal eruption (Nairn, 
1979). 
The Rotomahana explosions began over an hour after the magmatic eruption of Tarawera, 
possibly at 3.20am when a large shock was felt (Cole & Nairn, 1976). Hector (1886) 
indicates the phreatic eruptions began shortly before 4am, however there were no survivors 
close to Rotomahana to give a more accurate time (Nairn, 1979). 
By 5.30 - 6am the paroxysmal stage of the eruption was over, activity at Tarawera had 
subsided to just steam and gas emissions (Cole 1970; Cole & Nairn 1976). In this short 
time (3-4 hours) at least 1.3 kin3 of material was erupted from Tarawera and Rotomahana, 
Chapter 2 The Tarawera 1886 eruption 17 --=-------------=------------------------
and dispersed over the surrounding area (Pullar & Birrell, 1973). At Rotomahana and 
Waimangu, steam emissions continued after the Tarawera eruption subsided - until August 
1886 clouds of steam obscured the fissure from view at Rotomahana (Cole & Nairn, 1976). 
The rift from Rotomahana to Waimangu remained intensely active hydrothermally. Smith 
(1886) reports that a hydrothermal eruption from Waimangu on 15 June produced a steam 
column that reached a measured height of 15,400 ft ( 4620m). His description of the crater 
of Rotomahana dating from August 1886 is of an intensely active thermal field. " ... a 
dreadful mass of boiling mud, black and brown in colour, with seething pools of steaming 
water or liquid mud, sometimes cast up into fumaroles ejecting steam, at others vomiting 
forth stones and mud with a noise like the roar of innumerable steam engines ... large 
bodies of stones, sand and mud ... scattered far and wide over the mud covered hills around 
the margin" (Smith, 1886, p.58). Alfred Warbrick also gives a description of the crater of 
Rotomahana obtained during a perilous descent into it in July 1886. Hot streams of mud 
were described as flowing across a fairly firm ground, however his visit was cut short 
when the main crater burst into life, necessitating his immediate evacuation. Even when he 
had reached the lip of the crater he and his party reported having to dodge ejecta from the 
crater, while being showered with fmer sand and mud particles (Warbrick, 1934). 
Waimangu Geyser itself remained active until November 1904, commonly ejecting muddy 
water and blocks up to heights of 150 m, and occasionally to 460 m (Cole and Nairn, 
1976). The region from Tarawera to Waimangu remains a very active thermal area to date. 
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2.3 Effects of the eruption on the local area & populace 
The morning of 10 June 1886 revealed a landscape around Tarawera that was completely 
changed from the day before. Thick deposits of ash, mud and scoria blanketed the 
countryside, fissures had opened up, trees were gone, or at the least their foliage was 
stripped. The villages of Te Ariki and Moura were completely destroyed, not even leaving 
a trace of their existence (figure 2.1) 
Figure 2. 1 The site of the village of Te Ariki after the eruption. Photograph by C. Spencer, 27 
July, 1886 
While many estimates of the number of casualties hover around the 150 mark, the most 
recent estimate is that about 120 people were killed as a result of the eruption (Lowe et al., 
2001). Fortunately the region wasn't very densely populated and the eruption occurred in 
winter when few tourists were around, or the number of deaths could have been 
substantially higher. 
The eruption ejected over 1.3 km3 of material, dispersing it over the Bay of Plenty region 
(Pullar & Birrell, 1973). For most of the duration of the eruption the wind had been 
blowing to the northeast, as is evidenced by the distribution of eruption ejecta. However 
the records taken by Dr Ginders at Rotorua's meterological station show that winds during 
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the month of June 1886 were quite variable (Kearn, 1988). Should the eruption have 
occurred a few days earlier or later the results might have been quite different. 
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of eruption ejecta over the Bay of Plenty region. After Thomas, I 888. 
(lsopachs are in centimetres) 
Distally, the furthest settlements to be significantly affected by the eruption were those 
along the coast of the Bay of Plenty, from Tauranga to Opotiki. Along the east coast, 
significant ashfall was encountered from Tolaga Bay northwards (Kearn, 1988). 
Tauranga's experience of the eruption was recounted in the BOP Times, 12 June 1886. The 
paper reported that it began between 1 and 2am on the morning of the 101'\ when residents 
noticed vivid flashes of lightning shooting upwards from a dense black cloud in the 
southern sky. Around 4am a series of "severe" earthquake shocks were felt, but these do 
not appear to have been severe enough to cause any damage. Rumbling noises were heard 
also, and by 7am a "leaden cloud" was approaching the city. This ash cloud enveloped 
Tauranga in darkness, showering the town and surrounding environs in "fine sulphurous 
dust". S. Percy Smith (1886, p.30) reports this as occurring at 6am, but agrees with the 
paper as to the depth of the deposit - about half an inch (1 .25 cm). The ashfall naturally 
caused some degree of anxiety. The mayor, R. C. Jordan, after consulting with W. M. 
Commons of the Northern Steamship Company decided to send a telegram to Auckland 
requesting steamers in case an evacuation was warranted. Concerned residents were 
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making it clear that they wanted to leave (Kearn, 1988). Steamers were made ready, but not 
required - by 11.30am the ash had settled enough that sunlight was able to penetrate the 
darkness, (BOP Times, 12 June 1886). It was realised that Tauranga was in no immediate 
danger, and messages began to be received that indicated that the source of the ash was 
somewhere in the Rotorua-Taupo region (Kearn, 1988). The ashfall caused some 
inconvenience and discomfort to the residents of Tauranga. Shopkeepers who had opened 
at 9am, though the town was in darkness, were forced to close again due to the influx of 
volcanic ash into their premises (BOP Times, 12 June 1886). In the morning while the ash 
was falling, goggles and netting to protect the face and eyes were reported to be in great 
demand (NZ Herald, 17 July 1886). "Getting into one's mouth and nose was almost 
suffocating. . . Everything is covered with this stuff, it being so very fine the consequence 
was it worked its way into places where one would imagine it was a matter of impossibility 
for anything to penetrate, and even things in glass-cases and drawers were smothered with 
it" (NZ Herald, 17 July 1886, p.5, col. 2). 
Tauranga was on the periphery of region affected by ashfall. The mean size of ash 
particles, and of the thickness of ash deposits has been shown to decay exponentially 
according to distance from source (Pyle, 1989). As it was only the distal part of the ash 
cloud that affected the town, it was fine ash rather than coarser fragments that reached 
Tauranga - hence reports of ash being "very fine dust" or "like Portland cement" (NZ 
Herald, 17 July 1886, p.5, col.2). The ash was of nuisance value, and an irritant to 
breathing whilst falling, but caused little real damage. 
Further to the east, Te Puke and Maketu did not fare so well as Tauranga. Te Puke received 
a deposit of 7.5 cm of ash. Although only 10 km away from Te Puke, Maketu reportedly 
only received 2.5 cm (Smith, 1886). In the short term this almost proved disastrous for 
local farmers. The Bay of Plenty was extensively farmed at this time. Tauranga and 
Whakatane counties combined officially had 72 sheep farmers, and 37196 sheep. Also in 
the counties were almost 14000 head of cattle, over 2500 horses and 3000 pigs (Statistics 
of the colony of NZ for the year 1886). James Tanner, who farmed 220 acres near Te Puke 
described the landscape after the volcano as "a mass of ashes" (Tanner, 1886). The 
immediate view was that all food for livestock was destroyed, Tanner described local 
farmers driving cattle into the ·bush so that they may have a chance to survive, it was after 
Chapter 2 The Tarawera 1886 eru'J}tion 21 ----"------------"----------------------
all winter and feed was not plentiful. Some farmers had reserves of hay, others tried to 
drive stock to Tauranga. Some losses were sustained doing this, hungry stock tried to eat 
the poisonous tutu plant, which survived at the roadside. Carcases of horses and sheep 
were seen at intervals along the road (NZ Herald, 28 June 1886). Further east around Te 
Teko things were worse, 25 cm of ash and scoria fell on farms here (Kearn, 1988). The 
inhabitants of the town all evacuated, except for the schoolmaster and his wife, who 
became disorientated and hid under a hawthorn hedge for the duration of the eruption 
(Kearn, 1988). It would take longer for stock to be returned to this area. However for most 
of the farmers in the Bay of Plenty, the emergency was relieved after a week by rain, 
which uncovered enough grass for stock to survive (NZ Herald, 17 June, 1886, p.6). New 
growth soon appeared in the spring; damage to pasture was only temporary (Tanner, 1886). 
Earthquakes in the Te Puke area were probably similar to those experienced in Tauranga. 
As in reports from Tauranga, the tremors were described as severe. Tanner described his 
house as ''tottering" during the tremors. Several other reports also describe severe shaking 
"The house was rocking like a ship on a stormy night" (Swarbrick, 1886, in Kearn, 1988, 
p.108). However other residents in Te Puke, (e.g. Mr Steel, the local schoolteacher) were 
not even woken by the events of 10 June (Kearn, 1988). Damage from shaking does not 
appear to have occurred, accounts of stronger shocks are presumably exaggerated. This 
area remained dark until about 10am, when it began to clear. By midday it was "no darker 
than on an ordinary dull winter day" (Sinclair, 1886). 
Whakatane, like Te Puke received a deposit of about 7.5 cm of ash (Smith, 1886). The ash 
here was coarser than that encountered further west in Tauranga, the bottom 5 cm were 
described in the NZ Herald (15 June 1886, p.6) as "heavy coarse dark sand". The upper 2.5 
cm was a lighter colour. This would represent the later part of the eruption - the 
Rotomahana phreatic eruption. Earthquakes were also frequently felt, but were not very 
strong (Kearn, 1988). Opotiki received about half of the amount of ash that Whakatane 
received (Smith, 1886). 
Gisborne did not receive any ash, however the ash cloud passed over the town, and the 
explosions of the eruption were heard (Williams, 1886). 
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Given its proximity to the eruption, Rotorua was very fortunate to have escaped being 
heavily damaged or even destroyed. As it was only a light dusting of ash fell on Rotorua -
less than 1 cm (Smith, 1886). Rotorua did experience unusual hydrothermal activity during 
the eruption though. Reports vary somewhat - there are some exaggerated accounts which 
describe events third-hand. However existing mud pools and springs were described as 
becoming more active (Kearn, 1988). In this same account a spring on Rangiruru St. was 
said by Postmaster Dansey to have begun spouting water to 50 ft (15 m). This height may 
or may not be accurate, but the outbreak of the spring or vent as a geyser was heard and 
then seen by some of the sanatorium employees who were approaching it (NZ Herald, 15 
June 1886). Several accounts exist describing other new hydrothermal vents or springs that 
appeared during the morning of 10 June (Kearn, 1988). 
The combination of earthquakes, hydrothermal eruptions and the spectacle of the volcano 
itself was enough cause panic amongst some of the residents of Rotorua and Ohinemutu. 
Some fled their houses "In the inky atmosphere, rapidly flitting forms were encountered as 
they fled forth in scanty apparel" (Black, 1913, p.17). Some thought the day of Judgement 
had come (NZ Herald, 15 June 1886). Arthur Burrows, resident in Rotorua saw the geysers 
at sulphur point in action, and the glow of the volcano beyond them, but attributed the 
glow to the thermal activity at sulphur point (Kearn, 1988). This caused him to run through 
the main street crying out "Sulphur Point has blown up, Rotorua is sinking!" (Kearn, 1988, 
p.123). The NZ Herald, on 11 June (p.6) reported that "Many left their houses in their 
nightdresses and (with) shawls around them only, carrying their babies and young children, 
running with one aim to flee from this devouring element, which was expected every 
moment to engulf the entire community, so great was the terror of the people." Some fled 
to Ngongotaha, others carried on heading for Tauranga or Cambridge (Kearn, 1988). Henry 
Roche observed many of these people fleeing past the survey camp at Kawaha point. He 
recalled one group that shouted, "It's the end of the world, we're going." Though they did 
not reply to his question of "where to?" (Roche, 1948). Many stopped at Te Awahou, (12 
km from Rotorua) prompted by the cold and wet and exhaustion to stay at the schoolhouse 
where the local schoolmaster put on a fire to warm around 50 refugees who arrived in the 
night and early morning (Roche, 1948). 
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Although the eruption caused some to panic in Rotorua, effects in the town were not the 
catastrophe these residents expected. For those living closer to the volcano however, the 
effects of the eruption would be devastating. In the immediate vicinity of Tarawera and 
Rotomahana, several Maori settlements existed. On the shores of Lake Tarawera were Te 
Ariki and Moura, on the edge of lake Rotomakariri was the small settlement of 
Waingongongo. All of these would be utterly destroyed, all residents killed. Te Wairoa, 
approximately 1 km to the SE of Lake Tarawera would also suffer badly, though most 
people in this location survived. 
Due to the logistics of procuring boats, and then getting them from Rotorua to Lake 
Tarawera through mud, ash and fallen trees, a rescue party sent to Moura and Te Ariki was 
not able to start the search for survivors until 14 June. The journey to Wairoa, and thence 
to the lakeside where the boats were to be launched was no easy task. Draught horses were 
used to pull a 24 ft (7.2 m) whaleboat and a 16 ft (4.8 m) skiff (Warbrick, 1934). They had 
to contend with not only the mud and ash, but also fallen trees around lake Tikitapu. These 
needed to be either removed, or the boats had to be jacked over them (Warbrick, 1934). In 
places the party had to bodily lift the whole wagon over the fallen trees (NZ Herald, 17 
June 1886, p.5). A boat was necessary - reaching these places overland would be even 
more difficult, especially if one was attempting to carry injured survivors back. Joseph and 
Arthur Warbrick, along with a man known as Kean tried to reach Te Ariki overland from 
Te Wairoa on the Ii\ but could not get there before nightfall, and had to return. A second 
attempt on the 13th by Warbrick and C. H. Humphries reportedly reached the northern side 
ofRotomahana,just above the site of Te Ariki. Humphries described the site as "a mass of 
liquid mud" (The Press, 15 June 1886, p.3). The unstable nature of the mud and ash 
deposits was seen by the rescue party in the boats during the trip around the southern shore 
of the lake; several large slips of mud occurred at this time, sliding from the top and sides 
of the hills into the lake (Harrow, 1886). At the site of the village of Moura, nothing was 
left but very liquid mud, those who attempted to land there sank about 3 ft (90 cm) into it 
(Kearn, 1988). Trees that were growing there were found floating in the lake about a mile 
offshore (Kearn, 1988). A scene of devastation again greeted the rescuers at Te Ariki 
(figure 2.1). This village was only 1.5 km north of the Rotomahana craters. Again nothing 
was left to indicate it had ever been there, where it had been was now a bank of mud, 
estimated to be anything between 25 feet (7.5 metres) (Mair, 1886; Edwards, 1886) and 50 
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feet (15 metres) thick (Harrow, 1886). Later examination of these deposits shows them to 
contain cross-laminated primary bed forms - indicating that the village was buried by 
surge flows (Nairn, 1979). Even had the rescue party arrived earlier, there would have been 
no chance of survival. Where the village of Waingongongo had been was now a large 
explosion crater, leaving little doubt as to the fate of the Ngati Rangitihi inhabitants 
(Kearn, 1988). A similar fate befell Rangihuea, the Te Ariki Chief and colleagues at 
Rotomahana itself, possibly on Puai Island (NZ Herald, 25 June 1886, p.6) or beside the 
Pink Terraces (Kearn, 1988). No trace was ever found of bodies from these locations. 
TeWairoa 
Figure 2.3 Tephra at Te Wairoa, local resident "Rewiri" and his whare. Photograph by A. 
Ryan, 13 June, 1886. 
Further away from the craters of Rotomahana and the fissure of Tarawera itself, the village 
of Te Wairoa was close enough to receive a heavy deposit of ash and mud, but far enough 
that there were survivors. S. Percy Smith, surveying the district a few days after the 
eruption (from 13 to 16 June) measured the depth of the deposit of ash, scoria and mud at 
Wairoa, finding it to be 2 ft 8 inches (80 cm) deep. In some places it had drifted up against 
fences or trees etc to an estimated depth of 5 to 7 ft (1.5-2.1 m) (Pond & Smith, 1887). In 
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Early July Professors Brown and Thomas, of Auckland University also measured the depth 
of the deposit at Te Wairoa, coming up with results of 2 ft 3 inches and 2 ft 10 inches, ~68 
cm and 85 cm respectively (Kearn, 1988). 
Scoria and ash began to fall sometime after the beginning of the eruption, long enough that 
Joseph McRae (the proprietor of the Rotomahana hotel) and about 12 observers from Te 
Wairoa) had a chance to get up, walk to the church at Te Mu, view the spectacle of the 
eruption for at least ten minutes, (Humphries, 1886) and then return to the Terrace Hotel 
(McRae, 1886). Five minutes or so later ash and scoria began to rain down upon the roof 
(Humphries, 1886). Clara Haszard, daughter of the local schoolteachers described stones 
clattering on the roof from about 3am. "The noise was so great we could not hear each 
other speak ... " (Haszard, 1886). Both iron roofed wooden buildings of the European 
settlers and Maori whares were situated in this village. The accumulation of material upon 
these buildings proved too much for most of them to sustain, those that did survive were 
generally propped up with timbers by the occupants in an effort to keep the roof from 
collapsing. Maori whares tended to fare better under the weight of the ash, partly due to the 
steeper pitch of the roofs, but also because of the strong ridgepoles used in their 
construction. Even these required additional reinforcement in some instances. The roof of 
the large whare of Guide Sophia was reported to have begun to sag, before being propped 
up (Kearn, 1988). Fortunately this held, as it sheltered many of Te Wairoa's inhabitants 
from the ash, scoria and mud. Some of the ash was said to have slid off owing to the 
steepness of the roof (Kearn, 1988). The wharepuni (principal building) "Hinemihi" was 
successfully propped up in a similar fashion, using wooden benches to support the roof 
(The Press, 16 June 1886, p.3). Like some of the colonial buildings it had a wooden tile 
roof, but in this case stood up to the bombardment of volcanic ejecta. 
Most of the buildings of the European settlers were roofed with had corrugated iron, some 
with wooden tiles. The roofs of the buildings not only collapsed under the weight of the 
ash, but were also penetrated by some of the larger scoria clasts. The Haszards, local 
schoolteachers, had "stones" break through the roof and lodge in the ceiling and walls of 
their house (Lundius, 1935; Haszard, 1886). Later in the night the roof collapsed, a falling 
beam striking and killing Charles Haszard (A. Haszard, 1912). Five members of this family 
were killed by the eruption, the ash and mud burying them alive (Kearn, 1988). Volcanic 
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ejecta was also reported to have broken windows in the Rotomahana Hotel (Humphries, 
1886). This can be seen in photographs taken on the 13 June, 3 days after the eruption 
(Kearn, 1988). 
Figure 2.4. The ruins of the Rotomahana hotel, I 3 June I 886. Photograph by A. Ryan 
The roof and verandah of this hotel were both to fail due to the accumulation of material, 
the collapse of the latter killing English tourist Edwin Bainbridge (Kearn, 1988). Before 
the collapse of the main part of the roof of the hotel, the detached kitchen and pantry had 
already collapsed, as had the bar (McRae, 1886a). 
Contemporary photographs of Te Wairoa show thick accumulations of ash and mud 
covering everything, those roofs that remain have accumulations of up to ~ 40 cm of ash 
upon them. In the case of the hen-house in figure 2.5, the survival of the shed is due to the 
fact that the roof was shored up. This was performed by H. Lundius as he sheltered here 
with J. C. Blythe and Clara Haszard after the house of the Haszard family collapsed 
(Kearn, 1988). More ash may have accumulated on some roofs, however by the time that 
photographs were taken it is possible that some ash may have either fallen off or been 
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blown off the roofs. Steeper roofs naturally had less ash accumulate on them, though even 
these did not always survive. The church at Te Mu, overlooking Te Wairoa, was one such 
Figure 2.5 Tephra accumulation on the Haszardfamily hen-house. Photograph by C. Spencer, 
8 July, 1886 
Figure 2.6 The remains of the Church at Te Mu. Photograph by A. Ryan, 13 June, 1886 
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example - although the ash was more prone to sliding off the steeper roof, the thickness of 
the ash here (the photograph shows drifts of over two metres) sufficed to collapse the roof 
and destroy the church (figure 2.6). 
Also on slightly higher more exposed ground than Te Wairoa itself was the settlement of 
Tokiniho. This was situated on a hill above the west shore of Lake Tarawera, about 3 km 
north of Wairoa (Kearn, 1988). This would place it in the vicinity of the present day 
Spencer Road settlement. A search party that reached it found a collapsed whare, and about 
10 bodies inside (NZ Herald, 14 July 1886, p.5). There were no survivors (Kearn, 1988). 
Trees in the Wairoa Township were stripped of all foliage by the falling debris, but largely 
remained standing. This was not the case for much of Tikitapu bush, around the road 
between Lake Tikitapu (Blue Lake) and the crest of the hill before Rotorua. In this region 
the road ran (and still runs) through the bottom of a valley bearing S.E., the direction from 
which a storm was blowing during the night of the eruption, and also the direction of 
Rotomahana. While this area was beyond the extent of lateral surges from Rotomahana 
(Nairn, 1979), the combination of wind and the weight of mud carried by that wind served 
to fell many trees in the bush at this locality. In the base of the valley trees were largely 
felled parallel to the road, those remaining had the South east sides of their trunks coated in 
mud (Pond & Smith, 1887). The resulting blockage of the road served to hamper both 
evacuation and rescue efforts. The road was impenetrable for horse drawn carriages etc, at 
least for those without the manpower of the rescue party sent through on 13 June. Buggies 
etc were abandoned at the start of the bush, people and horses were able to make it through 
(Roche, 1886). Even then it proved difficult, Dr James Hectors party journeyed from 
Rotorua to Te Wairoa on 13 June. Realising how unstable the Rotomahana mud that 
draped the landscape was, Hector advised an evacuation of Wairoa - if it rained it would 
become even more difficult to get through (Kearn, 1988). Nevertheless it was with great 
difficulty that they made their way out to Rotorua the next day. "Every few yards men had 
to stop and breathe. The mud on their boots weighed several pounds. Mr Pope, the 
Inspector of Native schools, got into a place from which he was unable to extricate 
himself, and it was necessary to get a man to go in with a horse to pull him out." (NZ 
Herald, 15 June 1886, p.5). This occurred in the flat area next to Lake Tikitapu. The 
settlement in this area was also heavily damaged by the eruption. Travelling to Wairoa on 
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10 June surveyor H. Roche estimated the mud on the road to be 1 ½ ft deep ( 45 cm) (Kearn, 
1988). It was certainly enough to destroy the sawyers' cottages. In addition, slips coming 
down off the hills would cause further obstacles for those trying leave or reach Wairoa. 
Although were trees felled here partly because of the strong winds on the night of the 
eruption, the falling mud, ash and scoria served to strip almost all foliage off plants and 
trees from Tikitapu bush to Tarawera. This fact was noted by many observers at the time. 
Effects on Lifelines 
While infrastructure in terms of lifelines was obviously much less established than today, 
telegraph wires did exist in the region. Limited telephonic communications were also 
available, but only within major towns or for short distances (Kearn, 1988). Telegraphic 
communication was thus the most usual and effective means of communication. Ashfall 
from the eruption brought down the lines between Rotorua and Maketu, poles were 
downed in quite a few places. A lineman from Rotorua estimated that each pole was 
supporting 50 pounds of mud (~23 kg), and described the lines as being "as thick as a 
candle with mud" (NZ Herald, 14 June 1886). This left Rotorua direct communication with 
Taupo and Napier, though retransmission from Napier was still possible (Kearn, 1988). 
Rotorua was thus able to communicate with the outside world after the eruption - although 
there is no question the outside world knew of the eruption, given that the eruption column 
was seen from Auckland, and the explosions heard from Christchurch! ( Christchurch Star, 
11 June 1886, p.3). 
Although many of the lines survived, they became temporarily unworkable during the 
eruption. This was noted to have occurred from 5.50am until 9.50am at the exchange in 
Maketu. The telegraphist attributed this to be due to the electrical disturbance that 
accompanied the eruption (Smith, 1886). Similarly, shortly after the commencement of the 
eruption, the telegraphist and postmaster at Rotorua, (Roger Dansey) found strong electric 
currents did not allow transmission of messages. He was unable to get through to anywhere 
until contacting Napier at 8am on the morning of the 10th (Dansey, 1886). Lightning strikes 
associated with the electrical disturbances caused by the eruption also caused damage to 
telegraph lines between Maketu and Opotiki, temporarily cutting this link (Auckland 
Evening Star, 15 June 1886, p.2). 
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The only other lifelines present in the region were roads - railways did not yet exist in the 
central or eastern Bay of Plenty, the closest lines were at Cambridge and Oxford (Tirau) 
(Kearn, 1988). The road between Te Wairoa and Rotorua was one of the worst affected, 
difficulties experienced by travellers on this route immediately after the eruption have 
already been described. However sediment movement would also cause problems days and 
weeks after the eruption. On 14 June a landslide of mud and volcanic debris came down 
from the steep hills above the North end of Tikitapu and blocked the road to all wheeled 
traffic (NZ Herald, 18 June 1886, p.6). 
This route experienced further problems in mid July, with subsidence occurring between 
Tikitapu and the ridge before Rotorua. This took place on a dramatic scale, contemporary 
photographs and drawings illustrating gaping fissures opening across the road. 
Figure 2. 7: Subsidence on the Te Wairoa Road. Photograph by JC. Blythe, July, 1886 
One of these fissures was estimated by S. Percy Smith (1887) to be about 90 ft deep (27 
m), a figure which appears accurate given the scale of the figure seen on its edge in figure 
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2.7. Fault movement during the eruption caused the formation of these subterranean 
crevices. Sediment movement within these could occur quite gradually, allowing the 
surface to appear undisturbed. However water from winter rains would rapidly exacerbate 
this, until eventually the surface above the fracture would catastrophically fail, exposing 
the deep fissures underneath. Similar fissures were seen to have opened in the region to the 
Southwest of Tarawera, from Waikorua (Earthquake Flat) to Maungakakaramea (Rainbow 
mountain) (Smith, 1886). This area is intensely faulted, and still actively subsiding, owing 
to the general extension and stretching of the earth's crust in Taupo Volcanic Zone (Cole, 
1990). 
Post-Eruption Lake Level Changes 
Changes in lake level due to sediment movement occurred after the eruption in Lakes 
Rotorua, Rotokakahi and most notably, Tarawera. Lake Rotorua appeared to have risen 
about 15 inches (37.5 cm) relative to the shoreline on the morning of 10 June (NZ Herald, 
14 June 1886, p.5). However subsequent investigation showed this to be partly due to 
localised subsidence around the shoreline (Kearn, 1988). The deposition of ash and mud 
into the lake would also account for a rise in lake level. Lake Rotokakahi ( Green Lake) 
also experienced a rise in lake level after the eruption, but the rise here was due to the 
outlet of the lake being blocked by mud (NZ Herald, 19 June 1886, p.6). The Ngati Tu 
hapu living at Kaiteriria on the south corner of the lake had to abandon their village as the 
rising lake gradually engulfed it (Kearn, 1988). It wasn't until almost a year later that the 
mud barrier was overtopped, and the lake drained a little (NZ Herald, 15 June 1887, p.6). 
The level of Lake Tarawera gradually rose over the years following the eruption, as the 
outlet became choked with debris, indirectly caused by the eruption. By 1904, the lake had 
risen 12m from its pre-eruption level (White et al., 1997). The collapse of a tephra bank on 
1 November led to flash floods that inundated an area of 150 km2 (White et al., 1997). This 
darn was located about 1 km downstream of the current outlet, at the mouth of a tributary 
gulley that extends from the Tapahoro lava flows about 5 km north (Hodgson & Nairn, 
2000). It was possibly a fan deposited from both older rhyolitic material and 1886 scoria 
carried down this tributary that caused the dam that blocked the outlet of the lake 
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(Hodgson & Nairn, 2000). In three days the lake fell 3.3 m, at times ~700 m3 s·1 of water 
was being discharged from the lake (Maclaren, 1906). At Kawerau, peak flow in the 
Tarawera River has been estimated to have been 800 m3 s·1, compared to a normal present 
day average flow of 20 m3 s·1 (Hodgson & Nairn, 2000). The deposition of material carried 
downstream in the flood caused intense aggradation of the Tarawera riverbed, resulting in 
the river avulsing across the plains and causing further flooding problems. 
This event can be regarded as the last major physical effect of the 1886 eruption. It is 
interesting to note that the ash and scoria deposit has not undergone any substantial rilling 
or surface erosion since deposition. White et al., (1997) attribute this to the high 
permeability of the tephra deposit and gentle relief of the area. This is in sharp contrast to 
erosion of the Rotomahana mud deposit following the eruption. Rapid growth of plants in 
the spring following the eruption also helped consolidate the deposits of the 1886 eruption. 
The area now is clothed in lush native bush, forestry plantations and farms. 117 years after 
the eruption there is little visible in the natural environment to remind one of the events of 
10 June 1886. 
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Chapter 3 
Basaltic volcanic hazards generated by Mount Etna, Italy: effects of the 
2002 eruption on the province of Catania 
3.1 Background 
Mount Etna is Europe's largest volcano, and one of the most frequently active (after 
Stromboli). The volcano is situated within the province of Catania, on the east coast of 
Sicily. This province is home to almost 1,100,000 people, all of whom are susceptible to 
hazards created by the volcanic activity of this mountain. Of these 1,100,000 inhabitants 
about 350,000 live at the base of Etna, in the city of Catania. Many smaller towns are 
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Figure 3.1 location map 
di ea ea n ,a of Mt. Etna and Catania 
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On 27 October 2002, a flank eruption began that would last 3 months, finally ending on 28 
January 2003. Eruptive fissures opened on the south and east flanks of the volcano, with 
both effusive and explosive activity ensuing. Aa lava flows caused damage to property 
proximal to the volcano, while strombolian and especially hawaiian style activity created 
large amounts of basaltic ash that would cause damage to more distal areas. Volcanic 
tremor / earthquakes also resulted in damage to local areas. 
During November and early December 2002 fieldwork was undertaken to more accurately 
ascertain the effects of the volcanic activity, especially of basaltic ash, on the populace and 
infrastructure of the province of Catania. 
Defining these effects provides a useful tool to help quantify the expected effects of the 
next basaltic eruption in TVZ, especially one from Tarawera. The basaltic ash erupted 
from Etna is expected to create similar hazards to some of those that will be produced in a 
near-future eruption of Tarawera. Although Catania is situated at the base of Etna, the size 
of the volcano (3330 m) is such that the approximate centre of Catania (taken as Giardino 
Bellini) is 25 km from the vents active on Etna in 2002/2003. Similarly, Rotorua is about 
25 km from the 1886 fissure that bisects Tarawera Volcano. Villages/settlements exist 
closer to the vents/fissure in both cases. 
3.2 Hazard types 
Hazards associated with the eruption resulted from ashfall, volcanic tremors . and lava 
flows. Lapilli and bomb fallout was restricted to areas in the immediate vicinity of the 
vent. S02 emission, though in large quantities (up to 20,000 tons per day) (Bruno et al., 
2002) was sufficiently distant from inhabited areas to cause no health problems to 
residents, being adequately dissipated by winds. However concern amongst local citizens 
about the gaseous emissions of Etna led to some people wearing ash masks even when ash 
was not falling. These would of course have been ineffective had S02 or H2S been a 
problem, but reassured those unwilling to trust official information. 
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3.2.1 Lava flows 
Several aa lava flows were emitted during the eruption. These caused some damage to 
forestry plantations and infrastructure on the slopes of the volcano, as they flowed 
downslope, destroying everything in their path. Damage began with the destruction of a ski 
school and the hotel "Le Betulle" at Piano Provenzana by lava flows which began on 27 
October, the first day of the eruption. 
Figure 3.2 Le Betulle Hotel Remains (Photograph by M. Fulle) 
These same lava flows also threatened forests near Linguaglossa. However, although 
destructive, the slow movement of the flows (usually metres rather than kilometres per 
hour) allowed for mitigation strategies to be employed. An attempt to protect the pine 
forests was made by Ground crews from the Vigil de Fuoco (the fire department) and 
Corpo Forestale (the forest corps), as fires created by these flows could easily spread. 
These crews were supported by helicopters water bombing lava flows from the air 
(L 'unione Sarda, 29/10/02). This strategy succeeded in restricting damage to that caused 
directly by the lava flows, stopping fires spreading far beyond the edges of those flows. 
Nevertheless over 80 hectares of forest were destroyed (La Sicilia, 2/11/02). In addition to 
the loss of forest, several roads on the slopes of the volcano were destroyed when 3 m high 
aa lava flows passed over them (Figure 3 .3 ). 
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Figure 3.3 An aa lava flow in the Ragabo Forest destroys the road above Linguaglossa, November 2002 
By 2 November the flow approaching Linguaglossa had stopped, 80 m from diversionary 
earthworks and 5 km from the town. Similar fire-fighting strategies were employed as 
further flows approached forests on the west side of Etna. 
Direct damage from the flows themselves affected also affected other types of 
infrastructure. Ski lifts on the southern slopes of Etna, near Rifugia Sapienza, were 
destroyed by lava flows on 24 November. An irrigation reservoir near Casa Santa Barbara 
was emptied to minimise the risk of a phreatomagmatic explosion when a 4 km long lava 
flow approached on 17 November, this flow fortunately stopped a few metres before the 
reservou. 
Creating earthworks to divert lava flows has in the past been employed with some success 
on Mt. Etna, attempts at this strategy were again made during the 2002 eruption. The flow 
that approached Rifugia Sapienza on the night of 24 November was successfully diverted 
by directing it slightly to the east to protect the ski station (figure 3.4) 
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Figure 3.4 Earthworks around the ski lift station at Rifugia Sapienza, November 2002. Note the lava flow to 
the left of the picture 
However a few weeks later on the night of 16-17 December a second flow that followed a 
similar path destroyed two buildings beside the ski station. This was in spite of the local 
fire brigade's efforts to cool the approaching front with water, and the earthworks created 
with army excavators and bulldozers. An explosion occurred as the lava flow destroyed 
one of these buildings, caused by a water or oil tank being trapped under the flow. As a 
result 32 people near to the building were injured, and one car destroyed. The high 
numbers of people present in this area as the flow approached increased the amount of risk 
posed by that flow. As well the danger of explosions there was a possibility that the flow 
could cut off access to Sapienza. Army and Navy excavators were also available to clear 
the access road to Sapienza should lava flows have cut it off (La Sicilia, 12/12/02). 
3.2.2 Earthquakes 
Volcanic tremors were responsible for damage to several buildings in towns and villages 
on the slopes of Etna. At the beginning of the eruption on 27 October, continuous shaking 
in close proximity to the vents (within 1 km) was reported by INGV staff. These were 
sufficiently violent to make it very difficult to stand, and long enough to induce feelings of 
nausea (G. Sawyer, pers. comm., 2002). Earthquakes continued throughout the course of 
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the eruption. INGV reports (Azzaro et al., 2002; Azzaro & Scarfi 2002; Mostaccio & 
Scarfi 2002) indicated that intensities of the earthquakes in urban areas reached up to 6 on 
the European Macroseismic Scale (EMS-98). (This also equates to 6 on the Modified 
Mercalli scale, refer appendix 1 & 2). These tremors resulted in damage to buildings in 
several settlements. Most buildings in the region are constructed of either concrete, though 
some older buildings are of basalt. Prior to 1981 no building code for earthquake-resistant 
buildings existed in Italy, and most buildings in the region were built before this (Behncke, 
2002). Therefore earthquakes of MM6 caused more damage than they might otherwise 
have done if more stringent building codes were in place. Most damage was minor, 
resulting in the cracking of concrete walls and plaster facings. However many of the cracks 
caused by earlier shaking were further expanded in subsequent events (Mostaccio & Scarfi, 
2002). Some older buildings became unstable, reinforcement of exterior walls using 
wooden struts was then employed to prevent failure. An earthquake on 2 December felt 
over much of Etna caused damage to several structures in Macchia di Giarre, 4 km WSW 
of Riposto. Large pieces of masonry fell from the primary school building, which was 
closed as a result (Azzaro et al., 2002). An intensity of 6 on the EMS-98 scale was 
assigned by INGV (Azzaro et al., 2002). (MM 6) 
The dislodging and or cracking of roof tiles occurred in several buildings. Concrete 
balconies were also prone to damage, and were observed in some cases to have collapsed. 
This may have been accentuated by the accumulation of ash on these flat surfaces. 
Dry stone retaining walls were a common casualty of the earthquakes, many of these had 
been constructed without building permits by local residents. The collapse of such features 
was common during these tremors (figure 3.5). However retaining walls constructed and 
maintained by local authorities alongside roads in the vicinity of Zafferana Etnea also 
suffered partial collapse. Road surfaces were affected as well, cracks formed and 
disaggregation of the seal took place in some areas. Further damage occurred to roads as a 
result of small landslides near Piano Provenzana. 
_C_h~ap_te_r_3_E~ffi_e_ct_s~of_t_h_e_2_00_2_e_r~z~_t_io_n~of'---Nl_t_E_tn_a_, l_ta~ry ________________ 39 
Figure 3.5 Collapsed retaining wall in Monacella, November 2002 
Panic was common among some of the population of these towns. During ash sampling in 
Monacella on 7 November several people were observed sitting in cars in a local car park, 
as they were too frightened to remain in their homes. They approached INGV staff, asking 
when the activity would stop. Earthquakes earlier in the morning had prompted this 
response. There were also reports of panic among the populace of Zafferana and S. 
Venerina because of volcanic tremors (Mostaccio & Scarfi, 2002). Many inhabitants from 
these towns were too scared to remain in their homes. Four hundred households (about 
2000 people) were evacuated from Santa Venerina by 29/10, the evacuees housed in "tent 
cities" prepared by the Civil Protection (La Sicilia, 29/10/02). This was mainly a 
precautionary measure, as many masonry buildings were susceptible to damage even in 
relatively minor shakes of MM5-6. In the town of Misterbianco, a phone call to a local 
school to enquire about the effects of a perceived (though actually non-existent) earthquake 
on the school buildings alarmed the teachers, resulting in the evacuation of 700 children. 
(La Sicilia, 09/11 /02, p.26). 
The opposite reaction to local tremors was also observed, as some people in real danger 
from unstable buildings refused to be evacuated - a family of five near Giarre temporarily 
barricaded themselves into their home to avoid being evacuated by the local authorities 
after their home was declared to be unfit for use (La Sicilia, 5/11/02). 
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3.2.3 Ashfall hazards 
The 2002 flank eruption of Mt Etna resulted in more ash falling on Catania than there had 
been in living memory. During the first three days of the eruption the Istituto Nazionale di 
Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV) measured a total of 2.5 kg/m2 of ash falling on Catania, 
(P. Del Carlo, pers. comm., 2002). Bulk density of the ash samples varied during the 
eruption, and also with proximity to source. However using a bulk density of 1.6 g cm-3 
(which a distal sample taken on 7 November yielded), this thickness equates to 1.6 mm. 
While not a great thickness of ash, it was still sufficient to cause havoc in Catania, as roads 
became extremely slippery, and numerous traffic accidents ensued. At the same time 
Nicolosi, approximately 13 km from the active southeast crater received 9.7 kg/m2 (~6 
mm), while the tourist resort of Rifugia Sapienza, under 4 km from source, received 
38880g/m2 (~25 mm) during these three days (Del Carlo, 2002a). 
Attributes of the ash 
The grainsize of ash falling in any given area varied from day to day, as the activity at the 
crater waxed and waned, and the plume height varied. A continuum of eruptive styles from 
hawaiian to strombolian type activity was seen during the eruption. Activity changed from 
one style to the other on scales of hours to weeks. Often an intermediate style existed, 
where lava jets pulsated less continuously than hawaiian activity, but more continuously 
than a strombolian style of eruption. These changes in style affected the ratio of tachylite 
and sideromelane that dominated the composition of the ash. Tachylite dominated in 
quieter periods, while an increase in the amount of sideromelane was seen in ash taken 
from more explosive periods (Del Carlo et al., 2002a). Minor olivine, clinopyroxene and 
lithics were also present, again to varying degrees as the eruption progressed. (Del Carlo, 
2002a, 2002b; Del Carlo et al., 2002a, 2002b ). 
Grain shape has an effect on the packing of ash deposits, and in tum the bulk density. The 
blocky morphology of much of this ash contributed to high bulk density values measured 
in both a proximal (600 m) and distal (12 km) sample. The bulk density measured from the 
proximal sample was 1.26 g cm-3, whereas the distal sample gave a value of 1.63 g cm-3. 
Grainsize varied in the proximal sample from 125 µ to 5 mm, with a mode of 750 µ. The 
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sample from 12 km from source (in Monacella) ranged from 750 µ to 0.25 µ, the mode was 
63 µ. Figures 3.6 - 3.9 illustrate the morphology and presence of extremely fine grains on 
samples from Catania (25 km from source), Monacella (12 km from source) and 600 m 
from the active crater. 
Figure 3.6 SEM ofSideromelane clast 
from Catania, 11/1 1/02 (scale bar JOO µm) 
Figure 3.8Sideromelane and tachylite 
clasts, collected 12 km from source 
(scale bar I 00 µm) 
3.3 Effects of the eruption 
3.3.1 Buildings 
Figure 3. 7 SEM close-up of fine grains on 
sample from figure 3. 6 (scale bar I O µm) 
Figure 3.9 Finer particles adhering to a 
larger clast, proximal sample 
(scale bar I 00 µm) 
The weight of ash on roofs did cause some problems, despite accumulations of tephra 
falling on structures never exceeding 40 kg m-2 in any 3-day period, even in proximal areas 
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such as Rifugia Sapienza. (This is not including the Torre del Filosofo observatory, which 
was buried under a scoria cone built around the active vent). Ashfall was usually . not 
continuous in any one area for more than a few hours during the course of the eruption. 
This was due to either changes in wind direction, or the waxing and waning of the 
explosive activity. This usually gave residents time to clean ash from roofs between 
ashfalls. However in the case of some badly maintained buildings, flat or slightly pitched 
roofs that were not cleaned accumulated sufficient ash to cause collapse after rainfall 
saturated them (P. Del Carlo, pers. comm., 2002). Minor structural damage also occurred 
on houses with pitched roofs that were not cleared of accumulated ash. Although Sapienza 
was subject to the heavier ashfalls than more distal urban areas, the structures in this resmi 
were designed to cope with snow loading, being situated at 1900m above sea level. In 
addition, regular cleaning of roofs meant that buildings in this area did not experience 
damage from ashfall. 
Figure 3. I 0 Rifi1gia Sapienza 
November 2002. Jn the foreground 
workers clean the restaurant roof 
while the eruption continues in the 
background 
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Roof guttering on buildings in towns on the flanks of Etna was damaged or destroyed in 
several cases by the accumulation of ash, which blocked downpipes enough that water and 
ash built up in the spoutings until collapse ensued (P. Del Carlo, pers. comm., 2002). In 
some cases ash was observed to have accrued at the base of downpipes to such an extent 
that it blocked the downpipe from the base upwards. However many downpipes on older 
buildings in Catania end 30 cm or more above the ground, discharging water directly onto 
footpaths. These were not usually affected by such blockages, as the ash did not 
accumulate into piles this high before being dispersed. 
Removal of ash from rooftops was a labour intensive exercise. This usually involved 
someone climbing onto the roof and sweeping the ash onto the ground. Ash in spoutings 
needed to be scooped out by hand. On taller buildings within the city the use of cherry 
pickers was employed to gain access to rooftops. Again ash was manually scooped up, and 
then poured over the edge into dump trucks below. 
3.3.2 Communications 
Little effect on communications was caused by ashfall or the presence of the plume. 
Mobile phones continued to work as usual, and phone lines remained intact. One possible 
exception was interference to hand held radios used by INGV staff to contact the base 
stations in Catania and Nicolosi from near the summit of Etna. Although these worked 
without problems most of the time, on some days interference occurred. This was despite 
similar weather conditions existing on days when they did function normally, and attempts 
at contact being made from the same location. Although not a definite link, it is possible 
that the plume was responsible for this interference. Mobile phones appeared unaffected, 
they were used as a backup for communication. 
3.3.3 Electricity distribution 
No effects on electrical distribution networks were reported to have occurred as a result of 
the eruption. 
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~.3.4 Gas supplies 
Gas supplies remained unaffected by the eruption. While moderate seismic activity may 
have been sufficient to burst gas mains, gas supplies in the peripheral towns on Etna are 
not piped, but stored in tanks on the properties of those who use it. 
3.3.5 Water Supplies 
Fortunately for the region around Etna, water supplies are derived from subterranean 
streams/springs which were unaffected by the eruption. However prior to the eruption, the 
area had been experiencing a drought. This did affect the amount of water available when 
increased demand occurred as a result of people wanting to wash ash away with garden 
hoses. A few days into the eruption, on 4 November the drought was broken as rain fell in 
Catania. 
3.3.6 Stormwater/sewerage 
The influx of ash into the stormwater system proved to be a problem for drainage in 
Catania. Siltation effectively blocked some drains completely, and restricted flow in others. 
Combined with rain, this resulted in localised flooding on several occasions, which 
affected traffic flow when roads became submerged. Fortunately there was little heavy 
rainfall in Catania during the course of the eruption. No problems with sewerage were 
reported, though little data could be gathered on this subject due to some communication 
(language barrier) problems during fieldwork. INGV staff were unaware of any damage to 
infrastructure or blockages of actual sewerage pipelines. It was their understanding that 
sewerage was flushed directly out to sea without any kind of treatment, though this is 
unverified (P. Del Carlo, pers. comm., 2002). Figures 3:11 - 3.14 illustrate the effects of 
ash on the streets of Catania. 
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Figure 3.11, Ash blocking Stormwater drains 
in Catania, November 2002 
Figure 3.13, Siltation seen in open stornrwater 
drains in Catania, November 2002 
Figure 3.12 Ash blocking Stormwater drains in 
Catania, November 2002 
Figure 3. I 4 Flooding as a result of ash 
blocking drains, Catania, November 2002 
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3.3. 7 Transportation 
Aviation 
Catania's airport (Fontanarossa) was closed throughout much of the eruption due to the 
ash plume causing danger to air traffic. Even when the wind was not blowing directly 
towards the airport (south) the plume could cause problems, interfering with flight paths. 
The radar used by Fontanarossa airport is not capable of detecting the ash plume (La 
Sicilia, 12/12/02). Therefore on cloudy days it was not always apparent where the plume 
was. The same applied to night-time. Consequently during the course of the eruption the 
airport adopted a timetable of opening from 7am until 6pm where possible (La Sicilia, 
28/12/02). Even then the airport was not always able to open. In addition to the problems 
caused by the plume, ash had to be cleaned from the runways before any planes took off or 
landed. Some pilots reportedly refused to fly into Catania, preferring to land in Palermo, 
or Reggio Calabria (La Sicilia, 4/11/02). 
Roads 
Travelling by road was adversely affected. Traction was affected by both wet and dry ash, 
even with very small (~l mm) amounts. Stopping distances increased as vehicles skidded 
on the slippery surface. Cornering needed to be approached with caution, a driving style 
similar to that used for driving on ice was necessary to avoid accidents. Frequent minor 
accidents and falls experienced by riders of motorcycles and mopeds during the first few 
days of the eruption led to their use being briefly prohibited within the city of Catania. 
However the extensive use of mopeds as a means of transport in this region necessitated 
the local authorities lifting the ban, and merely recommending that they were not used. In 
addition to the hazard caused by the slipperiness of ash on road surfaces, airborne ash was 
particularly problematic for cyclists/mopeds; it easily got into the eyes, noses and mouths 
of those riding without masks and goggles or full-face helmets. This was further 
accentuated as clouds of dry ash were stirred up by passing automobiles. These clouds of 
ash also reduced visibility on the roads, a problem affecting all road users. Visibility of 
road markings was reduced to nil with only a small (<1 mm) covering of ash. Ash on roads 
never exceeded a few millim~tres in Catania, except in the occasional drift. Many of the 
viUages on the slopes of Etna have at least a few roads that are steeply inclined. Driving up 
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these steep gradients with even a thin layer of ash on the ground was not always possible in 
a two-wheel-drive (2wd) car, given the lack of traction. Closer to the vents different 
problems were experienced with thicker deposits. Between Sapienza and the active crater 
at 2700 m, a four-wheel-drive (4wd) ski field service track provided access for local 
authorities to monitor the eruption, and to monitor the numbers of tourists that tried to 
approach too closely. Although ash deposits on this road were usually several centimetres 
deep, and at times over 30 cm, 4wd vehicles with differential or hub locks were able to 
successively drive up the incline. However drifts did have to be smoothed out to ensure 
their success. An unsuccessful attempt was made to climb even moderate inclines in 2wd, 
with both thin (>5 111111) and thicker (5 cm) deposits. 
Wet ashfall presented different problems. Although water prevented the ash from being 
stirred up into clouds, during heavy ashfalls the rapid accumulation of ash on windscreens 
directly inhibited visibility. In lighter ashfalls windscreen wipers were able to effectively 
clean windscreens (figure 3.15). However during heavier falls it became necessary to 
frequently stop vehicles every few hundred metres and manually clean windscreens, using 
bottles of water to clean off the finer particles. 
Figure 3.15 Light rain and light ash were easily coped with by vehicle windscreen wipers 
The addition of water to ash on the ground does effectively stop it from being remobilised 
by winds. Rain did not effectively remove ash, as cham1els formed within the deposit, and 
the bulk of the mantle of ash remained in situ. The remaining ash compacted and hardened 
once it dried out. Ash left on the roads could then be driven over, rather than through. 
However the presence of any wind during ashfall created drifts of ash that in turn created 
their own hazards. Small drifts acted like "speed humps" in the road, which if driven over 
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at speed could cause damage to vehicles or even accidents to occur. At times larger drifts 
blocked roads altogether until mechanically removed. While dry ash was removed from 
roads with the use of road sweepers, the removal of ash that had been dampened or wetted 
entailed using machinery such as snowploughs and front-end loaders. In urban areas ash 
was swept more regularly, with both road sweepers and workers with brooms (figures 3.16 
& 3.17). 
Figure 3.16 Clearing ash off roads in Monacella. Snowploughs proved effective at quickly cleaning deposits 
of several millimetres off roads. 
Figure 3.17 Council workers sweep ash from streets in Catania 
As this work was performed in addition to the normal work carried out by the city council 
workers, the City of Catania was forced to pay overtime rates to its workers to do this. This 
led to reluctance on the part of the council to clean up the streets until the eruption was 
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Qver. They did not want to have to do the same job twice. Pressure was put on INGV to 
give· a date for the end of the eruption, which was not possible. However an accumulation 
of ash over the days then weeks of the eruption would have caused a greater amount of 
damage, and would have cost even more to clean up. The council was eventually 
convinced that it was in their best interest to continue to remove ash· from streets and 
public buildings/parks etc (P. Del Carlo,pers. comm., 2002). 
3.3.8 Ash Disposal 
In rural areas, and especially on Etna itself, disposal of the ash covering roads was usually 
simple - it was dumped at the side of the road, or over Armco barriers onto recent (i.e. the 
last century or so) non-vegetated aa lava flow deposits. The basaltic ash is fertile enough 
that vegetation quickly begins to establish itself in the ash. In fact this property of the ash 
has led to some of the ash being sold by the local council as fertilizer. Other ash from the 
cities was used to fill in landfills, the remainder has been dumped into the sea (P. Del 
Carlo, pers. comm., 2002). 
3.3.9 Nuisance value 
Many problems associated with the ashfall were not senous enough to be deemed 
'hazards', but still were seen as a nuisance. This included things like the curtailment of 
outdoor dining - restaurants could not serve food outdoors as falling ash would land on 
meals, making them less than palatable. Even when ash was not falling directly it could 
still be blown about and into food. This had some economic repercussions on dining 
establishments. Hanging out washing to dry with ash falling resulted in soiled clothing. 
Shopkeepers had to continually sweep pavements if a minimum of ash was to be carried 
into shops on the soles of the shoes of customers. Fortunately the majority of shops in 
Catania have wooden floors, which mad~ cleaning inside easier. 
3.3.10 Agriculture/forestry 
Agriculture was adversely affected by the 2002-2003 eruption, at least in the short term. In 
the long term the basaltic ash t}lat covered crops will act as a fertilizer, enriching the soils. 
However, industry associated with forestry, horticulture and farming all suffered losses 
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because of these eruption. Although ashfall was never heavy enough to damage the forests, 
lava flows destroyed 80 hectares of forestry near Linguaglossa between October 29 and 
November 2 (see section 3.2.1). On 14 and 15 November further damage occurred to 
plantations near Casa Santa Barbara ( on the west side of Etna), as aa flows bisected a 
forested area. Fo11unately these flows largely followed the same path as those from the 
2001 eruption of Etna, thus killing only a small number of trees. 
Drought conditions throughout October meant little grass had grown around Etna in this 
month. This lack of fodder for stock, combined with a thin covering of ash on the ground 
meant that farmers had to bring in feed for sheep and cattle that would otherwise have been 
able to find adequate grazing on the lower slopes of Etna (La Sicilia, 29/10/03 ). 
Fruit and vegetable growers were perhaps the hardest hit economically. Ashfall damaged 
fruit and drastically reduced its value. Almost one third of Italy' s oranges are grown in the 
region of Catania, along with other citrus fruit, (La Sicilia, 09/12/02). 50% of these were 
lost, ruined by both ash pitting the skin and being absorbed into the fruit (La Sicilia, 
29/10/02). 
Figure 3. /8 Citrus fruit damaged by ash/all (photograph from "La Sicilia" 6 November 2002) 
Ash on the surface also made the fruit difficult to pick, and it was feared that it could 
damage machinery used in picking and processing of fruit. Even harder hit were vegetables 
in general, 80% of crops were lost, (La Sicilia, 26/12/02). This damage occurred both in 
the province of Catania, and that of Siracusa, where crops over 50 km kilometres away 
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from the active vents were similarly damaged. Giuseppe Guastella, President of the 
Sicilian branch of Italy's federation of farmers "Coldiretti", estimated that agricultural 
damages to the Catania region cost 80 million euro, Siracusa a further 60 million euro, 
(Guastella, G., 2002). Furthermore 75% of agricultural jobs were lost during this season, as 
crops were unable to be harvested (La Sicilia, 21/12/02). Locally produced fruit sold in 
local markets and shops during the course of the eruption was recognisably damaged, or 
covered in ash. This was not always easy to remove, for example running water over 
bunches of grapes was not sufficient to remove all of the ash, it was n~cessary to manually 
rub the ash off each grape to ensure the fruit was clean. This demonstrates how crops can 
easily be ruined economically, as the time needed to clean the fruit or vegetable affected is 
worth more than the produce itself. This damage was not caused by heavy ashfall - most of 
the affected area was subjected to less than 3 mm of ash by the time this damage was done. 
3.3.11 Tourism 
Tourism in the region was also adversely affected by the eruption. The closure of the 
airport was partly to blame for this, which under normal circumstances is Italy's 3rd busiest 
airport. Italy's tourism association (Assoturismo) reported a downturn in business for 
hotels etc of 75%. The same association said that business was down by 25-30% in 
restaurants and pizzerias, 25% in travel agencies and 30 to 35% in ticket offices, 
(Siciliasearch.com). Only 50% of the usual number of visitors to Catania (for the time of 
year) were present during the course of the eruption according to an estimate by staff at 
Catania's visitor information centre. 
3.3.12 Effects of the eruption on the populace 
Reactions to the eruption ranged from panic to intense curiosity. While some people were 
too scared to remain in their homes, other people wanted to get as close to the activity as 
possible to obtain better views of the eruption. Both types of behaviour caused problems 
for local authorities. The evacuation of over 2000 people from Giarre and S. Venerina was 
necessary, given earthquake damage to houses, but some residents in other areas also 
affected by the tremors also wanted to be evacuated- even if this was not necessary. Most 
people were worried to some· degree, especially those with property on the flanks of the 
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volcano. However when asked, many people expressed the view that it was just nature, the 
volcano was just doing what it had always done. They lived beside the volcano and thus 
had to live with the consequences (from conversations with local inhabitants). 
The desire to witness the spectacle of lava erupting from Etna from close up motivated 
many other people (both locals and tourists) to attempt to climb to the active vents, or to 
the front oflava flows. Not only did this put people in immediate physical danger, at times 
the amount of people approaching flows obstructed emergency services. To attempt to 
prevent this police put up roadblocks on many roads to restrict access to the mountain. The 
Department of Civil Protection oversaw the emergency, and directed staff from the fire 
department, municipal police, national police, provincial police, financial police (who also 
have an alpine rescue section) and forest corps. They were responsible for manning the 
roadblocks, preventing people from getting too close to the flows and vents, and rescuing 
those that were injured or lost. The forest corps and fire fighters were there to stop the 
spread of fires started by lavas flows burning vegetation. During late November this force 
comprised 232 staff (La Sicilia, 27 /11/02). Local alpine guides also patrolled the summit 
area. Despite these precautions people still attempted to get up close to the volcano. As 
well as the dangers posed by bomb fallout, volcanic gases and lava flows, the terrain at the 
summit of the volcano is comprised of jagged (and very sharp) pieces of aa lava, bombs 
and blocks, scoria and ash. Temperatures can also drop very quickly to sub-zero, as the 
altitude of the crater was 2700 m. Snow fell in this area on several occasions during the 
course of the eruption. These factors were often overlooked by eager tourists wanting to 
get a close view of the eruption, keeping the alpine rescue teams very busy rescuing lost 
and hypothermic sightseers (Guarda di finanzia officers, pers. comm., 2002). Despite 
controls on people climbing up to the top, some skirted patrolled areas, on other occasions 
climbers/walkers were let through from Rifugia Sapienza, the climb of almost 1 000m to 
the active area ensuring that only those fit enough to climb this much would make it to the 
more dangerous areas. The amount of interest in the eruption meant that it was impossible 
to keep absolutely everyone away from danger. Reports of impending damage to Sapienza 
as lava flows approached on 24 November resulted in thousands of spectators trying to 
drive to Sapienza to witness the sight. On this occasion the roadblocks were emplaced 
further down the mountain to keep people at bay. Queues of traffic several kilometres long 
stretched from just outside Nicolosi to the roadblocks. This hampered emergency services 
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in gaining access to Sapienza. On most nights spectators could be encountered at both the 
sides of the road, and even stopped in the middle of the road. The impact of the sight of a 
large strombolian explosion, even from four to five kilometres away is not to be 
underestimated. This created hazards in itself. On return from fieldwork with INGV staff 
near the active vents, it was not uncommon to see cars that had just stopped, after the 
drivers rounded blind corners and were confronted with a spectacular volcanic eruption. 
This of course led to following traffic having to react quickly to avoid crashing into the 
stationary vehicles. 
Health Effects 
The short-term effects of the basaltic ash on the reg10ns inhabitants were largely of 
discomfort, rather than anything serious. Ash getting into peoples eyes was both painful 
and difficult to remove. It did have the potential to scratch the cornea if eyes were rubbed 
as opposed to being washed out with water. The wearing of masks to filter out ash particles 
was a common sight in Catania during the course of the eruption (figure 3.19). 
Figure 3. 19 A municipal police officer in Catania wearing an ash mask while on traffic duty 
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Red Cross volunteers were often present on the streets in Catania during ashfall, handing 
out ash masks to pedestrians. Civic authorities recommended that people should try to keep 
outdoor physical activity to a minimum during ashfall, and that asthmatics remained 
indoors during those times (La Sicilia, 07/11/02). Staff from the University of Catania's 
Institute for Respiratory Diseases and the Department of Microbiology are currently 
conducting investigations into the long-term effects of the ash on human health. 
3.3.13 Economic effects of the eruption 
The costs of the eruption is not easy to evaluate. A loss of €140 million was described by the 
national confederation of farmers, or farmers lobby (the Coldiretti) (Guastella, 2002). Judging 
the loss experienced by the tourism industry is more complicated given the large amount of 
variables. Over 80 hectares of forestry plantations were lost, several buildings were destroyed by 
lava flows, roads near Linguaglossa and Sapienza were covered and at least one car was 
destroyed. Earthquake damage affected many buildings, retaining walls and roads, all off which 
need to be repaired. As well as damage directly caused by the eruption, several costs need to be 
taken into account. Loss of employment resulted for fruit pickers and processors as crops were 
destroyed, the decline in tourism during the eruption had repercussions for local restaurants, 
retailers, hotels and the hospitality industry in general. Local authorities needed enough 
manpower to both monitor the eruption and keep the overcurious far enough away to avoid being 
injured of killed by the eruption. This involved over 200 people for three months (La Sicilia, 
27/12/02). 2000 evacuees needed to be put into tents and fed. A further undisclosed number of 
evacuees were housed by relatives or rented alternative accommodation. Clean-up .operations 
took many hours, and were performed by council workers in addition to their normal duties - the 
workers therefore demanded to be paid at overtime rates. (P. Del Carlo, pers. comm., 2002). As 
well as roads and public facilities/buildings, the drains had to be cleared of a build up of ash. 
Traffic accidents occurred as vehicles skidded on slippery surfaces. The cost of closing the 
airport alone was said by the mayor of Catania, (Umberto Scapagnini) to be around 500,000 
euros per day (La Sicilia, 29/10/02). 
Italy has had to cope with several other natural disasters during this time, notably a landslide in 
Lombardy, and earthquakes in Molise and Puglia. An aid package of€ 700 million, funded by 
the government was announced in February 2003. This package was to cover all of the 
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emergencies from late 2002 until that time. Catania received a significant portion of this though 
the exact amount is unknown (La Sicilia, 07 /02/03). The many costs involved with coping with 
the eruption make it impossible to place an accurate figure on the cost of the emergency. 
However it will certainly be in the hundreds of millions of euro dollars. 
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Chapter4 
Hazards associated with Tarawera Volcano 
4.1 Introduction 
A future basaltic eruption of Mount Tarawera will potentially cause considerable damage 
to the Bay of Plenty region. While the exact magnitude and duration of an eruption cannot 
be accurately predicted, the vulnerability of the region can be assessed. Risk is commonly 
defined as hazard x vulnerability (Blong, 2000). By determining likely hazards, preparation 
and thus mitigation strategies can be implemented that will reduce the vulnerability of the 
region. In this way the risks posed by Tarawera Volcano can be reduced, to minimize both 
loss of life and damage in the surrounding area. This chapter aims to quantify the likely 
physical processes of an 1886 type eruption, and thus identify the hazards that may affect 
the Bay of Plenty region. 
4.2 Future basaltic activity at Tarawera Volcano 
The magnitude of any future basaltic eruption at Tarawera Volcano is unknown. 
Predictions of the behaviour of a specific volcano are largely based on past activity, yet 
there has only been one previous basaltic eruption at Tarawera. While it is probable that a 
near future eruption from Tarawera will be basaltic (see chapter 1), the only indications of 
the style of basaltic eruption to occur at Tarawera are given by the 1886 eruption. The 
violence of this eruption does indicate that Tarawera is a dangerous volcano: any volcano 
that erupts over 1 :3 km3 of material in around 4 hours is not to be treated lightly. 
The effects of a near-future basaltic eruption have been calculated based on an eruption 
type similar to that of 1886. Using the 1886 eruption as the basis of a hazard evaluation 
does give an indication of effects likely to occur in the event of explosive basaltic activity. 
That eruption was the largest basaltic eruption in the 1.6 ma history of TVZ (Wilson et al., 
1995). For this reason the magnitude of the 1886 eruption, in terms of volume of ejecta, 
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can be seen as a probable worst-case scenario. Although effusive activity did not occur in 
1886 it is a common phenomenon with basaltic volcanism and has accordingly been 
included as a potential hazard in this assessment. 
4.3 Precursory Activity & Monitoring 
A future eruption of Tarawera will not occur without warning. There will be precursory 
signs before the next eruption. The ascention of a body of magma through the earth's crust 
creates enough movement to be detected by seismometers, and at times tremors strong 
enough to be felt by people. A swarm of localized earthquakes would be detected weeks to 
months before volcanic activity manifested itself at the surface. Monitoring at Tarawera is 
performed by the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (IGNS). Six seismometers 
are situated within 30 km of Tarawera Volcano, including one on top of the volcano itself. 
Although the regional seismic network will indicate any unusual seismic activity, precisely 
locating magma movement would require further seismometers in the area (Sherburn & 
Nairn, 2001). Temporary seismometers could be easily installed should localized seismic 
activity begin in this area. Ground movement is also measured. Ground deformation 
associated with a magmatic intrusion beneath Tarawera may be manifested at the surface 
by tilting or bulging of the volcanic edifice. This would in turn result in a change in the 
shoreline of local lakes. Three water level recorders on the west, north and east shores of 
Lake Tarawera utilize the lake surface as a level, thus monitoring this type of activity on 
the mountain. In addition horizontal strain monitoring networks were set up around Lake 
Rotomahana and the Tarawera Volcano summit in 1983. Though not monitored they can 
be used in the event of any kind of unusual geological activity at Tarawera (Sherburn & 
Nairn, 2001). Another effect of magma rising in the crust along the Tarawera Vent 
Lineation will be changes in the local geothermal activity. A large intrusion of magma will 
noticeably heat the geothermal system. From 1970 to 1998 the temperature and discharge 
rates of Frying Pan Lake and Inferno Crater were monitored. The data recorded from these 
will provide a useful background baseline if monitoring of these thermal areas 
recommences (Sherburn & Nairn, 2001). This could easily be reinstated if seismometers 
record unrest at the volcano. 
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4.4 Expected hazards 
Major hazards associated with basaltic volcanism at Tarawera Volcano are as follows: 
• Ashfall 
• Bomb and lapilli fallout 
• Phreatomagmatic eruptions and base surges 
• Hydrothermal eruptions 
• Lava flows 
• Lahars 
• Earthquakes & seiching 
• Poisonous gases 
4.4.1 Ashfall 
Ashfall will have the most far-reaching consequences of an eruption. Damage will be 
widespread, as ash will be distributed over a much greater area than that affected by any of 
the other hazard types. Most economic damage from an eruption is likely to be caused by 
ash, though loss of life is unlikely to directly occur as a result of ashfall, as opposed to 
some of the more proximal hazards. While the same eruption magnitude as the 1886 event 
is used to evaluate hazards, it is possible that (up to a point) larger or smaller amounts of 
ash could be deposited in any given area, dependent on weather conditions. The weather 
conditions experienced in the 1886 eruption were similar to prevailing weather patterns 
today. Figure 4.1 indicates wind patterns at various heights in the North Island. Winds are 
less variable at altitude, and it is these winds that have the greatest control on ash 
distribution. Prevailing winds above 2 km altitude are westerly winds. The summit of 
Tarawera, and thus the source of the ash, is at 1111 m. Low-level winds ( <1000 m) will 
thus only create local effects on tephra distribution. Figure 5 .1 illustrates prevailing wind 
directions in the North Island. 
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Figure 4.1 The frequency of wind directions at various heights above Auckland airport derived from 1966 to 
1979 data (Johnston, 1997) 
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While existing data on wind direction indicate only a 0.7% chance of winds above 2 km 
altitude blowing from the east or southeast (which would deposit ash on Rotorua) the 
possibilities of these effects should be considered. Whakatane and Kawerau are more 
likely to be affected by heavy ashfall. The southwest winds above 2000 m that would cause 
the heaviest ashfall to affect these towns occur 20% of the time. Westerly winds are the 
most common, at 37%. Whakatane and Kawerau would still be affected, but with only 
light deposits. 
Probabilistic models of ash dispersal, such as ASHF ALL or HYP ACT would indicate a 
similar dispersal of tephra to that experienced in 1886, or dispersal slightly more east than 
northeast, assuming prevailing wind conditions. A wind blowing from west to east would 
result in little or no ash deposition on Rotorua, and possibly none on Tauranga. Instead the 
slopes of the Ikawhenua ranges would receive most of the ashfall, to the east of Tarawera. 
Whakatane and Opotiki would receive slightly less ash than during a southwest wind (as 
experienced in 1886). Parameters needed for ash dispersal models include the magnitude 
(volume) of the eruption, the height of the eruption column and local wind direction/speed. 
The magnitude and duration of a future eruption are not only unknown, but more 
importantly largely unconstrained (though unlikely to exceed the 1886 magnitude). 
Prevailing winds are known, though regional variations (which affect results) are not taken 
into account in these programs (Turner & Hurst, 2003). This large amount of variables 
involved in predicting future basaltic activity at Tarawera would thus make results 
unreliable. It is therefore preferable to determine likely effects based on the 1886 scenario, 
but to include the possibility of thicker deposits of ash in areas feasibly affected if winds 
were different. In this way any differing wind conditions may be taken into account, and 
the worst-case scenario effects established for each of the main centres in the Bay of Plenty 
Region. The ashfall hazard map in figure 4.2 therefore does not represent ashfall expected 
from a single event, but gives an indication of the maximum expected thickness in any one 
area, contingent simply upon distance from source. Wind direction is not taken into 
account. 
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Figure 4.2 Maximum thicknesses of ash possible at any location under/886 conditions 
Properties of basaltic ash affecting hazard evaluation 
In terms of hazard evaluation, one of the most important properties of volcanic ash is its 
density. This will determine the load that it imposes on structures subject to ashfall. The 
density is governed by its mineralogy, vesicularity, grain shape, compaction and water 
content. The density of basaltic ash from a future eruption of Tarawera is an unknown 
factor, but it can be estimated. To do this, Tarawera 1886 and fresh Etna 2002 ash samples 
were collected during fieldwork. A coarse proximal sample from Etna was collected on 11 
November 2002 from within 600 m of the active crater. A more distal fine sample was 
collected on 7 November in Monacella, 12 km from source (see chapter 3.) Constraints on 
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the volume of samples taken were made by the necessity of carrying them from Italy to 
New Zealand. Samples were weighed by volume (1 litre) to establish bulk density. The 
bulk density of the Etna samples was measured at 1260 kg m-3 for the proximal sample to 
1630 kg m-3 for the distal sample. To compare with Tarawera, two samples collected from 
Ngamotu Road (10 km from the Tarawera fissure) gave bulk density values of 1051 and 
1074 kg m-3. These agree with bulk density values given by Walker et al., (1984) as 
varying from 900 kg m-3 near the vent to 1100 kg m-3 distally. Although bulk density is 
lower than the Etnean samples, the density of the actual clasts from Tarawera was higher 
than average (Walker et al., 1984). Table 4.1 lists the average density of Tarawera's 1886 
scoria clasts by grainsize. 
Table 4.1 Average densities of 1886 scoria clasts (after Walker et al., 1984) 
Grain size (mm) Average Density (g cm-3> 
16- 32 1.40 
8 - 16 1.40 
4-8 1.54 
2-4 1.68 
1 - 2 1.86 
0.5 - 1 2.00 
Given the high density of Tarawera scoria clasts, the bulk densities for Etna seem 
particularly high. However the magnitude of the Tarawera 1886 eruption was far greater 
than the Etna 2002 eruption. Samples taken at similar distances from source are therefore 
much coarser from Tarawera than Etna, and consequently have a lower bulk density. 
Walker et al., (1984) do not indicate where the distal samples measured for bulk density 
were sampled. Measured bulk densities may therefore have included greater values if 
samples were taken further from source. This may not have been possible given the 
weathering of fine ash over the ~ 100 years since the eruption. 
The weathering of the ash prior to sampling may also explain large differences between the 
densities of Tarawera and Etna. Samples of Tarawera tephra taken from Ngamotu Road in 
2002 during fieldwork for this thesis show a depletion of fine material. It is possible that 
samples collected in the 1980's by Walker et al. were also depleted of fine ash, leaving 
coarser vesicular material to be weighed, thus giving lower values for bulk density. SEM 
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pictures of these samples do show more fines present in Etna samples. Furthermore 
vesicular clasts from Tarawera 1886 contain vesicle fillings, a textural feature of partly 
altered volcanic ash (Heiken & Wohletz). This also indicates changes to the ash subsequent 
to deposition (figure 4.3) 
Figure 4.3 Tarawera ash sample showing sideromelane with vesicle fillings 
Figure 4.4 Tachylite and Sideromelane clastsfrom Tarawera. Less fine samples are present here than in 
typical slides from Etna 
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A large amount of pre-existing rhyolitic material was also mixed in with the 1886 ash, as 
the explosive activity of the 1886 eruption fragmented large amounts of Kaharoa rhyolite 
from Tarawera volcano in creating the present day craters. Walker et al., (1984) give a 
figure of 10% by volume for non-basaltic material. This will also have an effect on the 
density of the ash, especially as some of that material is pumiceous (figure 4.5) 
Figure 4:5 Pumice clastfrom Tarawera ash 
For these reasons the freshly sampled Etna 2002 ash is thought to be more indicative of 
possible future ash densities from Tarawera. Although a component of rhyolitic lithics will 
possibly be included in future activity, the plane of weakness created by the 1886 basalt 
dikes will most likely be exploited by ascending magma. Thus the surface would be 
reached without significant amounts of overlying rhyolite being fragmented. 
In order to determine likely tephra loading from future basaltic activity, values from the 
distal material collected are more applicable - few buildings are found close to Tarawera 
Volcano. Parts of Spencer Road are within a 10 km radius, as are a few houses to the 
southeast of Tarawera. However the Etnean "distal" sample measured for density was 
collected only 12 km from source. Even the densities of Tarawera samples from Ngamotu 
Road, 10 km from the 1886 fissure, were closer to the higher distal values given by Walker 
et al. (1984) than proximal ones. Tephra loading for structures at this range may therefore 
also be calculated using the distal values calculated. The 1630 kg m-3 bulk density value 
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determined from Etna is rounded down to 1600 kg m-3 for use in these calculations. This 
takes into account the possibility that the values measured from the 1886 may not only be 
erroneous, but may be exceeded in future activity. This value (1600 kg m-3) is not expected 
to be significantly exceeded by future Tarawera ashfalls since these densities are high for 
typical bulk densities of tephra. 
An estimation of wet ash densities is also required to calculate the effects of tephra loading 
on roofs, in order to determine when roofs are likely to fail in the event of rain. The 
proximal and distal Mt. Etna ash samples were left soaking overnight to achieve maximum 
saturation, and weighed after excess water was decanted off. Wet density of the ash was 
found to be 1710 kg m-3 in the coarse proximal sample (750µ modal grainsize) and 2086 
kg m-3 in the fine more distal sample from Monacella. The samples respectively absorbed 
approximately 45% and 46% water by volume. The Tarawera samples from Ngamotu 
Road took less water to fully saturate. Wet density of these two samples was found to be 
1455 kg m-3 and 1480 kg m-3. This ash thus absorbed around 41 % (by volume) of water 
before becoming fully saturated. A sample of Rotomahana mud was also weighed, as this 
may add weight to tephra loads. A wet density value of 1880 kg m-3 was obtained. This is 
not expected to differ significantly in a future eruption of Rotomahana. A rounded value of 
2000 kg m-3 is used in calculations of wet density for future Tarawera tephra. This is again 
slightly less than the maximum Etnean wet ash density value. 
4.4.2 Bomb and Lapilli Fallout 
In addition to the problems caused by the inundation of ash, the potential for immediate 
and potentially severe damage from the impact of bombs and lapilli exists. An 1886 type 
eruption will disperse scoria over a wide area. Walker et al., (1984) mapped scoria 
fragment distribution from 1886. Taking the 3 largest scoria fragments found from each of 
120 sites, an isopleth map was created. Results indicated the maximum distance traveled 
by scoria clasts (by diameter) are given in table 4.2 
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Often the direction that clasts traveled furthest in was southeast, which was at 90° to the 
wind conditions at the time. This is indicative of partial control by ballistic trajectories. 
These trajectories would in tum be dictated by vent geometry. Wind would still have 
influenced the paths of scoria clasts as the distances traveled by scoria exceed that possible 
for ballistic trajectories alone. Furthermore no clasts were found to have traveled any 
appreciable distance directly into the wind. However the initial trajectories of larger clasts 
will influence their final distribution, thus even areas that are not directly downwind of the 
plume may be subject to lapilli and scoria airfall. 
Prediction of ballistic trajectories of large clasts in future activity is not possible given the 
unknown vent geometry. As wind direction during future activity is also unknown, these 
clasts may feasibly affect any area within the distances given above. During basaltic 
activity Rotorua will thus be in range of lapilli up to 16 mm diameter. Kawerau will be 
subject to clasts over 32 mm, but under 64 mm. Other settlements included within the 32 
mm isopleth are Lake Okareka, Waiotapu, Rotomahana and several small settlements on 
the south side of Lakes Rotoma and Rotoiti. Spencer Road, less than 12 km from the 
summit of Tarawera may be subject to clasts of 64 mm and over. 
Projectiles pose hazards in two different ways - damage can be caused by impact, or clasts 
may still be hot enough to cause fires upon landing. 
Impact energy 
The impact energy of ballistic clasts is a function of the density, mass and diameter of 
those clasts, and the velocity at which they are traveling (EK = ½ mv2; Blong, 1984, p25). 
Terminal velocity is reached in only a few tens of metres, therefore the impact energy can 
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be easily established by calculating the size, mass and density of the clasts. Blong (1984) 
refers to the density of clasts ranging from about 0.15 to 3.6 g cm-3, however this includes 
highly vesicular pumice, with a much lower density than basaltic material, and dense 
lithics from the vent walls. Clast density from Tarawera 1886 scoria is given in table 4.1. 
Ballistic ejecta impact hazards will affect buildings, infrastructure, vehicles, trees, crops, 
people, and livestock. Details of effects are given in chapter 5. 
Ignition from projectiles 
Ignition of buildings or foliage by incandescent bombs has been documented in several 
cases, including the 1975 eruption of Ruapehu, where bombs struck Glacier Hut, charring 
wood and burning through the floor (Blong, 1981). Bombs between 0.1 and 2 metres 
diameter from the 1973 Eldjfell eruption at Heimaey also started fires after penetrating 
house roofs and windows (Booth, 1979). The 1886 Tarawera eruption may have caused 
fires as a result of incandescent bombs landing on buildings - the Haszard household burnt 
down during the eruption, and "red hot stone" was seen landing on the house (Kearn, 1988, 
p.134). However it is unclear whether this was the cause of the fire. Projectiles larger than 
5 mm may remain hotter than the surrounding gas dispersion (Sparks and Wilson, 1976). 
The larger the projectile, the hotter the interior will remain. Incandescent projectiles 
landing on Te Wairoa were no larger than about 40 mm, many were smaller than this. It is 
possible that even projectiles as small as 20-30 mm will remain hot enough to start fires if 
they land in dry vegetation. For example in 1914 at Japan's Sakurajima Volcano, bombs 
ignited forest undergrowth 4.7 km from source (Omori, 1916, cited in Blong, 1984). This 
type of hazard may occur again at Tarawera, especially as the volcano is largely 
surrounded by forest. An eruption occurring in the summer will naturally prove much more 
hazardous in terms of fire danger. Fires resulting from ignition by incandescent projectiles 
may cause widespread damage to forests. These may be hard to control, both from the 
danger of projectile impacts to firefighters, and because fires may be started in several 
areas at once. 
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4.4.3 Phreatomagmatic ernptions/Pyroclastic surges 
Emptive style 
Explosive activity between the north end of Rotomahana and Waimangu during the 1886 
eruption of Tarawera was influenced primarily by the interaction of magma and 
groundwater, and to a lesser extent the lakes ofRotomakariri and Rotomahana. Pyroclastic 
base surges were created as Taalian style eruptions ejected water, lake sediments and basalt 
fragments up to 11 km into the atmosphere (Nairn, 1979). However the explosion craters 
that were generated by this eruption subsequently filled with water, creating the present 
day Lake Rotomahana, a much larger lake than the combined Lakes Rotomahana and 
Rotomakariri of pre 1886. 
Lake Rotomahana currently has a surface area of 7.95 km.2, and a long axis of 6.2 km. Its 
mean depth is 60 m, though at its deepest point (the Great Crater Basin) it is 150 m 
(Donald et al., 1991). These dimensions give it a volume of 0.48 km3, considerably larger 
than in 1886. The changes to the environment in this area will influence future magmatic 
activity should it occur here. To illustrate: Rotomahana occupies 6.2 km of the 17 km long 
eruptive fissure of 1886, i.e. 35% of its length. Walker et al., (1984) estimated 0.7 km.3 of 
material (DRE) was erupted in the 1886 eruption. This was calculated assuming a total 
ejecta volume of2 km3 from dense basalt at 2800 kg m-3• 90% of this was juvenile basaltic 
material, the rest rhyolitic material and ash & mud from Lake Rotomahana, therefore 0.63 
km.3 of basaltic magma was erupted. Using the Pullar and Birrell (1973) figure of 1.3 km-3 
would give a dense rock equivalent of 0.46 km3• If 90% was juvenile basalt, 0.41 km3 of 
basalt was erupted. Assuming that the basalt was essentially evenly distributed along the 
length of the fissure, 35% of it would have intruded under the present day Lake 
Rotomahana. Depending on which volume is used, this equals between 0.22 km3 and 0.14 
km.3 of magma. The larger volume is just under half the volume of Lake Rotomahana. The 
small amount of basaltic material found as a component in the Rotomahana mud may of 
course indicate a smaller magmatic source, and/or that quenching took place and little 
magma was explosively. The style of future activity in this area will in part depend on the 
amount of magma that is intruded into the geothermal field and Lake Rotomahana. Nairn 
(1979) calculated a solid vo_lume eruption rate (for the 130 minute duration of the 
Rotomahana to Waimangu part of the eruption) of 6 x 104 m3s"1, with large explosions at 
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between 105 - 106 m3s-1• Future eruptive style at this location in an 1886 type eruption 
would depend on several factors. Sub-aqueous explosive activity is possible in freshwater, 
to a maximum pressure of216 bars - a depth of 2160 m (Cas and Wright 1987). This is far 
deeper than the 60 - 150m depth of Rotomahana, which does make explosive activity a 
possibility. It is also feasible that quenching of lavas may occur - assuming that magma 
reached the lake water without first triggering phreatomagmatic explosions in the 
geothermal system beneath the lake floor. The depth of water plays an important role in 
determining eruptive style, as does the temperature, viscosity and volatile content of the 
magma, and how much magma is interacting with the water at any one time (i.e. the 
magma-water ratio). This ratio will depend on the surface area of magma exposed to the 
water, in turn determined by the extrusion rate and area of exposure. In terms of converting 
thermal to mechanical energy the most effective ratio of water to magma mass is~ 0.3. 
With a ratio less than 0.1 dry strombolian activity will ensue, over 0.3 and eruptive styles 
range from surtseyan to subaqueous quenching of lavas (Sheridan & Wohletz, 1981 ). 
Dikes from the 1886 eruption were from 1 to 5 metres wide (Cole & Hunt 1968, Nairn & 
Cole, 1981). Although the intrusion underneath Rotomahana would exist under the entire 
length of the lake, the actual exposure of magma to water would (as in 1886) occur in 
discrete areas, making an estimation of the surface area of magma contacting water 
difficult to ascertain. Furthermore the vesicularity of the magma will influence the surface 
area exposed to water. The margin of error in any attempt to determine actual surface area 
in this way will be fairly large, given the amount of variables in such a construct -
especially when predicting future activity. Observations of basalt-water interactions at 
Surtsey, Heimaey and Hawaii do however indicate probable results. With a gradual 
effusion of non-vesiculated lavas, the volume of lake water at Rotomahana would result in 
quenching of lavas and the creation of (unconfined) steam. This would act as an insulating 
layer against the violent interaction of water and magma (Kokelaar & Durant, 1983). Much 
less explosive activity would therefore ensue. However magma may become explosive 
through the release of volatiles without any interaction with water - something that is still 
possible under low hydrostatic pressure. While the maximum volatile fragmentation depth 
(or VFD) may differ according to magma type, the 150m maximum depth of Rotomahana 
is shallow enough for this to be considered a possibility (Kokelaar, 1986). These magmatic 
explosions would then generate further explosions from instantaneous quenching and the 
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accompanying creation of steam (Kokelaar & Durant, 1983). The likelihood of (initially) 
purely magmatic volatile exsolution taking place beneath the lake is perhaps not as 
probable as an interaction of magma and groundwater. The extensive hydrothermal system 
in this area is likely to be intersected (or even exploited as a pathway) by ascending 
magma, providing many opportunities for phreatomagmatic explosive activity beneath the 
lake floor. As the magma rises through the wet sediments, some of these deposits will be 
incorporated into the rising melt (Kokelaar, 1983; Kokelaar & Durant, 1983). Trapped 
water will then be flashed to steam, becoming violently explosive as the steam expands. 
The subsequent phreatomagmatic explosions may then remove enough overburden to 
expose more magma to lake water, creating further explosions. The hydrostatic pressure of 
the lake waters will affect activity on the surface of the lake: the explosions beneath or at 
the lake floor will be partly suppressed by this pressure, the chilling effect of the water and 
the inertia of the containing water (Kokelaar & Durant, 1983). Ballistic dispersal of 
material is thus restricted. For these reasons, explosivity will increase in shallower areas, 
and as the depth of water decreases. The high rate of extrusion may lead to the build-up of 
either volcaniclastic sediments, pillow lavas or both. This would increase the level of the 
vent, again resulting in an increase in the violence of explosions. The 1963 eruption of 
Surtsey demonstrated this type of activity (Kokelaar & Durant, 1983). Should the duration 
of the eruption be long enough, the vent may eventually become subaerial, whereupon 
phreatomagmatic activity would become purely magmatic, and thus less explosive -
assuming the vent was enclosed sufficiently to prevent the access oflake waters (Kokelaar, 
1983). However it is important to realize that despite possible quenching effects of the lake 
waters, the probability of extremely violent phreatomagmatic activity is still very high at 
Lake Rotomahana. The risk of phreatomagmatic activity occurring in the geothermal 
valley from Rotomahana to Waimangu is also very high. The hydrothermal systems here 
are expected to act as the Rotomahana ones did in 1886 - by explosively interacting with 
the basaltic magma. Initial explosions created by expanding steam as magma interacted 
with groundwater would remove overburden, resulting in depressurization of the 
hydrothermal system, hence causing further hydrothermal explosive activity (Nairn, 1979). 
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Pyroclastic Surges 
The results of violent phreatomagmatic explosions from Rotomahana to Waimangu will be 
the creation of large unstable eruption columns, which may collapse to form pyroclastic 
base surges. The generation of the columns from Rotomahana will be similar to wet 
Surtseyan type activity. Consequently the reduction of energy caused by the heat exchange 
between the magma and the lake water will reduce the heat that drives the convecting 
plumes. Condensation of steam may also take place, increasing the density of the column, 
which in turn leads to column collapse and the generation of secondary pyroclastic base 
surges (Nairn, 1979). Larger explosions of the 1886 eruption are thought to have been 
powerful enough to "generate primary base surge by direct sub-horizontal outward flow 
from the vents" (Nairn, 1979). Through the expansion of Lake Rotomahana and the 
extension of the geothermal field to W aimangu, the amount of water available to interact 
with magma has increased. This renders base surges even more of a probability in a near 
future eruption ofTarawera. 
Pyroclastic flows and surges typically travel at speeds of tens of metres per second, 
although primary blasts have been observed to advance at up to 300 m s-1 (Wilson & 
Houghton, 2000). For example the 1980 Mount St. Helens lateral blast traveled at up to 
150 m s-1 (540 km/h) (Nakada, 2000). Temperatures within flows may reach hundreds of 
degrees Celsius. During the 1992 eruption ofUnzen in Japan, temperatures of up to 660°C 
were determined (Nakada, 2000). Surges from Rotomahana may be cool (possibly less 
than 100°C), as they will be formed from wetter surtseyan type activity. However 
phreatomagmatic surges may also be hot (Cas & Wright, 1987). The actual temperature of· 
surges will be influenced by the magma-water ratio; less water equals drier hotter flows, 
more water will produce cooler wetter flows (Sheridan & Wohletz, 1981). 
Pyroclastic surges are less dense than pyroclastic flovrs, typically containing 0.1 - 1 % by 
.. 
volume of solids - even close to the ground where density is greater (Wilson & Houghton, 
2000). For this reason the effect of topography on surges is minor; they may travel over 
ridges, into valleys and over higher ground again, as opposed to denser flows, which 
follow lower ground. While containing less solid particles and more gases than flows, the 
speeds and potential high ten;iperatures of surges still render them extremely destructive. 
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The pyroclastic base surges from the 1886 eruption traveled at least 6 km to the west of 
Lake Rotomahana, traveling over hills 350m higher than the vents. Proximal deposits near 
the great crater exceed 20m thickness (Nairn, 1979). The villages of Te Ariki and Moura 
stood in the path of these surges, and were consequently completely destroyed. The only 
trace of their previous existence was an upright from a whare, discovered in 1887 in a 
stream at the bottom of one of the Rotomahana craters (Kearn, 1988). 
The greater extent of the lake and hydrothermal system have now created further areas at 
which hydrovolcanic activity may create either primary or secondary base surges. 
Moreover it is possible that future surges may travel in any direction from source. This 
mainly depends on vent orientation in the case of primary surges, and wind direction in the 
case of secondary surges or plumes (Wilson & Houghton, 2000). As a result, hazard zones 
for pyroclastic surges need to be considerably in excess of the extent of base surges 
deposits from 1886. 
Surges from sub-plinian to plinian eruptions do not usually travel more than about 10 km 
(Valentine & Fisher, 2000). This is of course still substantially further than the 6 km extent 
of 1886 flows. In some cases they may exceed this, for example the 18 May 1980 surge at 
Mt. St. Helens traveled ~35 km, the 1883 Krakatau basal surges reached about 80 km 
(Valentine & Fisher, 2000). Krakatau was a much larger eruption though, and the Mt. St. 
Helens surge was initiated by a lateral blast & sector collapse - the topography at 
Rotomahana (i.e. a lake rather than a mountain) would preclude this type of mechanism 
from occurring. Therefore base surges would not be expected to exceed a 10 km radius 
from the vents. Even then 10 km is a worst-case scenario, surges are not expected to travel 
far beyond the 6 km experienced in 1886. The 10 km figure quoted is for sub-plinian to 
plinian type eruptions. 6 km is more indicative of the magnitude of Vulcanian type activity. 
The increase in lake size and extent of the geothermal system will not increase the size of 
surges, only the size of the source area for those surges. However it is possible slightly 
larger explosions could occur, 10 km is thus used as a safer estimate of the maximum 
extent of pyroclastic base surges (figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6 Pyroclastic surge hazard map. The thick (inner) red ellipse indicates the likely extent of 
pyroclastic surges in any direction, the thin (outer) ellipse is a maximum possible from this type of eruption. 
Airfall 
Not only will ejecta from Rotomahana be deposited by pyroclastic surges, significant 
amounts will be carried further by the eruption plume. Mud will be distributed over a wide 
area adding to the load already imposed on structures by ashfall. It will not be remobilized 
into the air as easily as dry ash given its high water content. While the permeability of the 
ash is expected to prevent it from being easily remobilized from slopes (White et al., 
1997), the high water content of the mud deposit will make it much more likely to form 
lahars. Mud from the 1886 eruption was deposited as far as Whakatane and Maketu to the 
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northeast and north respectively, and Galatea to the southeast. Thick deposits of wet mud 
created extreme difficulties for traveling along Tarawera Road between Te Wairoa and 
Rotorua after the 1886 eruption, as mudflows from hillsides above the road inundated it in 
the days and weeks after 10 June. 
Flooding 
An additional problem which may occur as a result of the intrusion of magma into the 
waters of Lake Rotomahana is the raising of lake waters by displacement. Although much 
of the water would be heated to boiling point and thus driven off as steam, the maximum 
quantity of magma calculated as being available to enter the lake is 0.22 km3 - almost half 
of the volume of the lake. While most outflow from the lake is subterranean, an artificial 
outlet exists on the northeast side of the lake, draining water into Lake Tarawera. This 
outlet may become blocked by sediments ejected in the early explosions of a Rotomahana 
eruption, or even from ash and scoria from a magmatic eruption of Tarawera itself. 
Subsequently the lake level may be raised by several metres. This would inundate farmland 
along the eastern margin of the lake, flood the first few hundred metres of the Waimangu 
geothermal valley, and possibly cause significant spillover into Lake Tarawera at Rapatu 
Bay. Even without blockages the lake may rise quickly enough that outflow into Lake 
Tarawera would not keep up with the input of magma. 
4.4.4 Hydrothermal eruptions 
A high level intrusion of magma into Okataina Volcanic centre will heat groundwater and 
existing geothermal systems. This will cause changes to hydrothermal activity in the 
region. The geothermal field at Waimangu will be affected to a larger degree than other 
fields, due to its location along the Tarawera Vent Lineation. Much of central Rotorua may 
also be subject to more intense hydrothermal activity than normal, as the city is largely 
built upon an active geothermal field. This area experienced several changes to the 
geothermal activity during the 1886 eruption, and is likely to again. New geysers are 
expected · to appear and existing ones to change their behavior. Localized hazards from 
explosive hydrothermal eruptions can be expected, and muddy or rocky ejecta may damage 
property or injure . people close by. Active geothermal areas such as Kuirau Park, 
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Whakawerawera and Arikikapakapa golf course would therefore need to be closed in the 
event of a scientific alert level 3 or over. The possibility of large hydrothermal eruptions in 
the Rotornahana-Wairnangu area after the main event cannot be discounted for months or 
even years after the eruption. 
4.4.5 Lava flows 
Although the 1886 eruption was entirely explosive it is possible that a future basaltic 
eruption of Tarawera Volcano could produce effusive lava flows. These could originate 
anywhere along Tarawera Volcano north ofRotornahana. 
Below Tarawera's bushline (700-800 rn on the northwest side, 900-1050 rn on the 
southeast) the flanks ofTarawera Mountain are covered in native bush and scrub. The only 
infrastructure is a small prefabricated building used to collect fees by local tour operators. 
Native bush gives way to exotic plantations on the flatter slopes of the volcano through till 
Edgecurnbe. Lava flows originating on Tarawera Volcano will travel downslope through 
these forests, slowing and ponding in flat areas at the base of the volcano. On the western 
margin of the volcano, lava flows reaching Lake Tarawera would be quenched upon 
contacting the water. Explosions similar to those seen at on Hawaii's coast where 
pahoehoe flows from Kilauea reach the sea are only possible when waves enter lava tubes 
or reach lava in a confined space, thus creating steam explosions (Peterson & Tilling, 
2000). This is thus unlikely in the lake, unless a storm or seiching create big enough waves 
to splash onto a fast moving flow - and unimportant as it is highly unlikely anyone would 
be close enough during a large eruption to be put at risk. While hummocky type terrain 
will result in lava ponding, and thus stop flows from traveling very far, a lower slope angle 
will not stop flows. They may not travel as fast as lava flows on steeper slopes, but they 
may travel further. This is because flows on flatter slopes are thicker than those on steeper 
inclines, and thus take longer to cool and solidify (Kilburn, 2000). Effusive activity at the 
north end of Tarawera Volcano could result in flows bisecting the Waiaute Stream, as it 
curves around the north end of the volcano. Consequently this waterway could be dammed 
as lava flows transect it. Localized flooding may then result behind the darns. Quenching 
of lavas and small steam explosions may ~lso arise at the lava-water interface. 
) 
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The actual distance traveled will be greatly affected by the duration of the eruption; 
without lava continuing to be produced at the vent and extending the flow front onwards 
by gravitational force, forward movement will slow, then stop. Given land use in the 
proximal area, direct damage from flows will be restricted to the destruction of forests, 
whether native bush or commercial plantations. However the impacts of the flows on the 
forests will not be restricted to those areas buried by lava; fires caused by lava flows may 
spread far beyond the limits of the flows themselves. A risk exemplified by Mt Etna is that 
effusive lava flows may occur at the same time explosive activity takes place from another 
source. Should the eruption be explosive at the same time that effusive lava flows are 
starting forest fires, access to the fires may not be possible due to the danger of ballistic 
ejecta (scoria & bombs) striking firefighters. Ash plumes and ballistic ejecta may also 
hamper helicopters or aircraft firefighting with monsoon buckets. This increases the risk of 
fires becoming much larger before reaching areas that firefighters could safely access. 
Thus more damage would be done, and the larger fires would be less controllable. Another 
danger for firefighters near lava flows in vegetated areas is methane type explosions from 
burning vegetation. Partly burned plants buried by an advancing lava flow release organic 
gases (such as methane), which may mix with atmospheric oxygen to create a volatile 
mixture. This can be ignited by the heat of the lava, resulting in explosions of molten 
spatter. Alternatively the gases may travel tens of metres beyond the flow margins, 
exploding beyond them and turning dirt, rocks and shrubs/trees into projectiles (Peterson & 
Tilling, 2000). 
4.4.6Lahars 
Lahars are a possible consequence of the large volume of ash that will be distributed over 
the Bay of Plenty region, however they are not a high risk. They were noticeably absent 
during and immediately after the 1886 eruption, due in part to the gentle relief of the area, 
and to the high permeability of the tephra deposit (White et al., 1997). The 1904 lahar that 
swept down the Tarawera River, occurred as a result of the collapse of a tephra dam 
blocking up the Lake Tarawera outlet, rather than downslope remobilization of tephra by 
rainfall. The Tarawera River is the most likely path for lahars to follow, as its catchment 
area is on Tarawera Volcano and from Lake Tarawera. Thus the thickest deposits of the 
eruption would be likely to be remobilized along this path. The danger of debris blocking 
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up the outlet to the lake will still exist, and this will need to be carefully monitored after an 
eruption, to ensure dams do not form. Even a blockage lasting days or weeks will have the 
potential to rupture suddenly, releasing lahars to travel downstream and inundate areas 
along the course of the river. 
Although the tephra deposits are not likely to cause lahars, the mud likely to be erupted 
from phreatomagmatic activity at Rotomahana will be susceptible to remobilization. 
Numerous small lahars may eventuate in steep areas, possibly inundating roads and 
damaging property. 
4.4. 7 Earthquakes 
Due to their shallow origins, earthquakes induced by the volcanic activity will be more 
localized in terms of their effects than tectonically induced earthquakes. While not 
expected to be devastating, effects approaching MM 6 may be expected in close proximity 
to the volcano, e.g. the Spencer Road settlement could experience shaking of MM 5 - 6. 
This value is calculated from descriptions and reported damages of the effects of 
earthquakes in 1886, and from the effects of earthquakes associated with the 2002 eruption 
of Mt. Etna. Although structural damage occurred to buildings around Etna, many of those 
buildings are old masonry structures built prior to the establishment of effective building 
codes in Italy. No major structural damage is expected to structures around Tarawera from 
earthquakes, due to higher building standards in New Zealand. Even wooden buildings as 
close as Te Wairoa stood up to the earthquakes of 10 June 1886 without suffering damage 
from this particular hazard. The earthquakes will be strong enough to be felt by everybody, 
and they may contribute to panic amongst inhabitants of the area, especially if 
accompanied by the sight of a large eruption. Earthquakes that continue after the eruption 
may cause more problems than those prior to or accompanying the eruption, as loose 
sediments (ash, mud and lapilli) will be remobilized, creating landslides that will damage 
property downslope. The road from Lake Tarawera to Rotorua will be particularly at risk 
from this type of sediment movement, due to both its proximity to the Volcano and the 
steepness of parts of the terrain that it travels through. This was a major problem 
subsequent to the 1886 eruption (see chapter 2). 
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Seiching of lakes will also occur during volcanic earthquakes - particularly Lakes 
Tarawera and Rotomahana given their proximity and depth (average depths 50 m and 60 m 
respectively, Donald et al., 1991)). Waves created may damage boats moored on, or close 
to shore, and the boat sheds near the north end of Spencer Road on Lake Tarawera. 
4.4.8 Poisonous gases 
Gases such as H2S and SO2 may be hazardous to the health of people or livestock 
downwind from eruptive activity. This will only occur in close proximity to the active 
vents, as these gases are rapidly dispersed by winds. However earthquakes in thermally 
active areas may create gas bursts, as pockets of accumulated gases such as H2S and CO2 
are released due to earth movement. Precedents of this have occurred. For example in 1999 
in the Alban Hills Volcanic District in Italy, seismic activity released a large flux of CO2, 
resulting in the deaths of 30 cows by asphyxiation (Beaubien et al, 2003). In built-up areas 
this type of activity may result in asphyxiation of people as lethal amounts of CO2 or H2S 
trapped in confined spaces are released. Parts of Rotorua are subject to this kind of hazard, 
including a significant portion of the CBD. Investigations of gaseous hazards are still in 
progress in this area, but lethal amounts of H2S and CO2 are presently degassing from 
several fumaroles in Rotorua (Dr M. Durand,pers comm., 2003). 
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Chapters 
The effects of a basaltic eruption on lifelines, infrastructure, agriculture 
and forestry in the Bay of Plenty region 
5.1 Introduction 
The hazards detailed in chapter four will affect the Bay of Plenty region in different ways 
depending on proximity to the volcano and on the amount of ash in any one area. This 
chapter seeks to assess how those hazards may affect the region. Identifying the 
vulnerability of lifelines for the major urban areas may help to reduce the risk posed by 
basaltic volcanism at Tarawera Volcano. The effects of future ashfall on given areas are 
broadly described in terms of light versus heavy deposits. In this way, the vulnerability of 
the Bay of Plenty region to the effects of any future basaltic activity at Tarawera Volcano 
can be assessed, without being constrained by one specific scenario. Furthermore the 
possible distal effects of basaltic volcanism elsewhere in TVZ on the Bay of Plenty region 
may be inferred from this same study. 
5.2 Lifelines & Infrastructure 
5.2.1. Transportation 
Roads 
In the event of heavy ashfall causmg maJor damage to lifelines, infrastructure and 
inhabited areas, access to devastated areas will depend largely on roads. Should 
evacuations of urban areas be necessary after an eruption, overland transport will be the 
only viable option for towns of any reasonable size that are not on the coast. Aeroplanes 
will have nowhere to land, helicopters will only be available for a small number of 
evacuations, e.g. small isolated communities or evacuees needing urgent medical attention. 
Rotorua and Kawerau will depend on roads both to evacuate residents, and to provide 
access to other utilities before repairs can be effected. 
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Roads will be covered in varying amounts of ash depending on their proximity to the 
volcano, slope, aspect (hills facing towards or away from the volcano), wind and local 
topography. Immediate effects of ash on roads will range from poor visibility and traction 
through to being them being rendered completely impassable. Table 5.1 describes the 
effects of different amounts of basaltic ash on road use, based on observations from Etna. 
Table 5.1 The effects of basaltic ash on road use 
Thickness of ash Effects 
0-2mm Road markings obscured, traction reduced (wet and dry ash), 
visibility reduced as dry ash is remobilized by traffic and wind. 
Steep hills difficult for 2wd vehicles to climb 
2-20mm Moderate hills become difficult for 2wd vehicles to climb, 
steep hills impossible. Drifts cause larger humps in road. Once 
dampened and compacted it becomes firmer, easier to drive on. 
20-100 mm Slight inclines may be impassable to 2wd vehicles, 4wd 
vehicles need differential or hub locks to climb moderate hills. 
Larger drifts (eg 300 mm) may hinder or stop 2wd vehicles on 
flat roads 
100-300mm Uneven surfaces in the ash stop any 2wd vehicles, compacted 
damp ash on flat surfaces is still able to be driven on. 4wd 
utility type vehicles (not cars) may be able to slowly progress 
on the flat. Drifts may need to be cleared. Moderate inclines 
difficult, but may be possible for experienced 4wd drivers. 
Steep inclines generally impassable. Ruts easily formed on 
hills. 
>300mm Compacted ash may be driven on by 4wd vehicles, softer 
patches may easily bog vehicles. Gradual inclines possible on 
compacted. ash, but after a few vehicles ruts in the ash will 
form, hindering uphill progress for further vehicles 
Essentially basaltic ash acts like sand when driven upon. Damp and compacted, it is dense 
enough to support vehicles without them sinking in very much and becoming bogged. 
Whether vehicles "bog" in the ash is not only dependent on how well packed and 
compacted thick ash deposits are, but on tyre width, vehicle weight and driving style 
(presence of wheelspin etc.) Exacerbating matters, less dense patches exist where drier 
windblown ash may form drifts, creating obstacles and affording less traction. Attempting 
to drive uphill on thick deposits of dry ash can be compared to driving up sand dunes. 
However, experience at Mt. Etna shows that driving up moderate inclines on thick deposits 
of ash and lapilli is possible in four-wheel-drive ( 4wd) vehicles. INGV 4wd vehicles 
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(amongst others) regularly climbed from Rifugia Sapienza to the active craters 
approximately 700 m higher, using a 4wd track that was regularly covered in ashfall. Thick 
ash deposits tens of centimetres deep that were not part of tracks were also driven upon 
without difficulty. 
Figure 5.1 ING V staff take IR spectrometer readings on Etna 2002. Note the ash-covered 
track used to access site 
While roads with thick deposits of ash are likely to be closed, travel of this type may be 
essential in some circumstances. For example overland travel on thick ash may be 
necessary in evacuations, for search and rescue type activities, or for access to essential 
utilities that need to be repaired. 4wd vehicles travelling in thick ash deposits would be 
well advised to travel in convoy, and to carry towropes and spades. Extra fuel may need to 
be carried as local petrol stations may be cut off from supply tankers, and vehicles driving 
over thick ash deposits will require more fuel than normal road travel. Many residents 
evacuated during or prior to the eruption will try to return to their homes to assess damage 
after the end or perceived end of the eruption. However less important roads will probably 
not be cleared of ash for weeks after an eruption, some residents will want to return much 
earlier than this to recover what they can. Local authorities will have to decide which areas 
are safe to let people back into, even if only temporarily to retrieve property. This will 
apply to areas close to the volcano that could be covered in a thick mantle of tephra, such 
as Spencer Road or Kawerau. In some areas access may not be possible at all. For example 
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the Spencer Road community is likely to be essentially inaccessible by land, unless winds 
were strongly blowing from the northwest during an eruption. The tephra in this area is 
likely to be supplemented by mud deposits from explosions at Lake Rotomahana, creating 
thick muddy deposits on the road between Tikitapu (Blue Lake) and Te Wairoa, cutting off 
the Spencer Road community entirely'. An evacuation of this area will be essential before 
the start of an eruption, as this road is the only route for residents to escape on. 
While thick deposits of ash are likely to result in closed roads, thin ash deposits ( <5 mm) 
will probably still be driven on after or during an eruption - the size of the area possibly 
affected (e.g. most of the Bay of Plenty) will necessitate this as alternatives will not exist in 
many areas until clean-ups are completed. The reduced visibility on roads created by ash 
remobilized by wind and passing traffic will result in much slower travelling times. 
Visibility will be similar to that experienced on dry dusty unsealed roads, but on roads 
which usually have a much higher traffic volume than the average gravel road. Major roads 
possibly affected would be most of State Highway (SH) 2, SH 38 and SH 5 anywhere 
north of Taupo. Oncoming traffic will face extreme visibility problems as vehicles pass 
each other. The burial of road markings will also affect traffic, as even 1 mm of ash may 
render them invisible. Urban areas will be more affected by this given the amount of 
markings present. Speed limitations will need to be temporarily lowered. The frequency of 
road accidents increased around Etna during ashfall from the 2002 eruptions; it is expected 
that this will also happen in New Zealand under these difficult driving conditions. The 
conditions will also slow emergency services in reaching accident sites. 
Rainfall on ash deposits can be beneficial, but also brings its own set of problems. A light 
rainfall may sufficiently dampen ash enough to prevent it from being remobilized by 
winds, but too much rainfall will result in fine ash being turned to mud. As well as this 
mud creating further traction problems for vehicle traffic, the ash will be carried in 
suspension by the water, subsequently blocking up drains and culverts. In rural areas this 
may result in streams diverting over roads rather than through the culverts designed for 
them, not only causing flooding but possible scouring causing erosion of road surfaces. In 
urban areas stormwater systems will be inundated with large amounts of ash. Even 
moderate rainfall may then cause surface flooding. These problems were experienced in 
Catania during Etna' s 2002 eruption, localised surface flooding quickly occurred during 
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brief showers. The main consequence of this was to hamper traffic movement. Fortunately 
no heavy sustained rains occurred while ash blocked up drains, serious flooding was thus 
avoided. During the May 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens it was quickly realized that ash 
was blocking drains, but residents were using water to clean ash off properties. As a result 
fines of US $200 were introduced for anyone caught dumping tephra in stormwater drains, 
along with the threat of having their name printed on the front page of the paper (Blong, 
1984). Ash was swept 0.5m from the gutter to help reduce the amount flushed into the 
stormwater system. Stormwater drains were protected by sandbags when 1.5 mm of ash 
was sluiced off roads by fire hoses in Portland, Oregon, for the annual Rose festival 
(Blong, 1984). While apparently effective, protecting drains with sandbags will also 
prevent water from entering the stormwater system through those drains. 
Not only will roads be affected by ashfall, in some areas they are at risk of destruction and 
or burial from base surges. Even assuming a maximum radius of only 6 km, pyroclastic 
surges from the Rotomahana area may reach several roads. State Highway 5 · 1ies within 3 
km of Waimangu, the expected limit of where phreatomagmatic explosions may initiate 
base surges. This main Rotorua-Taupo route would therefore be cut off during an eruption, 
and would have to be closed even if an eruption was feared to be imminent - i.e. at 
scientific alert level 2 this would be advisable, at 3 essential (refer appendix 3 for scientific 
alert level descriptions). Travelling at 50 m s-1 (a conservative estimate) it would only take 
1 minute for a pyroclastic surge to reach SH 5, at approximately 1 km northwest of the SH 
38 intersection. A powerful laterally directed blast may achieve this in 30 seconds. Should 
pyroclastic surges actually travel in this direction, the road would be destroyed, probably 
for several kilometres of its length. Anyone caught on the road ( or in the path of a surge) 
may be killed by one or more of various means; most causes of death in pyroclastic flows 
are attributable to asphyxiation and thermal distress (Nakada, 2000). Asphyxiation occurs 
as overwhelming amounts of ash are breathed into the lungs (Baxter, 2000). Impact from 
objects picked up by the blast is a possible cause of death, as is burial by volcanic material. 
SH 38 (near the intersection with SH 5) also falls easily within range of pyroclastic surges, 
and several kilometres could be destroyed (see figure 4.6). 
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Cleaning of roads 
Methods for clearing ash off roads depend on the thickness of the ash and whether it is an 
urban or rural location. Areas covered in very thick deposits ( over 30 cm) would need to be 
cleared with heavy machinery - bulldozers and front-end loaders. This may not be 
economically viable (at least initially), dependent on the area being cleared. More 
populated areas will be prioritised. In areas with average thicknesses of this amount, larger 
drifts would make clean-up operations very difficult. Thicknesses of ~hover ~3 mm will 
require graders or trucks equipped with snowploughs to clear roads. In rural areas ash may 
usually be swept into piles at the side of the road. The amount of time needed to clear up 
ashfalls will depend on the availability of equipment and staff to perform those tasks. 
Graders and snowploughs will be necessary to quickly clean thick deposits of ash from 
roads, front-end loaders and trucks to remove that ash, and road sweepers to finish the last 
millimetres. In most rural areas blading ash to the side of the road may suffice. This will 
not be possible in all areas, depending on local topography and land-use. In addition to 
plant material available locally, in the event of an eruption, machinery could be brought in 
from other centres. Most plant required to clean up will come from Works Infrastructure or 
Fulton Hogan, though other roading sub-contractors will have additional machinery that 
may be used. Equipment available from Bay of Plenty and nearby works depots is 
displayed in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Works Infrastructure plant in the greater Bay of Plenty area, as of June 2003. (Unpublished data 
from Works Infrastructure Ltd, Bay of Plenty East Coast). 
Rotorua Whakatane Taupo Tauranga Opotiki 
Graders 5 3 4 4 1 
Super Trucks 2 1 1 1 1 
Tractor Brooms 3 - - 3 1 
Loaders 5 2 3 5 2 
Tippers 10 4 4 8 4 
Snow Ploughs - - 2 - -
Water Carts 4 2 3 2 1 
Excavators 1 2 3 3 2 
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(note, "super trucks" are general purpose trucks fitted with rotary brooms on the front, used 
for sweeping debris off roads) 
Figure 5.2 Works Infrastructure equipment available to clear ash from roads. Clockwise from top left: 
loader, tipper, excavator, grader 
Additional equipment may be sourced from several other depots within 3 hours driving 
time if required. The Rotorua Works Infrastructure depot is located on SH 5, just south of 
the SH 30 intersection. This may be subject to a ~30 cm deposit of ash during an eruption, 
in the (unlikely) event of east or southeast winds. Should machinery still be present (if 
precursory activity had not prompted a temporary relocation of equipment) vehicles would 
be partially buried in tephra. Staff may experience difficulties in getting to the plant. 
Assuming they were travelling from Rotorua (if no evacuation had taken place), their 
vehicles would likely also be buried. 4wd vehicles may be able to travel on the flat roads of 
Rotorua, but would first need to be extracted from the ash. Even then the presence of the 
small hill near Whakawerawera, between Rotorua and the Works Infrastructure depot 
would probably stop the vehicle travelling any further. The remaining kilometre would 
have to be travelled on foot. Staff would then have to rely on the excavator and loaders 
digging themselves out of the ash, before clearing pathways for evacuations and access for 
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outside help could begin. For this reason it is recommended that in the event of precursory 
activity suggesting activity at Tarawera Volcano, road-clearing equipment should 
temporarily be relocated to depots further away from Tarawera. 
Gravel Roads are more problematic than sealed roads when it comes to cleaning off ash. 
Sweeping off the last layer of ash is not possible without also sweeping off gravel. The 
removal of 40 mm of ash from gravel roads in Adams County after the Mt. St. Helens 
eruption also resulted in the loss of 40 mm of gravel from the road surface (Blong, 1984). 
Similar experiences are expected here, which will necessitate the acquisition of large 
amounts of replacement road metal. Many gravel roads in the area are privately owned 
forestry roads, repairing them will be up to the companies themselves. 
An instantaneous clean up of ash is not possible; in some areas ash will not be cleaned for 
days, weeks or possibly even months. Problems associated with remobilization of ash may 
then be experienced, as ash is blown back onto the roads both from the sides of roads and 
the area affected as a whole. Eventually this will be stabilized as plants begin to take hold 
in the ash, but this may take months to years. Ash in cultivated fields may be ploughed in if 
deposits are less than 200 mm (Johnston, 1997). This will stabilize the ash, as well as 
fertilizing soils. In this way the amount of ash blown onto roads around pastoral land will 
be reduced. Finer ash will be more easily remobilized than coarser ash- so even thin distal 
deposits will create visibility problems as ash is entrained in the air by even light winds. 
The redistribution of wind-blown ash into areas already cleaned will also hamper recovery 
efforts. Dampening ash will help to stabilise finer material and prevent it from being 
moved by wind. Other stabilization methods involve the introduction of dust palliatives. 
Various substances were applied to roads to try to stabilize ash in the USA following the 
Mt. St. Helens eruption of 1980. These are described in table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Dust palliatives employed after the 1980 Mt. St. Helens Eruptions. 
(Data.from Blong, 1984) 
Area used Palliative applied Successful? Other 
Spokane County 32% Calcium chloride solution y -
Grant County Rock salt y Hygroscopic, needs 
high humidity to 
work 
Adams & Whitman Liquid sulphonate N Expensive, water-
Counties soluble, needs 2 
applications to work 
Oregon Coherex (petroleum resin y Non-toxic 
emulsion) 
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An investigation into the effect of dust palliatives on unsealed roads in New Zealand was 
conducted by Bartley Consultants for Transit New Zealand in 1995. This study 
investigated the use of two calcium lignosulphates, "Weslig 120" and "Borresperse CA", 
as well as a slow-break bituminous emulsion, and waste oil. The results showed that the 
first three test materials were effective for at least 5 weeks, but that waste oil was much 
more effective, and much cheaper. However waste oil is not as environmentally friendly as 
the other products, and may cause later problems when ash was to be disposed of on a 
more permanent basis. The lignosulphates are a by-product of the pulp and paper industry, 
and may thus be sourced locally, which would lower costs. In the event of an eruption the 
acquisition of such palliatives may not occur in time, unless they were in current use to 
suppress dust on gravel roads. Several other products are also useable as dust palliatives 
though. These include water, lime, cement, grass, vegetable oil, dilute molasses, and 
animal fats. Salt water is better than fresh due to the hygroscopic qualities of salt. However 
the use of hygroscopic or deliquescent chemicals is not so effective in dry areas, when 
humidity is less than 30%. For a fuller description of dust palliatives see Bartley 
Consultants, 1995. 
Using dust palliatives is of course a temporary method to control the remobilization of fine 
ash; tephra will still need to be cleaned off road surfaces and removed from stockpiles at 
the sides of roads. In urban areas it is necessary to remove the ash completely. This then 
requires somewhere to put the ash. Examples from the Etna 2002 eruption of where to 
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dump large quantities of ash include burial in landfills, the sale of ash· as fertilizer and 
dumping at sea. While the potential environme~tal impacts of dumping basaltic ash at sea 
are not fully understood, the large quantities of ash already present in the ocean following 
an eruption (both from airfall and ash carried out to sea by rivers) may already have done 
what damage there was to be done. This is an area that requires further research. 
Furthermore the 2001 Auckland lifelines report indicated that expected costs of marine 
disposal of volcanic ash are an order of magnitude greater than those estimated for disposal 
on land (Johnston & Becker, 2001). Certainly the quantities of ash that will be present in 
urban areas will quickly fill up landfills, options for disposal of ash may run out, 
necessitating marine disposal. 
The cost of cleaning roads 
After the sweeping of ash into piles at the sides of roads to quickly clear them, the ash will 
have to be removed, especially in urban areas. The cost of disposal of ash depends on how 
much ash there is, how far it needs to be transported and the actual cost of disposal. The 
May 2001 Auckland engineering lifelines group assessed this problem, and calculated 
costs of 30c per cubic metre per kilometre for transportation, and $3 per cubic metre for 
disposal (Johnston & Becker, 2001). These costs do not include the costs of the initial 
clearing of roads, or time to load ash onto trucks. Disposal costs will vary depending on 
where this occurs. Even cleaning up about 1 mm of ash from the 17 June 1996 Ruapehu 
ashfall in Rotorua cost over $53,000. This included cleaning the CBD, kerbs and channels 
in urban areas, plus cesspits in all areas (Johnston & Becker, 2001). The cost of cleaning 
roads that have been covered by surge deposits may equate to the costs of creating new 
roads, depending on the amount of welding of material (this is less likely for base surges 
than pyroclastic flow deposits) and the thickness of deposits. This will need to be evaluated 
if or when it occurs. 
Effects of basaltic ash on vehicles 
Provided sensible precautions are taken, the effects of basaltic volcanic ash on vehicles can 
be minimal. INGV vehicles, used almost daily on Mt Etna, show no ill effects from 
frequent trips up to the crater areas. Some of the vehicles in daily use (in 2002) by INGV 
Catania were over 10 years old and still running well. These included Fiat Panda 4wd cars 
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and a 1980's Range Rover. Staff indicated that the ash had little effect on the cars (M. 
Coltelli, pers. comm., 2002). While evidence from other eruptions does indicate that 
volcanic ash can cause engine air filters to easily block up (e.g. Mt. St. Helens May 1980; 
Blong 1984), this is easily remedied with regular cleaning and replacing of the filters. 
Closing windows and stopping fans or air-conditioning from taking in air from outside will 
also reduce the amount of ash entering vehicles. Moving parts may be subject to abrasion 
by ash, and fine ash does penetrate many areas in vehicles (Foxworthy & Hill, 1982). 
However damage is only expected if vehicles are already in a state of disrepair that may 
allow ash to more easily enter moving parts. For example split CV (constant velocity) 
boots would allow ash to abrade CV joints in a matter of a few hours driving time. Well-
maintained vehicles are expected to cope with careful driving in light ashfall or on ash-
covered roads. Driving during heavy ashfall is not advisable, due to extreme visibility 
problems. Abrasion of windscreens by wipers clearing ash off windscreens was reported 
during the 1945 Ruapehu eruption (Johnston, 1997). This was not encountered in Italy 
during Etna's 2002 eruption, either during personal experience of driving during light 
ashfall, or from discussions with residents and tourists about the effects of driving in 
l 
heavier ashfalls. Differing ash composition, grainsize/shape and vesicularity will influence 
the hardness and abrasiveness· of the ash, which may account for this. Damage to 
automobile paintwork from tephra has also been reported to have occurred in several 
eruptions, e.g. Ruapehu 1945 (Johnston, 1997), St. Helens 1980 (Blong, 1984). Again this 
was not experienced during fieldwork at Mt. Etna; paintwork on INGV vehicles showed no 
signs of blistering or abrasion ( aside from "abrasion" caused by ordinary Italian traffic). 
The chemistry and gas volatile content, and thus acidity of tephra from individual eruptions 
will differ, consequently affecting the potential for corrosion and blistering of paintwork. 
The acidity of tephra from a future eruption of Tarawera is however an unknown quantity, 
so the possibility remains that paintwork on vehicles and infrastructure ( e.g. painted iron 
roofs) may be affected in this way. 
Aviation 
Air transport will be severely affected by a basaltic eruption. While the plume is present it 
will be extremely dangerous for air traffic. Aircraft encountering ash plumes are 
susceptible to abrasion of all forward facing surfaces, frosting of windshields, damage to 
onboard avionics and damage or destruction of engines. Potential damage to aircraft by ash 
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has been well documented in the past and does not need to be reiterated here ( e.g. Blong, 
1984; Casadevall et al., 1996; Miller & Casadevall, 2000). Radar present in the area is not 
able to detect the presence of ash clouds (Johnston et al., 2000a) therefore flying at night or 
in cloud during an eruption can result in aircraft flying into ash clouds without warning. 
However an eruption of the short duration experienced in 1886 will not affect aircraft 
flying over the region for long. The plume will be quickly dispersed by winds after the 
cessation of the eruption. In the region inundated by tephra, the presence of ash on the 
ground at airports will stop aircraft from taking off or landing. During the 1996 Ruapehu 
eruption, Rotorua received a ~ 1 mm ashfall on the airport, requiring a substantial clean-up 
before it was re-opened (Johnston et al., 2000a). With the possibility of 30 cm of ash 
landing on Rotorua during an eruption of Tarawera, the subsequent re-opening of Rotorua 
airport may take a long time. 
5.2.2 Buildings 
Proximal Im.pacts 
Ballistic impact dam.age 
Damage from projectile impacts will depend on the material being struck, the mass of the 
projectile and the angle of incidence, given terminal velocities. Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
effects of bomb density, mass and diameter on impact energy. Galvanized iron is a 
common roofing material around Tarawera. Studies by Blong (1981; 1984) have shown 
that this can be damaged ( especially around fastenings), by bombs larger than 250-500g, or ~-
around 40 - 55 mm diameter. Penetration of steel cladding will occur with projectiles over 
2.5 g cm-3 that are over 2000 g (>90 mm) (figure 5.4). Repeated impacts on the same site 
will also weaken cladding materials. Bombs 50-60 mm in diameter (again depending on 
mass) will penetrate or at least severely damage roofing tiles, whether they are clay, fibre-
cement, asphaltic, slate or wooden. Roofing may be more at risk during the early part of an 
eruption, prior to the buildup of tephra as this may actually create a cushioning effect 
against impacts. Glass may be penetrated by projectiles of even 10 g, almost all glass 
(excepting laminated glass) will be penetrated by projectiles over 25 g (Blong, 1981). 
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Figure 5.3 The relationship between volcanic bomb size, density and impact energy and the damage caused 
to a range of building materials. (Blong, 1981, p 407) 
Figure 5.4 Roofing iron pierced by volcanic bombs, Soufriere de Guadeloupe. (Blong, 1984 p 206) 
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The risk to human life also depends on the impact energy of projectiles. Booth (1979) 
observes that 9 cm diameter scoria from the 1973 eruption of Eldjfell (Heimay) caused no 
discomfort provided padded clothing and a helmet were worn. However he also notes that _ 
in 197 4 an eruption of Etna caused severe lacerations to spectators when scoria under 8 cm 
diameter struck them. Furthermore in 1971 5 cm fragments penetrated fiberglass helmets 
left out overnight on the volcano (Booth, 1979). Since the density of 1886 fragments from 
Tarawera is above average, (Walker et al, 1984) it would be safer to assume that these 
smaller fragments pose a serious threat to the health of anyone caught out in the open 
during strombolian activity. Likewise stock left in the area would be at risk from ballistic 
ejecta. 
During the 1886 eruption, scoria clasts over 64 mm in diameter fell at a distance of over 12 
km to the south.east of the eruptive fissure (Walker et al., 1984). This area is extensively 
farmed, both farmhouses and other dwellings (including the settlement of Rerewhakaaitu) 
are found within range of projectiles of this size. Farmhouses are also situated at a distance 
of 7 km from the crater (on Tawa Road). Walker et al. (1984) found scoria clasts up to 74 
mm diameter at this distance. 128 mm bombs were found as far as 6 km from the craters. 
Though less dense than the 2.5 g cm-3 quoted by Blong (1981; 1984), in ascertaining 
impact damage on roofing materials, they are of sufficient size to penetrate steel cladding 
materials. Projectiles this large will only threaten a few houses; those at the west end of 
Ash Pit Road, and some to the south east of Lake Rotomahana. To the east and south, 
almost all buildings between Rotoiti or Kaingaroa forests and the volcano will be at risk 
from ballistic impact damage. Bombs may penetrate cement tile roofs, and damage 
galvanized iron roofing. Windows will easily be broken by these impacts. The risk to 
human life will also be considerable - any person caught outside during a shower of bombs 
and scoria of this size will be at risk of death or maiming from the impact of these 
projectiles. Risk will diminish with distance from the vents, stock in fields along northern 
boundary road will have a reasonable chance of survival, whereas animals 3-4 kilometers 
closer will be more at risk of death/injury. The Spencer Road settlement along the western 
margin of Lake Tarawera will also be at risk, as areas ohhis settlement lie within 10 km of 
the Tarawera vent. Projectiles over 64 mm diameter may damage roofs, break windows 
and may severely injure people outdoors. Further away the Lake Okareka township will 
also be at risk from ballistic projectile impacts. Clasts will be smaller (up to approximately 
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32 mm) but they may still injure those outside, and break windows. Table 4.2 indicates 
maximum probable distances clasts will travel. 
Ignition from projectiles 
Fires affecting buildings may start directly from: incandescent projectile impacts on houses, 
or from vegetation fires that spread to structures. These fires will only start in proximal 
areas, as clasts will cool the further they travel. Bombs may have started fires in Te Wairoa 
during the 1886 eruption (see chapter 4, p.67). They may do so again at similar distances 
from source. 
Base surges 
Houses at the west end of Ash Pit Road, at W aimangu and around Rotomahana Road are 
all within 3 km of the source of phreatomagmatic explosions from the Lake Rotomahana -
Waimangu section of the Tarawera Vent Lineation. This puts them at extreme risk of 
complete destruction by pyroclastic base surges. No mitigation could be effected at this 
distance, surges will destroy any building in their path. Evacuation will therefore be the 
only possible option. Rerewhakaaitu settlement is situated just outside a 6 km radius of 
prospective vent locations, and therefore not as likely to be destroyed by base surges, 
though this is still a possibility. The town will still be at risk of inundation from thick 
deposits of lake-floor sediments carried by the eruption plume. Again evacuation will be 
necessary. 
Medial / distal effects 
Tephra Loading 
The effects of ashfall on buildings depends on the thickness of ash, the density of that ash 
and whether it is wet or dry, the building's orientation, wind direction/speed and the 
construction of the building. This last parameter 'includes the pitch of the roof, cladding 
materials, structural support of roof and walls, and the span of the roof. Minor effects such 
as corrosion of paintwork are dependant of the chemistry and volatile content of the ash. 
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During an 1886 type eruption of Tarawera, it is inevitable that tephra loading on structures 
will affect some communities. Which communities will depend on the wind direction; with 
an easterly wind blowing, up to 30 cm of ash may fall on eastern suburbs of Rotorua, a 
southwesterly wind would have this effect on Kawerau. This thickness of ash will not 
remain on all roofs; pitched roofs may shed some of the load. The amount will depend on 
the actual pitch and the cladding material of the roof. There is a lower friction coefficient 
for galvanized iron than concrete tiles for example, pitched iron roofs will thus shed ash 
more readily than tile roofs. Most house roofs in the Bay of Plenty are pitched to some 
degree, and both concrete tiles and galvanized iron are common. Commercial and 
industrial premises on the other hand often have very low pitch angles, or even completely 
flat roofs. This is certainly true of Rotorua, buildings in both the central business district 
and industrial areas such as Ngapuna have mainly flat roofs, as illustrated in figures 5.5 -
5.7. These are unlikely to shed much ash at all. The same applies to large retail premises, 
like supermarkets and warehouse distribution outlets. 
Figure 5.5 Ngapuna, Rotorua. Note the many large span low pitched or flat roofs of the industrial area. 
(Photograph courtesy of Rotorua District Council) 
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Figures 5. 6 ( above) and 5. 7. Central Rotorua, illustrating many flat and low pitched roofs in the CBD 
More steeply pitched roofs will stand up to live loads better than flatter roofs (Blong, 
1981 ). For example during the 1991 eruption of Pinatubo, buildings at Clark Air Base 
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received ~150 mm of tephra. Residential houses with moderately pitched roofs (~33°) 
remained relatively undamaged (even when ash was not readily shed from roofs), while a 
wide-span aircraft hanger with a gently curved roof collapsed (Johnston, 1997). 
Conversely, drifts (of snow at least) can sometimes accumulate to a larger degree on 
pitched roofs, and create a greater load (Blong, 1981 ). As a rule pitched roofs will however 
prove to be more robust than flat roofs. 
Thicknesses of ash calculated to fall in any given area are an average thickness - they 
suppose a lack of wind. This is very unlikely as even on comparatively still days some 
wind will exist. Consequently loading will not occur evenly, and drifts will form. These 
will create even more loading problems as the load is spread unevenly. Figure 5.8 






Figure 5.8 Distribution oftephra loads on roof types when influenced by wind (Blong, 1981, p415) 
Importantly, projections such as chimneys and parapets can create areas of aerodynamic 
shade, causing drifts to form. This may result in loads two times that of the ground load. 
Furthermore when low roofs are present below larger higher roofs loads as much as 3 
times the ground load can exist on the lower roof. This is compounded even further if 
tephra slides off higher roofs onto lower roofs, as impact loads then apply (Blong, 1981 ). A 
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3_0 cm thickness of ash may therefore be translated into as much ~s a 90 cm load on lower 
roofs, causing collapse in almost all cases. 
To determine loading the following equation is used: (from Johnston, 1997) 
Where: 
L =dpg/1000 
Lis volcanic ash load (kPa) 
d is ash depth (m) 
p is ash density (kg m-3) 
g is gravitational acceleration (9.8 m s-2) 
Using the bulk density of 1600 kg m-3 and a rounded down wet density of 2000 kg m-3 
(given in chapter 4), expected maximum values for loading (in kPa) from future basaltic 
activity at Tarawera are given in table 5.4. These are based on the maximum distance from 
source of 1886 isopachs. 
Table 5.4 Maximum possible tephra loading under 1886 conditions by distance from source 
Distance from Max. possible Loading Max. loading Loading Max. Loading 
Source tephra Dry tephra, no Drytephra Wet tephra, no Wettephra, 
thickness wind with drifts drifts with drifts 
10km 900mm 14.1 kPa 28.2 kPa 17.6 kPa 35.3 kPa 
12km 500mm 7.8 kPa 15.7 kPa 9.8 kPa 19.6 kPa 
25km 300mm 4.7 kPa 9.4 kPa 5.9 kPa 11.8 kPa 
35km 150mm 2.4 kPa 4.7 kPa 2.9 kPa 5.9 kPa 
50km 75mm 1.2 kPa 2.4 kPa 1.5 kPa 2.9 kPa 
30 cm of dry tephra will thus exert a load of 4. 7kPa assuming no wind and even 
distribution. 30 cm of fully saturated wet ash will exert a much heavier load of 5.9kPa. 
None of the Bay of Plenty area is subject to New Zealand snow loading codes, however 
roofs in New Zealand are usually designed for about 2.5kPa, with a safety factor of_l.5, 
therefore total capable capacity is typically 4kPa (Dr. J. Mander, pers. comm., 2003). Even 
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with these figures there will be a lognormal distribution of their validity (+100% -50%). 
Therefore even though 4. 7 kPa exceeds the load bearing capacity specified for roofs, it 
does not follow that all roofs will collapse. With similar loads ( 4.5-6.0 kPa) on houses 
during the 1994 Rabaul eruption, less than 50% of roofs collapsed (Blong & McKee, 
1995). However the redistribution of ash by wind will create drifts, and some roofs will 
have areas with up to twice the ground load, i.e. 9 .4 kPa. This creates a much larger 
demand on roofs, which will in almost all cases cause failure. Similarly the 5.9 kPa load 
expected from 30 cm of wet ash will cause more failures than dry ash. As water acts as a 
dust palliative on ash, wet ash is unlikely to form drifts. However pre-existing drifts that 
are subsequently wet by rainfall may result in loads that are considerably more than the 
average ground load, as up to almost 500 litres of water per cubic metre of ash is absorbed. 
A fully saturated 60 cm drift would thus exert a load of 11.8 kPa, an amount which 
exceeds the design load of most roofs by almost 8kPa. Collapse would be almost inevitable 
- even if the roof remained intact walls would be likely to fail. It is therefore necessary to 
quickly clean roofs that do survive after an ashfall. 
If 30 cm of ash falls on Rotorua or Kawerau, many buildings will collapse under the load 
of ash. The 4kPa standard that most roofs are built to, will be equal to about 250 mm of dry 
tephra, or 200 mm of saturated tephra. An average deposit of this much will result in 
damage, especially to flat or slightly inclined large-span roofs. Where drifts occur damage 
will be exacerbated, but most houses will survive largely intact. However even buildings 
whose roofs cope with the load of tephra will sustain damage. 
Spoutings/gutterings are a common casualty during even light ashfalls; the recent Etna 
eruption was no exception, as light ashfalls of <30 mm in towns such as Zafferana and 
Nicolosi resulted in ash being washed into roof gutterings on many houses, blocking them 
up and causing collapse. Several spoutings on homes in New Zealand experienced this 
during the 1995 - 96 eruptions of Ruapehu (Johnston et al., 2000a). The removal of 
spoutings on houses would be advisable prior to any evacuation; as well as minimizing 
damage to the spoutings themselves, tephra will be more able to slide off pitched roofs 
without a buildup on the edge of the roof initially stabilizing the tephra accumulating 
further up. Dry tephra penetrating roofs and creating drifts inside the ceiling cavity is 
another hazard that may affect houses that otherwise survive the tephra loading (Blong, 
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1984). Ceilings will quickly collapse under the weight of tephra drifts. Tiled roofs may be 
more susceptible to this than iron roofs, owing to the greater number of spaces for tephra to 
penetrate. 
Closer to Tarawera, buildings downwind of ash may receive considerable amounts of 
tephra, and possibly mud. The Spencer Road community is spread out along the east coast 
of Lake Tarawera, and as such some parts of the settlement are closer to the volcano than 
others. At this range (~ 10 km) ash thicknesses will differ considerably. Those properties at 
the south end are also closer to Rotomahana, and may therefore receive deposits of mud as 
well as ash. Te Wairoa received ~80 cm of ash and mud in 1886, with drifts of over 2 
metres. This amount of ash and mud may well be emplaced here again, thicknesses will be 
similar on the Ohinetekura point and Rangiuru Bay sections of Spencer Road, a region 
with over 200 permanent dwellings and holiday homes. Even without drifts creating excess 
loading, 80 cm of ash, lapilli and mud will weigh over 1300 and up to 1450 kg m-3 
depending on the mud-ash ratio. This equates to 12.75 - 14.2 kPa, an amount that will 
completely destroy most buildings in the area. To the south of Tarawera, Rerewhakaaitu 
settlement and all other buildings north of Northern Boundary Road are also within range 
of this kind of deposit. Much of this area is also at risk from base surges, and not much is 
expected to survive an eruption in the event of ashfall and surges traveling in this direction. 
In eruptions with a duration of days or longer, ash may be manually removed from 
rooftops before tephra loads exceed the load-bearing capacity of the roofs. This would 
prove to be more difficult in the event of an 1886 type eruption; as it would accumulate 
within a few hours. Buildings could be protected to some degree if cleaning was 
undertaking during the ashfall, helping key infrastructure survive. In Rotorua and 
Kawerau, the impact of ash and lapilli would not be sufficient to wound people outside 
cleaning roofs. However there would still be a risk of injury that would need to be taken 
into account. Injuries are commonly reported when cleaning ash off roofs is undertaken, 
for example falls from ladders and roofs. The risk is increased during an ashfall; if cleaning 
is not preformed quickly enough the roof may collapse underneath the cleaners. Moreover 
in a heavy ashfall (as is expected from Tarawera), it will be dark, whether it is day or night. 
The urgency required in performing these tasks during an eruption would probably result 
in less safety precautions being taken. For example most buildings in the CBD front 
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directly onto footpaths - anyone passing below may be exposed to large amounts of tephra 
being swept off roofs. Problems with finding available staff to clean ash from the roofs of 
commercial, industrial or key infrastructure premises may also be had, as local staff will be 
more likely to want to protect their homes and families than their workplace - assuming no 
evacuation has taken place. 
5.2.3 Electrical distribution networks 
The importance of the integrity of electrical supplies is heightened by the dependence on 
electricity of other essential lifelines, such as water supplies, wastewater reticulation and 
telecommunications. The susceptibility of electrical distribution networks to damage from 
volcanic ash is known from the experience of previous volcanic activity, both in New 
Zealand and overseas. For example on 17 June 1996 Rotorua experienced electricity 
blackouts as a resident hosed ash off a neighbouring roof onto a transformer at a local 
substation (Johnston et al., 2000a). A full description of the effects of volcanic ash on 
electrical distribution networks is given in Sarkinen and Wiitala (1981 ). That study 
specifically looked at those effects, using ash from the Mt. St. Helens eruptions of 1980. 
While only this one source of ash was used, results from the Sarkinen & Wiitala study are 
compatible with the effects of subsequent ashfalls on electrical distribution equipment. 
Tephra was found to be conductive only when wet, and more so when it was a finer 
grainsize (deposits thus have a higher surface area). Problems caused by volcanic ash occur 
as ash adheres to insulators on electrical equipment (transformers, lines etc). If the ash is 
damp, (which may occur if it is from a phreatomagmatic eruption, or if weather conditions 
dampen the ash), the conductivity becomes high enough to cause flashover. A flashover 
occurs as electricity jumps (arcs) from a conductor to earth, or from conductor to 
conductor (Transpower, 2003). This damages the insulators themselves, and the lines or 
transformers they were designed to protect. Subsequently power may be cut. The Sarkinen 
and Wiitala study also found that lower voltage insulation is generally more at risk of 
flashover than higher voltage, due to these insulators having smaller weather sheds. This 
study used andesitic ash from Mt. St. Helens, and ensuing available documentation of 
eruptions affecting electricity networks has all been of andesitic ash. However flashover is 
also experienced in dry dusty areas devoid of volcanic ash as sediment builds up on power 
lines and insulators. After several months of dusty dry conditions in Western Australia the 
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first ram of autumn/winter often dampens wind-blown fine sediment on electrical 
equipment, causing flashover and small fires to start on wooden power poles (D. Richards, 
pers. comm., May 2003). This demonstrates that it is more the capacity for holding water 
close to the insulators than the presence of volatiles associated with the ash itself that 
causes flashover. In terms of the effects on electrical components, basaltic ash is therefore 
expected to act in a similar way to the andesitic tephras studied from past eruptions. 
The chances of flashover occurring will be highest if light rain falls during or after the 
eruption. Heavy rain is more likely to wash most of the ash off electrical transmission 
equipment, whereas light rain or drizzle will wet the ash but not dislodge it (Heiken et al., 
1995). Ash from a wetter style of eruption, such as might occur from the Rotomahana area, 
will disperse wet ash and sticky mud over a wide area, potentially causing more harm to 
electrical systems than the ash erupted from a purely magmatic source, due to the higher 
water content. 
As well as tephra causing flashover it is possible that the weight of ash on transmission 
lines will bring them down. This is even more applicable to the mud erupted m 
phreatomagmatic eruptive styles, as it is sticky and thus has a greater likelihood of 
adhering to lines. 
Another hazard likely to effect electrical distribution networks does not actually result 
directly from ashfall, but from atmospheric electrical disturbances associated with the 
eruption. Lightning strikes are commonly associated with volcanic eruptions, and the 
Tarawera 1886 eruption was no exception. Many telegraph lines and poles were struck by 
lightning, cutting communication links. Strikes such as these (on power poles) also 
occurred during the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruptions, and the May 1924 Kilauea eruption, 
when 21 consecutive poles were hit (Blong, 1984). These lightning strikes may also cause 
pole fires and damage to substations. 
The effects of volcanic ash on electrical distribution networks has been experienced by 
Transpower staff in the past, during the 1995 and 1996 eruptions ofRuapehu. Mitigation of 
ash induced flashover amounts to cleaning ash off affected insulators, which was 
performed during those eruptions by Transpower staff. Water blasters at approximately 
1500 psi were used to quickly clean off ash, manual cleaning using a dry cloth was also 
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employed, giving better results but taking much longer (Johnston, 1997). Similarly, fine 
wind-blown sediment is cleaned off power poles and lines by fire hoses at the end of 
summer in western Australia, to reduce the chances of flashover from build-up of fine sand 
over about four-months without rain (D. Richards, pers. comm., 2003). 
Electrical Distribution Networks in The Bay of Plenty Region 
Included within the area subject to ashfall from Tarawera are four power stations, as well 
as substations, some of which are controlled by national grid operators (Transpower), and 
others by local electricity supply companies. Transmission lines in the area are a mixture 
of both high and low voltage systems. Figure 5.9 details electrical generation facilities, 
substations and transmission lines. 
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Figure 5.9 Electrical generation facilities, substations and transmission lines in the Bay of Plenty 
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Substations and Lines 
Damage to substations will occur in part due to the same reason that Transmission lines 
will fail - flashover from conductive ash on insulators, but in this case on the insulators on 
feeder cables and transformers. In tum transformer fuses will be blown, again causing 
power outages. Lightning strikes may also damage substations. Protection and metering 
equipment in control rooms may also be at risk from building collapse under heavy tephra 
loading. The Edgecumbe Transpower substation is a vital link for the eastern Bay of 
Plenty, as it provides four local substations (Whakatane, Ohope, Station Road and 
Edgecumbe) with power from the national grid (Johnston, 1997). This substation also 
connects the Aniwhenua and Matahina hydro power stations to the national grid in the Bay 
of Plenty. 220kV lines provide an additional link to the national grid south of these hydro 
stations. However this link is the most vulnerable part of the electrical distribution network 
in the Bay of Plenty. A 13 km length of transmission lines passes within 6 km of the Lake 
Rotomahana-Waimangu section of the Tarawera Vent Lineation, at one point coming 
within 2 km of Waimangu. This whole length is at risk of being completely destroyed by 
base surges. Further lines connect the Bay of Plenty to the rest of the national grid through 
Tarukenga, north of Rotorua. Those lines pass within 24 km of Lake Rotomahana, and are 
thus not at risk of damage from surges, but may still be affected by ashfall. The Tarukenga 
substation may also be affected. It is 35 km from Tarawera Volcano, and may thus be 
subject to up to 150 mm of tephra, certainly enough to cause flashover. The 220 kV 
transmission lines that supply Tauranga also connect to the Tarukenga substation. In the 
event of damage to Tarukenga, Tauranga would still be connected to the national grid via 
the Te Matai substation, but only with l l0kV lines, which may also be subject to damage 
from ashfall. However even this substation requires a link to either Tarukenga or 
Edgecumbe to remain operational. Should Tarukenga and Edgecumbe both be damaged 
sufficiently to cut power, the entire Bay of Plenty region, including Rotorua, Tauranga and 
Whakatane would be without power. 
Connections west of Opotiki· through to Te Kaba are reliant on a low voltage (50kV) 
supply line, which will be especially susceptible to flashover from volcanic ash coating 
insulators. Although more distal, sufficient quantities of fine ash to cause arcing _ may 
adhere to insulators. Whakatane is connected by both 50kV and 1 lOkV lines to the 
Chapter 5 Lifelines, infrastructure, agriculture and forestry 104 
Edgecumbe substation, as opposed to the more robust (in terms of the effects of tephra) 
higher voltage 220kV lines that connect most of the main centres. 
Power Stations 
Power stations located in the Bay of Plenty region include both hydro and geothermal 
stations, and a cogeneration gas-fired turbine at Edgecumbe. The plant at Edgecumbe 
supplies the Anchor dairy-processing factory with up to 1 0MW of power, the surplus of 
which is sold to Bay of Plenty Electricity (BoPE) to service domestic customers. 
Edgecumbe is about 35 km away from Tarawera Volcano. It received over 10 cm of ash 
during the 1886 eruption. This can be viewed as a maximum expected deposit from a 
basaltic eruption, as it was directly downwind from the Volcano. The turbines are housed 
indoors, and therefore should not be at risk from flashover. Flat or slightly pitched roofs 
exist on all of the main structures associated with the mill and power plant structures. 
These should be able to withstand a 10 cm deposit of dry ash, but if the roofs were not 
immediately cleaned they would run the risk of collapse as the tephra absorbed water, 
increasing the demand on the roof. This depth of deposit would probably result in the 
factory temporarily closing, due both to access problems, and a depleted workforce trying 
to cope with the effects of the eruption on their homes and families. Assuming minimal 
staff could reach the factory, power may be available from this plant in the event of power 
cuts from other supplies. 
Closer to Tarawera Volcano, Kawerau Geothermal Station supplies the Tasman and 
Caxton pulp and paper mills with their energy requirements, with an output of around 
6MW. This is derived from two geothermal plants, one on each side of the Tarawera River, 
adjacent to the mill (Todd Energy website). The proximity of the Kawerau power station to 
Tarawera Volcano (~20 km) puts it at high risk of damage from a future basaltic eruption. 
Like Edgecumbe, the Kawerau area was directly downwind from Tarawera in 1886. This 
area received about 30 cm of ash during the eruption. This amount will put the plant at 
high risk of damage from tephra loading on structures, which may cause collapse. Flat 
roofs on most buildings associated with the mill and power station will exacerbate the 
loading problems. As well as potential damage directly occurring from roof debris landing 
on machinery, the tephra that was responsible for the collapse will then inundate the space 
below. 
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Lahars travelling down the Tarawera River will also threaten the power station and mill, as 
they are situated on its banks. These are most likely to occur after an eruption, as a result of 
the collapse of tephra dams. Close monitoring of the river will be necessary to stop large 
accumulations of volcanic debris from blocking the river or lake outlet, as occurred in 
1904 (see chapter 2). Large lahars will not only destroy the power plants and mill, but may 
inundate significant areas of the plains around the river. 
Located less than 30 km to the east and southeast respectively of Tarawera Volcano are the 
hydro power stations of Matahina and Aniwhenua, on the Rangitaiki River. 
Figure 5.10 Matahina hydro station (photograph from Trustpower) 
The combined output of these two stations is almost lO0MW, making them much more 
important to local energy requirements than the Kawerau and Edgecumbe plants. They are 
situated a similar distance from source than the Kawerau plant. Therefore in a worst-case 
scenario, with westerly winds blowing ash directly towards either one, tephra should again 
not exceed an average thickness of -30 cm. While the dams themselves will cope with 
tephra loading, the powerhouse roofs may collapse, damaging machinery. Transmission 
lines may fail due to flashover. Furthermore Aniwhenua powerhouse and Lake Aniwhenua 
dam control gates are remotely controlled from the BoPE main office in Whakatane (Todd 
energy website). Should phone lines be cut off, this method of control will be curtailed. 
The computers used to control these facilities may also be subject to damage or destruction 
in the event of tephra collapsing control buildings. A study by Gordon (2002) on the 
effects of volcanic ash on computers concluded that in the short term at least, computers 
were resilient to volcanic ash, main components such as hard drives were adequately 
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sealed so as to prevent dust (and ash) infiltration. Keyboards and floppy disks are more 
vulnerable than internal hardware, but inexpensive to replace. Wet conductive ash is more 
likely to produce short-circuting, however wet ash will not be as mobile as dry ash, and is 
less likely to infiltrate buildings, then computers. In the event of building collapse, 
assuming falling debris does not damage computers, it is more likely that any ensuing rain 
will damage computers more than the effects of the ash itself. The control systems in place 
at Aniwhenua should therefore survive if the building housing them does, but 
communications with the Whakatane control centre may be disrupted. 
The effects of ash on the components of hydroelectric stations was highlighted during the 
Ruapehu 1995 eruptions, as andesitic ash passed through the Rangipo Power Station, 
damaging turbines and auxiliary systems. During the seven months from September 1995 
to April 1996 it was estimated that the equivalent wear of 15 years station life occurred 
(Malcolm & Van Rossen, 1997). Almost $6.3 million had to be spent on rehabilitation. In 
April 1996 the two turbines were shut down because of excess wear of runners and seals, 
guide vanes, cheek plates and guide vane stem bearings and seals (Malcolm & Van 
Rossen, 1997). However there is one important difference between the Rangipo 
hydroelectric station and the Aniwhenua & Matahina power stations. Whereas Rangipo is a 
run-of-river scheme, fed directly by the Tongariro River, both Matahina and Aniwhenua 
stations use dams to create lakes from which water is sourced. The slow moving water in 
these lakes will help to settle out suspended ash before water passes through the turbines. 
Given possible volumes of ash in the catchment area (~20 cm thickness), a large amount of 
sediment will still pass through the systems. This alone will not immediately stop the 
plants from working, but may cause gradual damage similar to that experienced at Rangipo 
in 1995-1996. This is assuming that operators Trustpower (Matahina) and BoPE 
(Aniwhenua) are still. willing to keep the plants operating with the additional sediment 
load. The additional problem of siltation in the lake may cause long-term problems for the 
dams, reducing the capacity of the hydro lakes, and thus the capacity for generation in drier 
times. 
Conversely these power stations will be able to supply the Bay of Plenty with (some) 
electricity in the event of winds blowing from the east or southeast during an eruption. 
Should this occur there is a high likelihood that tephra dispersed towards Rotorua or 
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Tauranga would cause power cuts by damaging substations and transmission lines to the 
west of Tarawera Volcano. There may be dependency on these power stations for some 
time if the eruption brings down many power lines in the Bay of Plenty - enough 
replacement line to repair all damaged transmission lines may take time to acquire. 
5.2.4 Water supplies 
Water supplies may be affected for all inhabited areas that are subject to ashfall. Effects 
will be worse in areas using rivers or lakes for water supplies than for spring fed supplies. 
Water tanks fed by roof run-off will essentially be rendered useless until ash is cleaned off 
rooftops. Siltation within the tanks will occur as ash is washed into them from gutterings, 
and they should therefore be disconnected in the event of an eruption. Furthermore even 
moderate ashfalls may result in the destruction of roof gutterings or spoutings as heavy ash 
is washed into them and overloads the brackets holding them up. Small rural communities 
which obtain water by this method may need to be supplied by water tankers in the event 
of an eruption until repairs can be made. In some cases access problems due to road 
closures may result in proximal settlements having to be temporarily evacuated. 
Water supplies in major urban areas 
Rotorua 
Although in a worst-case scenario Rotorua may be subjected to large amounts of volcanic 
ash (~ 30 cm), the Rotorua area's water supplies are largely spring fed, and should 
therefore remain essentially free of an influx of tephra. A deposit of this much ash would 
likely result in the evacuation of most residents, however water supplies would still be 
required for those that remained, and for clean-up operations. Lighter ashfalls (millimetres 
to centimetres) would not result in many evacuations ( other than those who left 
voluntarily). In this situation demand for water would most likely exceed normal demand. 
The central urban area of Rotorua is supplied from the Karamu-Takina Springs. Water is 
then pumped via the Matipo and Utuhina pump stations to reservoirs. Reservoir capacity is 
32,000 m3 and average daily water demand was 23,572 m3 in the year 2000. (Peak demand 
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was 36,300 m3). In the event of water supplies stopping, Rotorua has less than 36 hours 
supply under normal demand. This source supplies approximately 43400 people. Problems 
more likely to affect the water supply are a lack of power to work the pump stations. Two 
electric pumps that service the central Rotorua area (Matipo and Utuhina) are assisted by 3 
booster stations (Pukehangi, Thomas Cr and Tihi-O-Tonga). This system supplies 15,500 
connections through a total of 360 km of pipes. Should the electricity fail, so will most of 
the water supply. Only the Utuhina pump has a backup diesel generator (P. Cooper, pers. 
comm.,. 2003). This backup generator will only supply minimal water. The water supply 
has temporarily failed in the past due to volcanic ash affecting electricity supplies - during 
the 1995-1996 Ruapehu eruptions. A resident washing ash into a power transformer 
caused a power failure, stopping the water pumps. A hosing ban was imposed until power 
could be reconnected, as Rotorua almost ran out of water (Johnston et al., 2000a). The 
Utuhina backup pump existed at that time, but could not keep up with demand for water. 
Other problems may be related to ashfall directly affecting the pumps themselves, either 
through infiltration into electrical equipment at pumping stations, or possibly through the 
collapse of roofs of pumping sheds in the event of heavy ashfall (see section 5.2.2 on 
building damage). Collapse of these structures may cause damage to the pumps 
themselves. Eastern suburbs and Okareka supplies are sourced from springs in Whaka 
Forest, Ngongotaha from the Taniwha spring. The vulnerability of these supplies to ashfall 
is similar to the central area, except that the eastern suburbs may receive more ash than the 
central urban area and Ngongotaha less, owing to their respective proximities to Tarawera. 
While the subterranean supplies are not expected to be directly affected by ashfall, earth 
movement as a result of volcanic earthquakes may affect subsurface hydrology, and thus 
springs. Implications are that water supplies could be cut off, or flow reduced. This is more 
applicable to areas closer to the volcano, and less likely to affect Rotorua, but is a 
possibility that needs to be considered. 
Though most water supplies in the Rotorua area are sourced from springs or bores, some 
smaller water supplies are from surface water. The Lake Rotoma settlement takes its water 
from the lake itself. A storage reservoir of 220 m3 supplies an average of 71 m3 of water 
per day to a total of 125 properties (Rotorua District Council, 2003). Heavy ashfalls in the 
area would result in siltation of the lake, which may in tum damage pumps and 
contaminate water supplies. Depending on volatile content of the ash, the pH may decrease 
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in the lake waters. Fine suspended ash components in the water would also make drinking 
water cloudy. Current treatment of Rotoma water comprises solely of light chlorination, 
which would not remedy any of these effects. However in an 1886 type scenario the 
community at Rotoma (which is situated around the southern side of the lake) may be 
inundated with over 30 cm of tephra. This volume of ash may if wet, put a load on 
buildings of over 600 kg m2 (5.9 kPa), certainly enough to damage buildings and collapse 
roofs. It is inevitable that this volume of ash would result in the evacuation of this 
community. Not only would buildings be destroyed, roads would also be closed, and the 
lack of facilities in the immediate area would isolate residents without a supply of food or 
medical attention. Light ashfalls that did not result in evacuation would only be expected to 
affect the water supply briefly, residents may have to temporarily rely on bottled water for 
drinking. 
Tauranga 
Tauranga itself will probably be subject to only light basaltic ashfall (a few millimetres fell 
in 1886), up to 5 cm in a worst-case scenario (assuming a southeast wind). While it is 
approximately 65 km from Tarawera Volcano, the catchment area for Tauranga's water 
supply is about 12-15 km closer, which may be subject to heavier ashfall in the event of an 
eruption. The Tautau and Waiorohi streams supply the city with water. In tum they are fed 
by springs from a large aquifer in the foothills of the Kaimai ranges. The headwaters of the 
two streams are situated approximately 50 km northwest of Tarawera, the streams flow 
away from the volcano, towards Tauranga. The Tautau stream supplies the Joyce Road 
water treatment plant (WTP) with up to 37,000 m3 of water per day, the Waiorohi supplies 
the Oropi plant with 30,000 m3 per day (Tauranga District Council, 2003). Distances from 
the springs to raw water pumps vary from 2000 to 5000m, as there are numerous springs 
(B. Everitt, pers. comm., 2003). While the aquifer will not be affected by an eruption of 
Tarawera Volcano, the streams will be; ash falling on the catchment area between the 
springs and the pumping stations may result in massive amounts of siltation in the river, 
especially as rain during or after ash deposition washes ash from the catchment into the 
streams. Landslips in the Waiorohi stream have in the past caused major problems for the 
Oropi pump station and treatment plants, as the sediment load carried by the stream has 
resulted in large influxes of silt and ash (from past eruptions in TVZ). This has caused the 
plant to shut down on one occasion (Tauranga District Council, 2003). However the Oropi 
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WTP has in the past used a flashmixer to mix alum, lime and water before filtration 
through sand, and then chlorination. Colloidal material (mostly tephra) has been 
responsible for the damage. A recent upgrade of the Oropi WTP to a microfiltration 
treatment plant has made it more resistant to sediment influx. Between the stream and the 
pump intake, Oropi uses a sediment-settling basin to minimise sediment input. This is 
followed by a 14 m x 20 m treatment sedimentation tank, and a 3 mm screen before the 
0.2µm filters. The Joyce Road WTP also uses microfiltration to clean water (plus a small 
amount of chemicals). Water is first passed through screens with 3-5 mm holes to stop 
leaves and large objects. It then travels through a 25m diameter raw water holding tank and · 
a 0.5 mm screen before entering raw water pumps, and eventually the microfilters (B. 
Everitt, pers. comm., 2003). In this way sediment input is minimised. However some 
tephra will still reach the microfilters, especially when the streams carry high sediment 
loads. Current procedure is to cease pumping when turbidity exceeds 500 NTU 
(Nephelometric Turbidity Units) (B. Everitt, pers. comm., 2003). (New Zealand drinking 
water standards are for water to be clearer than 0.1 NTU). Despite ash entering the system, 
particles that get through the sedimentation . basins and screens are not expected to 
adversely affect the membranes - they are designed to cope with filtering sediment, and do 
cope with the influx of existing rhyolitic ash from deposits in the area. However as the 
sediment load is increased, the capacity of the plants is reduced. This is a function of the 
solids loading capacity of the membranes. As more particles are trapped by the 
membranes, less water is able to pass through. A reduced amount of water will therefore be 
available for supply. Should turbidity in either stream exceed the 500 NTU threshold, 
shutting down one of the plants, water supplies will be reduced further. Fortunately 
supplies are able to be diverted from the Joyce WTP in these situations. · 
In the eventuality of high siltation in the streams forcing both plants to temporarily close, 
Tauranga will be able to temporarily manage to supply essential water to residents, with 
the aid of water restrictions to preserve reservoir stores. Current storage capacities for 
treated water in the Tauranga area (including Mount Maunganui) are 68,650 m3• Water use 
in the area currently averages between 30,000 and 35,000 m3 per day, however in summer 
this has been up to 57,000 m3 per day (B. Everitt,pers. comm., 2003). Essentially Tauranga 
has therefore about 2 days (under normal demand) of water stored. Water use restrictions 
could be put in place in a civil emergency, but basic requirements would still put high 
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demand on the reservoirs. Moreover water demand usually increases in times of ashfall, as 
residents use hoses to clean their property (Johnston et al., 2000a). Bringing water in by 
tankers to supply a city of over 90,000 is not feasible. Therefore it is essential that pumps 
are turned off during high sediment flow in the supply streams. As the suspended load 
decreased pumping may then be reinstated to replenish reservoirs. Regular emptying of the 
Oropi WTP sediment settling tanks and the Joyce Road WTP raw water holding tank will 
be required to avoid excessive build-up of fine tephra. Provided the usual procedures are 
followed, Tauranga's water supply is expected to be robust enough to survive ashfall from 
Tarawera Volcano. Often water supplies are reliant on the integrity of electricity supplies 
to keep pumps working. However dependence on electricity is not an issue for water 
supplies in Tauranga. All pump stations and treatment plants are equipped with permanent 
diesel standby generators that automatically start in the event of power failure. The 
distance of Tauranga from Tarawera Volcano makes it susceptible only to distal hazards 
such as ashfall. Tephra is not thought to be likely to be thick enough to severely damage 
buildings in this area (at worst about 3 cm), water supplies are therefore the most important 
lifeline to be at risk of damage from Tarawera Volcano. However the water treatment plant 
infrastructure, and methods employed by Tauranga District Council at present should cope 
with a basaltic eruption of Tarawera. 
Whakatane 
Like Tauranga, Whakatane's water supply is fed from a river. In this case water is sourced 
from the Whakatane River, just upstream from the town. This source also supplies almost 
1500 connections in Ohope and Otarawaiwere. Water is pumped through a single silt trap 
and clarifier before being filtered through sand, and then chemically treated (Johnston, 
1997). A pre-settlement tank is expected to be installed during upgrades planned to take 
effect in 5-6 years (S. Selvaratnam, pers. comm., 2003). Any west or southwest wind 
during an eruption of Tarawera will result in the parts of the catchment area of the 
Whakatane river being subjected to moderate tephra deposits of up to 10 cm average 
thickness. Much of this will be washed into the Whakatane River in the event of rain, 
resulting in high levels of turbidity. Should pumps continue to be operated in these 
conditions, a large influx of ash into the system would quickly damage and/or block pumps 
and treatment facilities. While the treatment facility still functioned, fine colloidal material 
would not be adequately filtered and storage reservoirs would be contaminated by cloudy, 
Chapter 5 Lifelines, infrastructure, agriculture and forestry 112 
possibly slightly acidic water. In the event of pumps being turned off before turbidity 
levels were too high, Whakatane would still have to rely on what supplies were stored in 
reservoirs. Daily peak demand of water from the Whakatane River averages 1 l 880m3• 
Reservoir capacity is essentially 10,300 m3 from the main reservoirs, plus a few hundred 
cubic metres from small reservoirs above the Melville subdivision (Whakatane District 
Council). This capacity represents less than one day of normal water supply. Immediate 
and severe water restrictions would therefore need to be emplaced in the event of an 
eruption affecting the water supply to prevent Whakatane running out of essential water. 
The same scenario applies to water supplies stopping because of electricity supplies being 
cut off as Whakatane currently has no alternative backup generators. The district council 
plans to install a single 200kV diesel backup generator in 2004 (S. Selvaratnam, pers. 
comm. 2003). 
Kawerau 
Water supplies in Kawerau are drawn from covered springs and should thus prove to be 
unaffected directly by tephra fall. However the pumps for the water supply will still be 
vulnerable to power cuts if the electricity supply is compromised. 
"The Plains" Water Supply 
The area bounded by State Highway 30, the Tarawera and Whakatane rivers and the coast 
is supplied by the Plains Water Supply. Edgecumbe and Awakeri are included in this 
supply. Water is derived from an artesian spring, adjacent to Braemar road, near the 
Tarawera River (Whakatane District Council, 2003). Ash influx is not likely to affect this 
supply given the subterranean source, however the pipeline travels across the Tarawera 
River on its own specially constructed bridge. This bridge may be at risk of being washed 
away in the event of lahars travelling down the Tarawera River after an eruption. A backup 
pump and bores near Otakiri may provide emergency water supplies should this happen, 
however it is possible that lahars may be large enough to affect this system too. Again this 
water supply is dependent on the integrity of electricity supplies. 
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5.2.5 Wastewater 
W astewater infrastructure, referring to storm.water drains, sewage pipes and sewage works 
will be adversely affected by any influx of volcanic ash. In some cases storm.water drains 
connect into sewage pipes, and storm.water thus passes through wastewater treatment 
plants before discharge. In this situation, ash is easily washed off roads and roofs into 
storm.water drains, and then into the wastewater treatment facilities. It can block up drains, 
damage pumps, filters, clarifiers and solid removal equipment. Biofilters may be stripped 
of growth and excessive wear on pumps and pumping components is iikely (Blong, 1984). 
Settlement ponds will accumulate more sediment than they can handle. These precede 
oxidation ponds, to take solid matter out of sewage. However tephra will not be adequately 
filtered out and ash will make · its way into the oxidation ponds, inhibiting biological 
oxidation. Airborne tephra falling directly into oxidation ponds will make this even worse. 
In these eventualities, raw sewage may end up being pumped directly into the sea/river. 
Blockages and damage in the waste treatment system in Yakima after the Mt. St. Helens 
eruption in 1980 resulted in raw sewage having to be pumped directly into the Yakima 
River for a few days, bypassing the treatment plant until repairs and cleaning could take 
place (Blong, 1984). Effects expected from ashfall in the Bay of Plenty region on local 
sewage treatment plants are not expected to be quite as severe, as storm.water and sewage 
are not combined in any of the 3 main urban centres. 
Sewage treatment plants 
Rotorua 
W astewater and storm.water systems in Rotorua are kept separate. Stormwater is piped 
directly to waterways and to Lake Rotorua (Rotorua District Council, 2003). Both light and 
heavy ashfalls in Rotorua may result in tephra blocking drains, the severity defined by the 
amount of tephra that is allowed to enter the system - in turn partly dependent on how 
much is present. Sewage systems in Rotorua would be affected either directly via ashfall 
on oxidation ponds, or by electricity cuts stopping any/all of the 53 sewage pumping 
stations in Rotorua and Ngongotaha from working. Some sewage disposal in Rotorua takes 
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place by spraying effluent in Whakawerawera forest. This would also cease without 
electricity to drive the pumps. 
Tauranga 
An influx of tephra is expected to cause blockages in Tauranga's stormwater drains. The 
worst-case scenario of ~5 cm of ashfall could cause substantial problems for drainage if it 
rains before roads and buildings are cleared of ash. Like Rotorua, sewage and stormwater 
are not interconnected in Tauranga, which will help sewage treatment facilities function 
after an ashfall. 101 wastewater pumping stations and 829 km of sewage pipeline exist in 
Tauranga (Tauranga District Council, 2003) they should remain unaffected, unless illegal 
connections from stormwater systems exist that may introduce tephra fo the system. 
However airfall directly into the two treatment plants (Chapel Street and Te Maunga), will 
inhibit the biological oxidation processes used to treat raw sewage. Sewage that is not fully 
processed may end up being discharged from Tauranga' s deep-sea effluent outfall pipeline. 
Consequently pumps used to do this may suffer from abrasion from tephra passing through 
them. 
Whakatane 
Whakatane's main problem with sewage processing may come from electricity outages, 
cutting power to the 13 electric pump stations. The 23-hectare oxidation pond will also 
suffer from an influx of airborne tephra, creating an anoxic environment and killing off the 
micro-organisms used to treat sewage. The lack of power to run pumps will not be as 
important to sewage reticulation as it may first appear - any power cuts will also have 
stopped the water supply from working. There will thus be little input of sewage to those 
systems after Whakatane has run out of water (reservoir storage is less than 24 hours under 
normal usage). Assuming power remains working or is reinstated, the effluent taken from 
the oxidation ponds is normally pumped to an outfall pipe that discharges the treated 
effluent 600 metres out to sea. The pump that performs this task will be subject to abrasion 
from tephra in these oxidation ponds, and may subsequently fail. Stormwater systems will 
be at risk from an inundation of tephra following rainfall, and causing blockages - which in 
turn cause localised flooding. 
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5.2.6 Telecommunications 
Problems commonly affecting telecommunications during eruptions include atmospheric 
electrical interference of microwave and VHF or UHF radio signals, lightning strikes on 
repeater stations and poles carrying lines, exchange air-conditioning failing due to tephra 
blocking intake filters, the disruption of power supplies and tephra loading collapsing lines 
- or buildings in extreme cases. Overloading of networks as people check on neighbours 
and relatives can also cause temporary cuts to telephonic communications, this occurred in 
Yakima after the Mt. St. Helens eruption for example (Blong, 1984). 
There is a high probability that radio, mobile phone and landline phone communications 
will be severely interfered with from atmospheric electrical disturbances during an 
eruption from Tarawera, while large volumes of tephra are present in the air. Although this 
does not always happen during eruptions it is a frequent occurrence, and the 1886 
Tarawera eruption was no exception. Telegraph operators in both Maketu and Rotorua 
found transmission impossible during the eruption, though lines were still intact (see 
chapter 2). The phreatomagmatic activity expected from Rotomahana also increases the 
chance of electrical disturbances, due to the high conductivity associated with wet tephra. 
Backscattering of radio wave energy caused by ionised gaseous columns and lightning will 
disrupt most radio wavelengths, microwave frequencies are more likely to be attenuated by 
absorption of the signal in the ash cloud (Blong, 1984). Radio communication by civil 
defence authorities during an eruption will thus be compromised. 
Not only will radio communications be affected, telephone communication in several 
towns will be disrupted because of electromagnetic disturbances. Four microwave repeater 
stations are located within a 30 km radius of Tarawera and Rotomahana. The closest one is 
situated on top of Mount Edgecumbe, the others are at Manawahe, on Ngongotaha 
(Rotorua) and in the Paeroa Range. Being situated on high ground they are all susceptible 
to damage from lightning strikes, the Mt. Edgecumbe microwave tower particularly so, 
given its proximity. This repeater station connects Rerewhakaaitu, Murupara and Galatea 
to the Telecom network, via the Manawahe station. Damage to this would leave these 
settlements without telecommunications until repairs could be made. Between Whakatane 
and Tauranga a fibre optic cable provides a physical link to the network, similarly Rotorua 
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and Taupo are also linked with a fibre optic cable (Johnston, 1997). These cables should 
provide a more robust link during and after an eruption, though electrical disturbances 
during the presence of the ash cloud may still affect these connections. 
The effects of ashfall on exchanges are potentially severe if tephra manages to penetrate 
exchange buildings. Both electrical and abrasive damage of equipment is possible. 
Rotorua, which may potentially receive more ash than either Whakatane or Tauranga, 
fortunately has a reasonably well-sealed building, maintaining a positive pressure inside. 
Charcoal air scrubbers on the bottom floor are designed to clean the outside air of gas, and· 
are largely effective - though some corrosion from H2S has occurred. Air conditioning 
units are also placed on the flat roof. All of these air-conditioning units and backup diesel 
generator air intakes have filters installed (Gordon, 2002). The survival of the air-
conditioning is essential for two reasons. Firstly, without positive pressure inside the 
building, ash is much more likely to find its way inside, and interfere with electronic 
equipment. Secondly, the systems produce a great deal of heat, and need to be cooled to 
continue to operate. Overheating will result in systems shutting down within half an hour if 
air-conditioning systems are rendered inoperative. For this reason ash will need to be 
removed from intake filters or filters replaced quickly after an eruption. An 1886 type 
eruption will be over in a matter of hours, and therefore this essential maintenance should 
be easily completed. 
In the event of power cuts, all exchanges have back-up batteries that will provide essential 
power for 4-8 hours, after which diesel generators will take over. Telecom service boxes 
around Rotorua have recently been upgraded with Invensys TM air-conditioning. units, as 
opposed to simple air vents. While the service boxes are otherwise sealed, the intakes for 
the air-conditioning units have no filters (Gordon, 2002). These will be susceptible to ash 
infiltration, which may in turn damage components, and cause localized disruptions to 
telephone connections. 
The most catastrophic damage that may possibly occur would be the collapse of roofs on 
exchange buildings. While unlikely to happen in Whakatane or Tauranga, it is a possibility 
in Rotorua in the event of easterly winds during an eruption. This would destroy most 
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equipment on the top floor, and all air-conditioning on the roof, which would in turn stop 
all equipment from working, closing the exchange down. 
5.3 Agriculture and Forestry 
The Bay of Plenty region is intensively farmed and commercially forested, with 312,420 
hectares of land currently utilized in these ways. The Agricultural Production Survey for 
the year ended 30 June 1999 listed land use by Regional Council, giving the following 
results for the Bay of Plenty: 
Table 5.5 Land use within the Bay of Plenty regional council boundaries, as of June 30 1999 
(Source: Statistics NZ) 
Grazing, Arable, Land in Horticulture Plantations of Other land Total Land 
Fodder and Fallow Exotic Timber 
Land 
Number Area in Number Area m Number Area in Number Area in Number Area in 
of Farms Hectares of Farms Hectares of Farms Hectares of Farms Hectares of Farms Hectares 
3,876 254, 548 525 2,595 690 13,564 975 41 ,434 4,020 312,140 
The above figures on take into account land within the Bay of Plenty Regional Council 
(EBOP) boundaries (figure 5.11). Commercial forest plantations also cover a large area to 
the south of Rotorua, in Rotorua district but under the auspices of the Waikato Regional 
Council. The same survey lists 39,397 hectares of land as being used for plantations of 
exotic timber in Waikato (Statistics NZ). These figures indicate that there is a lot of 
productive land at risk from a basaltic eruption of Tarawera. Effects will differ depending 
on land use, ash thickness and in some cases what season it is. 
Figure 5. I I Bay of Plenty Regional Council (EBOP) boundmy 
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5.3.1 Horticulture and Agriculture 
Even a few millimeters of ash have the capability to cause massive amounts of damage to 
crops, and potentially harm livestock. Depending on the thickness of the ash and the 
season, short-term effects could devastate the local agricultural industry. Although any 
season an eruption will cause major damage to agriculture and horticulture, at some times 
of the year damage will be exacerbated by the stage various crops are at. Any time between 
November and April will cause worse impacts than during the rest of the year. During 
these times annual crops will be ripening. Leafy crops such as cabbage, lettuce and 
broccoli will be ruined by even light ashfalls (Johnston, 1997). Pollination of flowering 
crops may not occur if thin layers of ash cover the flowers. The devastation of citrus 
production in the province of Catania by 1-3 mm ashfalls in the 2002 eruption of Etna 
illustrated how vulnerable crops are to ashfall, especially if affected during vulnerable 
stages of development (chapter 3). Table 5.6 indicates critical stages of development for 






Table 5.6 Periods of high crop risk from ash falls (from Johnston, 1997) 
Blossom 
End or flowering 
Initial stages of growth and flowertng 
Flowering stages 
Early stages or growth 
After blossoming Later stages of development 
Stonefrull Blossom _Cos~me=tl=c e=ff=ec=ts ____ _ 
Emergence 
Klwllrult Blossom .;..;;Ha::::..rv=esl=·----
Grape Flowerlng Fruit development -'-'Ha~rv~e=st ____ _ 
,,_.tember !October !November !December 1Januarv IFebruarv !March IAortl IMav !June 
Johnston & Nairn (1993) indicate crops and pastures under 50 mm of ash or more are not 
likely to survive tephra falls. However pastures have been shown to be able to recover in 
greater depths of ash than this. After the 1886 eruption plants buried at this depth or deeper 
than this began to quickly re-establish themselves. In many areas this happened by the next 
spring (3 months later). For example Te Puke, with 75 mm oftephra and Opouriau with 50 
mm both had grass growing back through the ash in this short time (Kearn, 1988). The 
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same applied to Opotiki, though only 3 cm of ash was present here. Certainly 50 mm of 
tephra will bury pastures and kill many crops, but experience from 1886 indicates that_ the 
basaltic ash is fertile enough that plants may survive moderate burials, · and pastures may 
recover even with tephra thicknesses of 75 mm. Recovery of pastures will be sped up if 
tephra is ploughed into the existing soil. The fertility of the soil is expected to improve, 
based on reports from 1886 (Kearn, 1988), and observations from the surrounding area of 
Etna. Ploughing ash into soil will also help prevent its remobilization, however this is only 
possible with depths of ash up to 200 mm (Johnston, 1997). 
The effects of even moderate ashfalls on livestock essentially amount to a sudden loss of 
feed, and possibly water supplies. Feed will need to be imported from outside the area to 
supplement available pasture if tephra deposits exceed 5 mm. Amounts over this will result 
in the need for all feed to be brought in from elsewhere, and/or stock may need to be 
transported away to unaffected areas. 
The leaching of toxic substances into soils from the ash is also possible - Fluorosis is 
commonly responsible for the deaths of stock when a significant component of fluoride is 
present within volcanic ash. This has occurred in several Icelandic eruptions, and was 
responsible for the deaths of over 2000 grazing animals from the 11 October 1995 eruption 
ofRuapehu (Cronin et al., 2003). An immediate toxic dietary intake ofF is >100 µg g·1 for 
grazing animals, though they may become sick before this: Cattle can tolerate around 40 
µg F g·1, sheep up to 60 µg F g·1. lnge~tion of fluoride occurs directly as tephra is 
consumed along with grass - under normal winter conditions sheep ingest 260-275 g of soil 
per day, stock foraging for feed amongst ash are likely to take in even more (Cronin et al., 
2003). A leachate analysis of ash collected from Mount Etna in November 2002 was 
conducted by the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences to determine the possibility 
of fluoride within samples of ash from the 2002 eruption (Table 5. 7). 
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Table 5. 7 Leach ate analysis of samples of Etna 2002 ash. Sample collection dates and distance from source 
are given 
25 km, 10/11/02 12 km, 07/11/02 
Lithium mg/g of dry ash <0.0005 <0.0005 
Sodium mg/g of dry ash 0.189 0.111 
Potassium mg/g of dry ash 0.024 0.0 
Calcium mg/g of dry ash 0.073 0.152 
Magnesium mg/g of dry ash 0.0072 0.0072 
Sulphate mg/g of dry ash 0.38 0.46 
Boron mg/g of dry ash 0.0013 <0.001 
Silica (as SiO2) mg/g of dry ash 0.014 0.027 
Nitrate (as N) mg/g of dry ash 0.0016 <0.0015 
Phosphate (as P) mg/g of dry ash <0.0025 <0.0025 
Al mg/g of dry ash 0.0072 0.0022 
Arsenic mg/g of dry ash 0.0082 0.006 
Bromide mg/g of dry ash <0.005 <0.005 
Chloride mg/g of dry ash 0.097 0.077 
Fluoride mg/g of dry ash 0.05 0.025 
Iron mg/g of dry ash <0.0002 0.0004 
Amounts were generally low, however the sample collected in Catania on 10 November 
gave results of 50 µg g·1• This is above the toxicity threshold for cattle. No reports of 
fluorosis have been given to date, but most of the land use around Etna is devoted to 
horticulture, with some sheep farming. Cattle are not common. No evidence of fluorosis 
occurring exists from the Tarawera 1886 eruption, but nevertheless it is a possibility that 
needs to be considered. 
Long-term effects 
Deeper deposits of ash will result in longer recovery times. The immediate vicinity of 
Tarawera and Rotomahana was completely devastated after the 1886 eruption. Nothing 
survived above 850 m (Clarkson & Clarkson, 1991) and only a few patches of vegetation 
survived below this on the southeast side of the mountain. The area to the west of 
Rotomahana was affected by base surges, which also killed and buried everything in their 
path. These deeply buried areas remained barren for about 10 years. Toetoe and tutu 
colonized near the shores of Lake Tarawera, and mat daisies began colonizing the middle 
slopes within 20 years. After 40 years forest was extending up the mountain from the lake 
edge - seeds were being spread by wind and birds (Clarkson & Clarkson, 1991). These 
areas that took time to recover were not infertile, there was simply too much tephra for 
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plants that were buried to grow through, re-colonization was necessary. The high 
permeability of the tephra meant that little rilling or surface erosion took place after the 
eruption, and the ash largely remained in place (White et al., 1997). Plants were therefore 
not exposed by subsequent rains, and remained covered in ash. In the long-term a deposit 
of basaltic ash will be beneficial, as the mineralogy of the ash will improve soil fertility. 
Many farmers and market gardeners may however be ruined financially before they can 
reap the benefits of the improved soils. 
5.3.2 Forestry 
Ashfall alone is not likely to kill mature trees, but the accumulated weight of ash is likely 
to break large branches in proximal areas. Rees (1970) indicated that this is likely to occur 
with ashfall over 500 mm thickness. Over 1500 mm would kill all trees, under 500 mm 
would result in slight damage and partial survival of shrubs. These results were based on 
the Paricutin eruption of 1943-52. Eggler (1963, cited in Blong 1984) also studying the 
Paricutin eruption noted that pine trees with basal diameters from 100-300 mm had the 
best rates of survival. This was because the trunks/branches were strong enough to resist 
excessive bending, but flexible enough to dump part of the ash load. The 1886 Tarawera 
eruption also gives a good indication of likely damage to trees. Even at 8 km from the 
Rotomahana section of the fissure, trees in Te Wairoa were completely defoliated by the 
ash, lapilli and mud. Trees here had bark stripped off the east side (facing Rotomahana), 
even though they were 2 km beyond the extent of base surges (Kearn, 1988). Partly buried 
trees such as kamahi and tawa quickly resprouted though, some even producing _seed the 
next year (Clarkson & Clarkson, 1991). To the northwest of Tarawera the 500 mm ashfall 
isopach almost reaches Lake Tikitapu, 11 km from the fissure. Thicknesses here were 
estimated by surveyor Henry Roche to be about 45 cm (Kearn, 1988). The effects of ashfall 
here were a little more severe than the "slight damage" description given by Rees (1970) 
for this depth of ash. Photographs show that all trees are completely defoliated, several 
have fallen or lost branches (figures 5.11 & 5.12). It should be noted however that fallen 
trees in this area are attributed not just to ashfall, but also to strong winds that were 
blowing that night. 
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f 
Figure 5.12, Tikitapu, 13 June, 1886 A. Ryan photograph 
~-----
Figure 5.13 Tikitapu, July-September 1886 Burton Brothers photograph. 
Note defoliated trees on the slope to the left of the lake 
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Downwind (northeast) of Tarawera on 10 June 1886, the 500 mm isopach fell 
approximately 12 km from source. This distance can therefore be taken as a likely 
maximum for a 500 mm isopach. Even though trees beyond this will be damaged, and 
defoliated for a few more kilometers, they will still be able to be harvested. (This will 
apply to some trees under this distance also). Beyond about 25 km (the maximum distance 
from source of the 300 mm isopach) trees . may suffer some defoliation and branch 
breakages, but most will survive. 
Even trees that are felled by the eruption may still be able to be harvested. 3000ha of trees 
belonging to the Weyerhaeuser Corporation were downed by pyroclastic flows from Mt. St 
Helens in 1980. Approximately 80% of these trees were still able to be salvaged (Blong, 
1984). This should apply to forests in the Bay of Plenty region also, once access to those 
forests is gained after clearing roads. The age and therefore size and value of the trees will 
have a bearing on this. Saplings proximal to the volcano are likely to be destroyed by 
heavy ashfalls, or at least damaged enough that they are rendered worthless. 
Replanting directly into the ash, or into soil covered in basaltic ash is expected to be 
successful. Pinus Radiata, which is widely grown in NZ, (including the Bay of Plenty) is 
successfully planted directly into basaltic ash on the slopes of Mt. Etna. Species of pine 
grow extremely well on Tarawera today, wilding pines such as Pinus Nigra and Pinus 
Contorta have spread over parts of Tarawera faster than many native plant communities 
(Clarkson & Clarkson, 1991). Growth through the 1886 tephra is exemplified by the fact 
that Poplar fence-posts in Te Wairoa that were buried in the ash have since grown into 
large poplar trees, and still stand amongst the "buried village" today. 
5.4 Discussion 
An eruption of the magnitude of the 1886 eruption could devastate the Bay of Plenty 
region, the amount of damage largely contingent upon wind direction. Although the 
likelihood of ashfall on Rotorua is low due to prevailing winds, the possibility of ashfall 
deposits totalling 30 cm thick exists. Many roofs will collapse, destroying houses, industry 
and the local economy. Roads will be essentially blocked to all but minimal 4wd traffic. 
No air traffic except helicopters would be able to land within the area. Line and substation 
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failure would result in electricity cuts, in tum causing most water supplies and wastewater 
reticulation to fail. Similar effects could be had in Kawerau. Both of these centres may 
require evacuation of many residents, depending on the amount of damage. Some will have 
to be relocated due to their homes being destroyed. Those that stayed would need to be 
able to co-ordinate with civil defence to ensure basic living conditions could be 
maintained, e.g. having sufficient/safe shelter, food and water supplies. 
Light ashfalls will result in temporary power cuts, airport closure in Rotorua, sewage 
treatment disruptions and some road closures. Seasonal crops may be damaged. Whakatane · 
would not be subject to tephra fall as thick as is possible for Kawerau or Rotorua, but may 
experience electricity disruptions, sewage reticulation failures and will possibly run out of 
water. Leaving the region by road will be difficult until ash is cleared from SH 2 to 
Tauranga. Due to its distance from Tarawera Volcano, Tauranga is less vulnerable tha:n 
Rotorua or Whakatane. Its water supply uses robust filtration methods, and diesel 
generators provide backup if power fails. Tephra loading damage is unlikely. In the event 
of easterly winds, power may be cut in the region of the Tarukenga substation. Tauranga's 
electricity supply is therefore its most vulnerable lifeline. 
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Chapter6 
Discussion 
6.1 Thesis Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis were: 
• To identify possible hazards associated with a future basaltic eruption ofTarawera 
• To determine probable effects of those hazards on the Bay of Plenty region, 
including the identification of vulnerable lifelines and infrastructure. 
6.2 Conclusions 
The likelihood of a future 1886 type eruption from Tarawera Volcano is unknown. The 
short geological history of Tarawera precludes a pattern of eruption types and frequency 
from being evident. However the fact that the 1886 eruption was not only the most recent 
basaltic eruption in Taupo Volcanic Zone, but the largest, indicates that future basaltic 
activity is definitely possible from this volcano. This possibility requires steps to be taken 
by local authorities to ensure that the risks associated with such a volcano are minimized. 
This thesis has sought to identify probable hazards and their potential effects as a step 
towards mitigating the hazards posed by basaltic volcanism at Tarawera Volcano. 
In the event of an 1886 type eruption the Bay of Plenty region will be affected by a range 
of hazards types, including ashfall, bomb and lapilli fallout, phreatomagmatic eruptions 
and base surges, hydrothermal eruptions, lava flows, lahars, earthquakes, seiching and 
poisonous gases. These processes will devastate parts of the Bay of Plenty region. How 
much damage is done will in part be determined by wind direction, as this will govern 
which distal areas are affected. 
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Proximal areas 
Much of the immediate area around Lake Rotomahana / Waimangu will be completely 
destroyed by base surges. Phreatomagmatic explosions arising from the interaction of 
magma and the groundwater of the Rotomahana-Waimangu geothermal system will create 
both primary surges from lateral blasts, and secondary pyroclastic surges from the collapse 
of unstable eruption columns. As well as completely destroying houses, farms, forests and 
several minor roads, these surges are also likely to reach State Highway 5, south of 
Waimangu, cutting off the main Rotorua-Taupo link. The 220kV transmission lines which 
represent one of two main electrical links for the Bay of Plenty to the rest of New Zealand 
also fall within the hazard zone posed by base surges. 
All areas within 20 km of the volcano will be subject to lapilli up to 32 mm, causing minor 
damage to property and possibly causing some injury. 64 mm clasts may travel up to 12 
km, and will have enough impact energy to break windows, roof tiles and to damage iron 
roofs. The risk of severe injuries and fatalities will be posed to people and livestock. 
Larger bombs up to 128 mm may be thrown as far as 6 km. These will create more 
damage, possibly even penetrating iron roofs. 
The hazards posed by lava flows will pose little threat to infrastructure or lifelines, as the 
area affected by them consist largely of forests. Fires started by the flows pose more 
danger as they have the potential to spread far beyond the limits of the lava flows 
themselves. 
Proximal areas will also be subject to thick tephra accumulations, killing trees, collapsing 
buildings and burying roads. The Spencer Road community is extremely vulnerable to this, 
due to its proximity. The only closer communities are Rerewhakaaitu and houses in the 
Rotomahana area. While also vulnerable they face more of a threat from base surges. 
Medial areas 
Kawerau and Rotorua may be affected by up to 30 cm thick ashfall deposits. The 
likelihood of this much ash falling on Rotorua is low due to prevailing winds being 
westerly, but it is a possibility. Effects will include the collapse of roofs and possibly entire 
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structures, especially of commercial and industrial buildings with large-span, low-pitch or 
flat roofs. Power lines may be brought down by tephra loading, electrical flashovers will 
occur on substation and transmission line insulators, especially on low voltage lines. 
Ensuing power cuts will in turn cause most water supplies and wastewater reticulation to 
fail. Roads will be blocked to all but minimal 4wd traffic. Steep hills will be impassable to 
all vehicles until roads have been cleared with heavy earthmoving equipment. This 
thickness of tephra may result in the evacuation of many residents, depending on the 
amount of damage sustained. Some will have to be relocated due to their homes being 
destroyed. 
In the event of light ( < 5 cm) of ashfall, effects will still be considerable. The airport at 
Rotorua will be closed, as will many roads. Temporary power cuts may occur, causing 
water shortages and sewage reticulation failure. Seasonal crops will sustain heavy losses, 
but long-term fertility of soils is expected to be improved. Stormwater drainage systems 
may be inundated by large amounts of tephra and subsequently blocked, resulting in 
localized flooding during even moderate rain. 
Hazards affecting Rotorua and. Kawerau that are not contingent upon wind direction 
include minor earthquakes not expected to be larger than MM V. In Rotorua, possible gas 
bursts of CO2 and H2S may occur as a result of tremors. Such gas releases will asphyxiate 
people in enclosed rooms or in extreme proximity to the source of these gases. Rotorua 
may also experience hazardous hydrothermal eruptions in its geothermally active area. 
These areas include not only parks, but the CBD and a few residential zones. 
Distal areas 
The maximum amount of ashfall expected in Whakatane is~ 7.5 cm, the same amount as it 
received in 1886. Whakatane's most vulnerable lifeline is its water supply, it currently has 
no back-up generator if electricity fails, and its water is derived from the Tarawera river, 
which may be subject to lahars and/or high sediment loads. Reservoirs in Whakatane hold 
less water than is usually used in any 24-hour period. Sewage reticulation is also dependant 
on electricity, which again is vulnerable to cuts. This is possible both from local substation 
damage at Edgecumbe and Tarukenga, and from disruptions to main transmission lines 
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south of Waimangu. The integrity of these lines is necessary for the entire Bay of Plenty 
region to connect to the national grid. Some back-up power may be available from the 
Matahina and Aniwhenua hydro stations, assuming Edgecumbe station survives. The 
electricity supply is the most vulnerable of Tauranga's lifelines, it is included in the region 
depending on the Tarukenga substation. Otherwise it is distal enough that the light ashfalls 
possible will be of nuisance value rather than hazardous. 
Distal roading will be affected, especially for Whakatane. Even ash deposits of 1 mm will 
create traction and visibility problems, causing accidents and slowing traffic. Thicker 
deposits will close roads to all but essential traffic, and in some cases will only be passable 
by 4wd vehicles. Connecting to any main centre from Whak:atane will involve driving 
closer to Tarawera, and thus into thicker tephra deposits. Leaving the region by road will 
be difficult until ash is cleared from SH 2 to Tauranga. 
6.3 Recommendations 
The most vulnerable communities are of course those closest to the volcano. However 
mitigating effects of some hazards is not possible; Rotomahana and Rerewhakaaitu 
settlements are both in danger of destruction from base surges, yet little could be done to 
alleviate these effects. Evacuation is the only option available. However evacuation may 
not always be possible in some areas. Spencer Road is also close enough that complete 
destruction of houses and the lifelines serving this community is a possibility. An 
evacuation of this community would save many lives, however should an eruption start 
before this had taken place, the sole evacuation route could very easily be cut off. The 
northern part of the community around Te Karamea Bay is 2 km further from the volcano 
than the closest part of the road at Ohinetekura point. At this proximity getting 2 km closer 
to the volcano would be extremely dangerous, and may not be possible. Building a suitable 
vehicle track or road to connect Spencer Road with Millar Road (see figure 4.6) would 
provide an emergency evacuation route. Only 2 km separates these roads, therefore only a 
small amount of money would be required to create an access route that will potentially 
save hundreds oflives. 
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Whakatane has a water supply that is particularly vulnerable to volcanic hazards. This is 
partly due to its source from the Whakatane river, which may be subject to lahars and/or 
high turbidity levels after an eruption. Current treatment methods will not cope with a large 
sediment influx; further settling tanks are required. While one has been proposed to be 
emplaced within 5-6 years, this needs to be prioritized. Whakatane does not have a large 
reservoir capacity, so stored water will not last for even 24 hours under normal usage. It is 
therefore important that treatment does not fail. Increasing the number or capacity of 
reservoirs would also help to reduce the risks posed by an eruption. 
Electrical weather sheds on insulators in areas proximal to Tarawera could be made larger 
to reduce the risk of flashovers cause by the adherence of wet volcanic ash. Thus the risk 
of power failures would be reduced. 
Currently only a few houses and farms exist in close proximity to Rotomahana. Recent 
trends towards the creation of "lifestyle blocks" in New Zealand have included areas such 
as the eastern shore of Lake Rotorua. Should this type of development occur here, the 
vulnerability of the area would increase as more property was put at risk. No mitigation 
can be effected against pyroclastic surges, it is therefore strongly recommended that the 
district and regional councils oppose residential development in this area. 
During a period of precursory activity, several steps could be taken mitigate possible 
effects of an eruption. These include: 
• Relocating earthmoving and road maintenance equipment away from depots near 
Tarawera, such as the Rotorua depot, would prevent them from being buried in 
deep tephra deposits. They would then be available to be used in re-opening roads 
into affected areas. 
• Stockpiling of electrical cables by power compames to replace downed 
transmission lines would lessen the time taken to re-establish electrical distribution 
networks after the cessation of the eruption. 
• The closure of geothermal parks such as Kuirau Park, Waiotapu and 
Whakawerawera during periods of increased activity may save lives, as 
unpredictable hydrothermal eruptions may occur in these areas. 
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• Evacuation route plans for proximal areas should be distributed by Civil Defense, 
as should information on likely expected hazards (keeping in mind panicking the 
population needs to be avoided). 
• Some spoutings and gutterings are easily removed from houses, simply unclipping 
from brackets. These could be temporarily removed to protect them from damage 
from ash accumulations 
6.4 Future Research 
During the course of writing this thesis it has become apparent that there are several areas 
relating to the effects of volcanism in New Zealand that require future research. A short list 
of the most important topics needing attention is listed below: 
• The effects of tephra loading on New Zealand structures is currently based on 
comparisons with overseas tephra loading effects, and on the use of a generalized 
specification of roof loading capabilities of 2.5 kPa. A more precise determination 
of actual roof loading capabilities for different types of structures in New Zealand 
would further constrain probable effects of tephra loading. 
• The environmental impacts of large quantities of ash being disposed of into the 
ocean have not been studied. While dumping ash off shore may be more expensive 
than disposal on land, there may not be enough sites on land where large amounts 
of ash may be accommodated. Additional marine impacts may be minimal in the 
event of large quantities of ash already present from fallout and river discharge. 
This hypothesis needs to be tested though. A possible study area is the east coast of 
Sicily, where tephra has been disposed of into marine environments already 
affected by ashfall. 
• The recovery of the region after an 1886 type basaltic volcanic eruption was 
outside the scope of this thesis. The impacts of a 30 cm deposit of ash on the 
population of Rotorua would be enormous. The evacuation of a large proportion of 
the city would be necessary, and the rehabilitation of the area (where possible) 
would require a lot of time and money. The local, regional and national economies 
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would be severely affected. Research into the social impacts and recovery of the 
region after such an event needs to be conducted, including planning for re-zoning 
of land-use after the event. Possible outcomes of this research may indicate which 
areas may be feasibly rehabilitated, and which areas may not be economically 
viable to recover. 
Acknowledgements 13 2 ---~---------------------------
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to acknowledge all the support and encouragement given to me by my 
primary supervisor, Jim Cole. Without Jim I wouldn't have had the chance to do an 
interesting project that took me to Italy! Thanks also to my co-supervisor David Johnston 
from IGNS. A big thanks to Nichola my lovely partner for all the support and proof-
reading, for putting up with me spending time in the North Island and going to Italy 
without her. Thanks to Mt Etna for erupting with the most impeccable timing, I owe you a 
sacrifice, or at least a libation. Thanks to the volcanologists at INGV for all the help while 
I was in Italy (Paola Del Carlo, Mauro Coltelli, Massimo Pompillio, Simona Scollo, 
Alessandro Bonaccorso, Mike Burton, Daniele Andronico). To David Middleton and EQC 
for funding for both the Cities on Volcanoes II conference, and the forthcoming COV III 
conference. Funding from the urban vulnerability program for fieldwork is also gratefully 
acknowledged (Cheers Jim), as is the funding from the Royal Society and the Mason Trust. 
Thanks also to the Rotorua District Council for financial assistance, the use of a car in 
Rotorua, and various infrastructure maps - thanks to Paul Cooper and Ron Papuni. John 
Scott and the Tauranga District Council also contributed financially, and Bryan Everitt 
supplied lots of technical information on water treatment at Tauranga. Environment Bay of 
Plenty contributed some funding at the beginning of the thesis when I had about $40 to my 
name, lots of gratitude goes your way Russ Martin! (Thanks also for thought-provoking 
conversations Russ). Cheers to all of the technical staff in the geology department; Jane 
Guise for "encouraging remarks" and entertaining conversations, Rob Spiers for letting me 
cut up agates and other assorted interesting rocks, Kerry Swanson for giving me interesting 
odd jobs (paid of course), Cathy Knight, John Southward, Arthur, Julie Anne. Alison 
Johnston the unnatural science~ librarian, the guru of finding all sorts of interesting and 
potentially useful (perhaps) information, as well as finding stuff we do want but can't seem 
to track down without her, cheers. Thanks also Neil Andrews for help with SEM, and to 
Mike Rosenburg from IGNS for looking at my Etna samples. Thanks to Ian Nairn for 
useful comments on some of my text, and to John Mander for help with tephra loading on 
structures. Thanks also to all of my fellow masters students, Erica, Kerry G, Kerry L, 
Tanamoose, Masty, Danette, Tiny, Grim, Deja vu, Emma, Vicky, Calum, Sac, Pee Jay, 
Linda, Eric, Verne, Beatrice, and Mike Durand too, it's been great studying with you all! 
References 133 -----------------------------
References 
Auckland Evening Star 
Azzaro, R., D' Amico, S. Mostaccio & Scarfi, L. (2002) 1 ° Rapporto Sul Terremoto 
Di Macchia di Giarre del 2/12/2002-ore 13:28 (loc.) www.ct.ingy.it 
Azzaro, R. & Scarfi, L. (2002) 1 ° Rapporto Sul Terremoto Etneo Del 29/10/2002 Ore 
18:15 (loc.) www.ct.ingv.it 
Bartley Consultants (1995) Effect of Dust Palliatives on Unsealed Roads in New 
Zealand Transit New Zealand Research Report, no.38, 132p. · 
Baxter, P. J. (2000) Impacts of Eruptions on Human Health in Sigurdsson, H (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.1035-1043 
Bay of Plenty (BOP) Times 
Beaubien, S.E., Ciotoli, G. and Lombardi, S. (2003) Carbon dioxide and radon gas 
hazard in the Alban Hills area ( central Italy) Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal 
Research, vol.123, p.63-80 
Behncke, B (2002) http://boris.vulcanoetna.com 
Bibby, H.M., Caldwell, T. G., Davey, F. J., Webb, T. H. (1995) Geophysical evidence 
on the structure of the Taupo Volcanic Zone and it's hydrothermal circulation Journal 
ofVolcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.68, p.29-58 
Black, A. C. The Tarawera Eruption in Auckland Weekly News, 5th June 1913 
Blong, R. J. (1981) Some Effects ofTephra Falls on buildings in Self, Sand Sparks S. 
J. (eds.) Tephra Studies Reidel, Dordrecht, p.405-420 
Blong, R. J. (1984) Volcanic Hazards: A Sourcebook on the Effects of Eruptions 
Academic Press, Sydney, 424p 
Blong, R. J. (2000) Volcanic Hazards and Risk Management in Sigurdsson, H (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.1212-1227 
Blong, R. J. and McKee, C. (1995) The Rabaul eruption 1994: destruction of a town 
Natural Hazards Research Centre, Macquarie University, Australia, 52p 
Blythe, J.C. 1886 Evidence at the inquest into the deaths ofHaszard family members, 
12 June 1886, J86/1256 (Coroner), National Archives 
Booth, B. (1979) Assessing Volcanic Risk Journal of the Geological Society of 
London, vol.136, p.331-340 
References 134 -------------------------------' 
Bruno N., Caltabiano T., Longo V., Salemo G.G. (2002) Misure del flusso di SO2 
dall'Etna con spettrometro COSPEC www.ct.ingv.it 
Cas, R. A. F. and Wright, J. V. (1987) Volcanic Successions, Modem and Ancient 
Allen & Unwin, London, 528p 
Casadevall, T. J., Delos Reyes, P. J. and Schneider, D. J., (1996) The 1991 Pinatubo 
eruptions and their effects on aircraft operations in Fire and Mud, Eruptions and 
Lahars of Mount Pinatubo, Philippines E.G. Newhall and R. S. Punonbayan, eds. 
University of Washington Press, Seattle p.1071-1088 
Clarkson, B. D. and Clarkson, B. R. (1991) A Century of Change on Mt Tarawera in 
Clarkson, Smale and Ecroyd, Botany of Rotorua Forest Research Institute, Rotorua, 
132p 
Cole, J. W. (1970) Structure and Eruptive History of the Tarawera Volcanic Complex 
New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics, vol.13, no.5, p.879-902 
Cole, J. W. (1972) Distribution of High-Alumina Basalts in Taupo Volcanic Zone 
Geology dept. of University of Victoria, Wellington, publication no.1. 
Cole, J. W. (1973) High-Alumina Basalts of Taupo Volcanic Zone, New Zealand 
Lithos 6, p.53-64 
Cole, J. W. (1984) Taupo-Rotorua Depression: an ensialic marginal basin of North 
Island, New Zealand in Kokelaar & Howells (eds.) Marginal Basin Geology. Volcanic 
and associated sedimentary and tectonic processes in modem and ancient marginal 
basins Geological Society Special publication, no.I 6, Blackwell Science, Oxford, 
p.109-120 
Cole, J. W. (1990) Structural control and the origin of volcanism in the Taupo 
volcanic zone, New Zealand Bulletin ofVolcanology, vol.52, p.445-459 
Cole, J. W. and Hunt, T. M. (1968) Basalt Dikes in the Tarawera Volcanic Complex, 
New Zealand New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics, vol.11, no.5, p.1203-
1206 
Cole, J. W. and Nairn, I. A. Catalogue of the Active Volcanoes of the World 
Including Solfatara Fields (1976), IAVCEI, Roma 
Cronin, S. J., Neall, V. E., Lecointre, J. A., Hedley, M. J. and Loganathan, P (2003) 
Environmental hazards of fluoride in volcanic ash: a case study from Ruapehu 
volcano, New Zealand Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.121, 
p.271-279 
Dansey, R. D. Telegraph message to Napier quoted in NZ Herald 11 June 1886, p.5 
Del Carlo, P (2002a) Rapporto ceneri Etna - 9 novembre 2002 www.ct.ingv.it 
Del Carlo, P (2002b) Rapporto ricaduta ceneri del 28/10/2002 www.ct.ingv.it 
References 135 -------------------,-----------
~Del Carlo, P., Andronico, D. and Cristaldi A. (2002a) Rapporto ceneri Etna 21-31 
dicembre 2002 www.ct.ingv.it 
Del Carlo, P., Andronico, D. and Cristaldi A. (2002b) Rapporto ceneri Etna 10 -25 
novembre 2002 www.ct.ingy.it 
Donald, R., Park, S., and McIntosh, J. (1991) Bay of Plenty Regional Council Lakes 
Overview Report 1991 Bay of Plenty Regional Council technical publication #5 
Dowrick DJ, 1996, The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale - Revisions arising from 
Recent studies of New Zealand Earthquakes, Bulletin of the New Zealand National 
Society for Earthquake Engineering, 29 no. 2, 92-106. 
Edwards, B. F. J. in NZ Herald 17th June 1886, p.5. 
Evening News & East Coast Business Advisor 
Foxworthy, B. L. & Hill, M. (1982) Volcanic Eruptions of 1980 at Mount St Helens: 
The first 100 days Geological Survey Professional Paper no.1249, 125p 
Ginders, A. (1886) Meteorological Observations at Rotorua NZ Meteorological 
Service records 
Gordon, K (2002) The Effects of Volcanic Ash on Components of Infrastructure 
Unpublished MSc thesis, University of Canterbury, 133p 
Guastella, G. (2002) quoted in Etna: Coldiretti, nei campidanni per140 mln di euro 
www .mondoagricoltura.it 
Harrow, E (1886) Account of visit to Rotorua and Lake Tarawera. Auckland Evening 
Star, 26 June, 1886, p.5 
Haszard, A. Weekly Graphic and New Zealand Mail, 26 Jan 1912, p.33 
Haszard, C. NZ Herald 14 June 1886, p.5 
Hawkins, J. W., Bloomer, S. H., Evans, C. A. & Melchior, J. T. (1984) Evolution of 
intra-oceanic arc-trench systems Tectonophysics, 102, p.17 5-205 
Hector, J. (1886) The Recent Volcanic Eruptions, a preliminary report George 
Didsbury Government Printers, Wellington. 
Heiken, G., Murphy, M., Hackett, W. and Scott, W., (1995) Volcanic hazards to 
energy infrastructure: Ash fallout hazards and their mitigation World Geothermal 
Congress, Florence, Italy, p.2795-2798 
Heiken, G. and Wohletz, K (1985) Volcanic Ash University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 246p 
References 136 ------'-----------------------------
Hochstein, M. P. (1995) Crustal heat transfer in the Taupo Volcanic Zone {New 
Zealand): comparison with other volcanic arcs and explanatory heat source models 
Journal ofVolcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.68, p.117-151 
Hodgson, K. A. & Nairn, I. A. (2000) The Catastrophic ~ 1350AD Post-Eruption 
Flood from Lake Tarawera, New Zealand Environment Bay of Plenty Resource 
Planning Report 2000/01, p.7-8 
Hogg, A. G., Higham, T. F. G., Lowe, D. J., Palmer, J. G., Reimer, P. J. Nairn, I. A., 
(2000) Precise 'wiggle-match' dating of the Kaharoa Tephra. Geol. Soc. NZ 
Miscellaneous Publication, 108A, 74. 
Holiday Accommodation Parks Association of NZ (Inc.) (2002) Blue lake Top 10 
Holiday park Available http://www.holidayparks.co.nz/bluelake/ 
Houghton, B. F., Wilson, C. J. N., Lloyd, E. F., Gamble, G. A., Kokelaar, B. P. 
(1987) A catalogue of basaltic deposits within the Central Taupo Volcanic Zone N. Z. 
New Zealand Geological Survey Record, vol.18, p.95-101 
Houghton, B. F., Wilson, C. J. N., McWilliams, M., Lanphere, M.A., Weaver, S. D., 
Briggs, R. M., and Pringle, M. S., (1995) Chronology and dynamics of a large silicic 
magmatic system; central Taupo volcanic zone, New Zealand Geology, vol.23, no.I, 
p.13-16 
Humphries, Mrs. NZ Herald, 22 June 1886, p.6 
Johnston, D. M. (1997) Physical and Social Impacts of Past and Future Volcanic 
Eruptions in New Zealand Unpublished PhD thesis, Massey University, 288p 
Johnston, D. M. and Becker, J. (2001) Volcanic Ash Review - Part 1: Impact on 
Lifelines Services and Collection/Disposal Issues Auckland Regional Council 
technical publication No.144 
Johnston, D. M., Houghton, B. F., Neall, V. E., Ronan, K. R. and Paton, D. (2000a) 
Impacts of the 1945 and 1995-1996 Ruapehu eruptions, New Zealand: An example of 
increasing societal vulnerability Geological Society of America Bulletin, May 2000, 
vol.112, no.5, p.720-726 
Johnston, D. M. and Nairn, I. A. (1993) Volcanic Impacts Report: The impact of two 
eruption scenarios from the Okataina Volcanic Centre, on the population and 
infrastructure of the Bay of Plenty, New Zealand Bay of Plenty Regional Council 
Resource Planning Publication 93/6 October 1993 
Johnston, D. M., Nairn, I., Cole, J., Paton, D. & Martin, R. (2000b) Distal impacts of 
the nearly equal 1300 AD Kaharoa eruption on modem day New Zealand Institute of 
Geological & Nuclear Sciences Science Report, Report: 2000/27, 30p 
Johnston, D. M., Perrin, N., McVerry, G., Dowrick, D, and Scott, B (2002) A review 
of earthquake, landslide, geothermal and volcano information for the Rotorua 
Lifelines Project Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Science Report 2002/04 
References 137 ---------------------------
Kearn, R. F. (1988) Tarawera: The Volcanic eruption of 10 June 1886 Kearn, 
Auckland, 472p 
Kilburn, C. R. J., (2000) Lava flows and flow fields in Sigurdsson, H (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.291-305 
Kokelaar, B. P., (1983) The mechanism of Surtseyan volcanism Journal of the 
Geological Society, London, vol.140, p.939-944 
Kokelaar, B. P., (1986) Magma-water interactions in subaqueous and emergent 
basaltic volcanism Bulletin ofVolcanology, vol.48, p.275-289 
Kokelaar, B. P. and Durant, G. P., (1983) The submarine eruption and erosion of 
Surtla (Surtsey), Iceland Journal ofVolcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.19, p. 
239-246 
La Sicilia newspaper. available online at http://www.lasicilia.it 
Lowe, D., Kearn, R., Lee, D., (2001) How Many Deaths Were Caused by the 
Tarawera Eruption? Geological Society New Zealand, newsletter no.126. 
Leonard, G. S., Cole, J. W., Nairn, I. A. and Self, S (2002) Basalt triggering of the c. 
AD 1305 Kaharoa rhyolite eruption, Tarawera volcanic complex, New Zealand 
Journal ofVolcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.115, no.3-4, p.461-486 
Lundius, H. The Tarawera Eruption NZ Railways Magazine 1 July 1935, p.30. 
L'unione sarda online newspaper www.unionesarda.it 
Maclaren, J. M. (1906) The source of the waters of Geysers, Geological Magazine, 
vol. 8, p.511-514 
McRae, J. NZ Herald, 22 June 1886, p.5 
McRae, J. 1886 Evidence at the inquest into the deaths of E. A. Bainbridge, 12 June 
1886, J86/1257 (Coroner), National Archives 
Mair, G. inNZHerald 16th June 1886,p.5 
Malcolm, L. and Van Rossen, A. (1997) Ashes to Ashes? International Water Power 
& Dam Construction, vol.49, no.2, p.22-24 
Miller, T. P. and Casadevall, T. J., (2000) Volcanic Ash Hazards to Aviation in 
Sigurdsson, H (ed.) Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.915-
930 
Milner, D. M. (2001) The structure and eruptive history of Rotorua Caldera, Taupo 
Volcanic Zone, New Zealand Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Canterbury, 
434p . 
References 13 8 --------------------------------' 
Mostaccio, A. & Scarfi, L. (2002) 1 ° Rapporto Sul Terremoto Etneo Del 24/11/2002 
Ore 07:59 (ora Locale) www.ct.ingy.it 
Nairn, I. A. (1979) Rotomahana-Waimangu eruption, 1886: base surge and basalt 
magma New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics, vol.22, no.3, p.363-378 
Nairn, I. A. (1989) Mount·Tarawera (Map) Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, New Zealand Geological Survey, Lower Hutt, New Zealand (NZL) 
Nairn, I. A. (1992) The Te Rere and Okareka eruptive episodes; Okataina volcanic 
centre, Taupo volcanic zone, New Zealand New Zealand Journal of Geology and 
Geophysics, vol.35, no.I, pp.93-108 
Nairn, I. A. & Cole, J.W., (1981) Basalt Dikes in the 1886 Tarawera Rift New 
Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics 24, p.585-592 
Nakada, S. (2000) Hazards from Pyroclastic Flows and Surges Sigurdsson, H (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.945-955 
The New Zealand Herald 
Otago Daily Times 
Peterson, D. W. and Tilling, R. I., (2000) Lava Flow Hazards in Sigurdsson, H (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.957-971 
Pond, J. A. & Smith, S. P. (1887) Observations on the Eruption of Mount Tarawera, 
Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 10th June 1886. in Transactions & Proceedings of the 
New Zealand Institute, 1886 vol.XIX issued May 1887, p.342-371 
Pullar, W. A. & Birrell, K. S. (1973). Age and Distribution of Late Quaternary 
Pyroclastic and Associated Cover Deposits of the Rotorua and Taupo area, North 
Island, New Zealand. NZ Soil Survey report 1. 
Pyle, D. M. (1989) The thickness, volume and grainsize of tephra fall deposits. 
Bulletin of Volcanology, 51: 1-15 
Rees, J. D. (1970) Paricutin Revisited: A review of man's attempts to adapt to 
ecological changes resulting from volcanic catastrophe Geoforum 4, p.7-25 
Roche, H., Tarawera eruption: June 10, 1886NZ Science Review Oct. 20 1948, p.77-
78. 
Rotorua District Council website 
http://www.rdc.govt.nz/our+services/water/water+supplies+at+a+glance/individual+s 
upplies.asp 
Santonocito, C. (2002) Alarme per un terremoto che non c' era La Sicilia 26/11/02, 
p.26 
References 139 --------------------------------' 
Sarkinen, C. F. and Wiitala, J. T., (1981) Investigation of Volcanic Ash on 
Transmission facilities in the Pacific Northwest IEEE Transactions on Power 
Apparatus and Systems, vol.100, no.5, p.2278-2286 
Saunders, A. D. & Tarney, J. (1984) Geochemical characteristics of basaltic 
volcanism within back-arc basins in Kokelaar, B._P. & Howells, M. F. (eds.)Marginal 
Basin Geology Geol. Soc. Spee. pub. 16 pp. 59-76 
Sherburn, S. and Nairn, I. A. (2001) A scenario of geophysical events inferred to have 
preceded the ~ 1300AD Kaharoa eruption: lessons for the future Institute of 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences science report 2001/26, 57p 
Sheridan, M. F., and Wohletz, (1981) Hydrovolcanic explosions; the systematics of 
water-pyroclast equilibration Science, vol.212, no.4501, p.1387-1389 
www.siciliasearch.com 
Sinclair, E. (1886) Diary Entry from 9 June 1886. Typescript of Manuscript, Rotorua 
Museum & Public Library 
Smith, S. P., The Eruption ofTarawera (1887) George Didsbury, Government Printer, 
Wellington. 
Sparks, R. S. J. and Wilson, L. (1976) A model for the formation of ignimbrite by 
gravitational column collapse Journal of the Geological Society of London, vol.132, 
p.441-451 
Statistics of the colony of NZ for the year 1886, George Didsbury, Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1887, p.277 
Statistics New Zealand agricultural survey 1999 http://www.statistics.govt.nz 
Statistics New Zealand Census 2001 http://www.statistics.govt.nz 
Tanner, J. (1886) Letters to England, published in Bay of Plenty Journal of History 
vol. 34, no.I May 1986 
Tauranga District Council (2003) 
http:/ /www.taurangawater.govt.nz/work/frsuppsystem.htm 
Taylor, B. (ed.) (1995) Backarc Basins: Tectonics and Magmatism Plenum Press, 
New York pp. ix-xi 
The Christchurch Star 
The Press (Christchurch) 
Thomas, A. P. W., Field book (1886) Geology dept., University of Auckland 
Thomas, A. P. W., Report on the eruption of Tarawera and Rotomahana, N.Z. George 
Didsbury, Government Printer, Wellington, 1888, 74p. 
References 140 -----------------------------
Todd Energy Website (2003) http://www.todd.co.nz/ 
Transpower website (2003) www.transpower.co.nz 
Trustpower website (2003) http://www.trustpower.co.nz 
Turner, Rand Hurst, T (2003) Numerical Simulations of Volcanic Ash Dispersal from 
the Ruapehu Eruptions of 1995 and 1996 
Available from http://www.niwa.co.nz/rc/atmos/ash/ 
Valentine, G. A. & Fisher, R. V. (2000) Pyroclastic Surges and Blasts in Sigurdsson, 
H (ed.) Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.571-580 
Waikato times 
Walcott, R. I. (1987) Tectonic evolution of the Hik:urangi Margin Geological Society 
of New Zealand Miscellaneous Publication, vol.37A, pp.112 
Walker, G.P.L., Self, S. and Wilson, L., (1984) Tarawera 1886, New Zealand - A 
Basaltic Plinian Fissure Eruption Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 
vol.21,p.61-78 
Warbrick, A. P., Adventures in Geyserland (1934) Reed, Dunedin 
Whakatane district council (2003) Yearbook available from: 
http://www.whakatane.govt.nz/council info.html 
White, J. D. L., Houghton, B. F., Hodgson, K. A. and Wilson, C. J. N. (1997) Delayed 
sedimentary response to the A.D. 1886 eruption of Tarawera, New Zealand Geology, 
v.25, no.5 p.459-462 
Williams, W. L. (1886) Phenomena connected with the Tarawera Eruption of 10th 
June, 1886, as observed at Gisborne Transactions and Proceedings of the NZ 
institute, vol.XIX, p.380-382). · 
Wilson, C. J. N., Houghton, B. F., McWilliams, M. 0., Lanphere, M.A., Weaver, S. 
D., Briggs, R. M. (1995) Volcanic and structural evolution of Taupo Volcanic Zone, 
New Zealand: a review Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.68, 
p.1-28 
Wilson, C. J. N. and Houghton, B. F., (2000) Pyroclast Transport and Deposition in 
Sigurdsson, H (ed.) Encyclopedia of Volcanoes Academic Press, San Diego, p.545-
554 
Appendix 1 








Not felt except by a very few people under exceptionally favourable 
circumstances 
Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors or favourably placed 
Felt indoors; hanging objects may swing, vibration similar to passing of light 
trucks, duration may be estimated, may not be recognised as an earthquake. 
Generally noticed indoors but not outside. Light sleepers may be awakened. 
Vibration may be likened to the passing of a heavy traffic, or to the jolt of a 
heavy object falling or striking the building. Doors and windows rattle. 
Glassware and crockery rattle. Liquids in open vessels may be slightly 
disturbed. Standing motorcars may rock. Walls and frame of buildings, and 
partitions and suspended ceilings in commercial buildings, may be heard to 
creak. 
Generally felt outside, and by almost everyone indoors. Most sleepers 
awakened. A few people alarmed. Small unstable objects are displaced or 
upset. Some glassware and crockery may be broken. Hanging pictures knock 
against the wall. Open doors may swing. Cupboard doors secured by magnetic 
catches may open. Pendulum clocks stop, start, or change rate. Some windows 
Type I cracked. A few earthenware toilet fixtures cracked. 
Felt by all. People and animals alarmed. Many run outside. Difficulty 
experienced in walking steadily. Objects fall from shelves, pictures fall from 
walls. Some furniture moved on smooth floors, some free-standing unsecured 
fireplaces moved. Glassware and crockery broken, very unstable furniture 
overturned. Small church and school bells ring. Appliances move on bench 
and table tops. Filing cabinets or 'easy glide' drawers may open [or shut]. 
Slight damage to Buildings Type I. Some stucco or cement plaster falls. 
Windows Type I broken. Damage to a few weak domestic chimneys, some 
may fall. Trees and bushes shake, or are heard to rustle. Loose material may 
be dislodged from sloping ground, e.g. existing slides, talus slopes, shingle 
slides. 
General alarm, difficulty experienced in standing. Noticed by motorcar drivers 
who may stop. Large bells ring, furniture moves on smooth floors, may move 
on carpeted floors. Substantial damage to fragile contents of buildings. 
Unreinforced stone and brick walls cracked. Buildings Type I cracked with 
some minor masonry falls. A few instances of damage to Buildings Type II. 
Unbraced parapets, unbraced brick gables, and architectural ornaments fall. 
Roofing tiles, especially ridge tiles may be dislodged. Many unreinforced 
domestic chimneys damaged, often falling from the roof-line. Water tanks 
Type I burst. A few instances of damage to brick veneers and plaster or 
cement-based linings. Unrestrained water cylinders [Water Tanks Type II] 
may move and leak. Some windows Type II cracked. Suspended ceilings 
damaged. Water made turbid by stirred up mud. Small slides such as falls of 
sand and gravel banks, and small rock-falls from steep slopes and cuttings. 
Instances of settlement of unconsolidated or wet, or weak soils. Some fine 
cracks appear in sloping ground. A few instances of liquefaction [i.e. small 







Alarm may approach panic. Steering of motor cars greatly affected. 
Building Type I, heavily damaged, some collapse. Buildings Type II 
damaged, some with partial collapse. Buildings Type III damaged in some 
cases. A few instances of damage to Structures Type IV. Monuments and pre-
1976 elevated tanks and factory stacks twisted or brought down, some pre-
1965 infill masonry panels damaged, a few post-1980 brick veneers damaged, 
decayed timber piles of houses damaged, houses not secured to foundations 
may move. Most unreinforced domestic chimneys are damaged, some below 
roof-line, many brought down. Cracks appear on steep slopes and in wet 
ground, small to moderate slides occur in roadside cuttings and unsupported 
excavations, small water and sand ejections and localised lateral spreading 
adjacent to streams, canals, lakes etc. 
Many Buildings Type I destroyed. Buildings Type II heavily damaged, some 
collapse. Buildings Type III damaged, some with partial collapse 
Structures Type IV damaged in some cases. Some with flexible frames 
seriously damaged. Damage or permanent distortion to some Structures Type 
V. Houses not secured to foundations shifted off. Brick veneers fall and 
expose frames. Cracking of ground conspicuous, landsliding general on steep 
slopes. Liquefaction effects intensified and more widespread, with large 
lateral spreading and flow sliding adjacent to streams, canals, lakes etc. 
Most Buildings Type I destroyed. Many Buildings Type II destroyed 
Buildings Type III heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type IV 
damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type V moderately damaged, 
but with few partial collapses. A few instances of damage to Structures Type 
VI. Some well-built timber buildings moderately damaged ( excluding damage 
from falling chimneys). Landsliding very widespread in susceptible terrain, 
with very large rock masses displaced on steep slopes. Landslide dams may be 
formed. Liquefaction effects widespread and severe 
Most Buildings Type II destroyed. Many Buildings Type Ill destroyed 
Structures Type IV heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type V 
damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type VI suffer minor 
damage, a few moderately damaged. 
Most Buildings Type III destroyed. Many Structures Type IV destroyed 
Structure Type V heavily damaged, some with partial collapse 
Structures Type VI moderately damaged. 
Construction types 
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Buildings Type I [Masonry Din NZ 1965 MM Scale] 
Buildings with low standard of workmanship, poor mortar, or constructed of 
weak materials like mud brick or rammed earth. Soft storey structures [ e.g. 
shops] made of masonry, weak reinforced concrete, or composite materials 
[ e.g. some walls timber, some brick] not well tied together. Masonry 
Buildings otherwise conforming to Building Types I-III, but also having 
heavy unreinforced masonry towers. [Buildings constructed entirely of 
timber must be of extremely low quality to be Type I]. 
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Buildings Type II [Masonry C in the NZ 1966 MM Scale] 
Buildings of ordinary workmanship, with mortar of average quality. No 
extreme weakness, such as inadequate bonding of the comers, but neither 
designed nor reinforced to resist lateral forces. Such buildings not having 
heavy unreinforced masonry towers. 
Buildings Type III [Masonry Bin the NZ 1966 MM Scale] 
Reinforced masonry or concrete buildings of good workmanship and with 
sound mortar, but not formally designed to resist earthquake forces. 
Structures Type IV [Masonry A in the NZ 1966 MM Scale] 
Buildings and bridges designed and built to resist earthquakes to normal use 
standards, i.e. no special collapse or damage limiting measures taken [ mid-
1930s to cl970 for concrete and to cl980 for other materials]. 
Structures Type V 
Buildings and bridges, designed and builrto normal use standards, i.e. no 
special damage limiting measures taken, other than code requirements, 
dating from since cl970 for concrete and cl980 for other materials. 
Structure Type VI 
Structures dating from cl 980, with well-defined foundation behaviour, 
which have been specially designed for minimal damage, e.g. seismically 
isolated emergency facilities, some structures with dangerous or high 
contents, or new generation low damage structures. 
Windows 
Water Tanks 
Type I - Large display windows, especially shop windows. 
Type II - Ordinary sash or casement windows 
Type I - External, stand-mounted, corrugated iron water tanks 
Type II - Domestic hot-water cylinders unrestrained except by supply and 
delivery pipes. 
Available from (http://www.es.mg.edu.au/NHRC/web/scales/scalespage2.htm) 
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4 argely observed 
5 Strong 
6 Slightly damaging 
7 Damaging 
8 Heavily damaging 
12 
DESCRIPTION 
Not felt, even under the most favourable circumstances. 
Vibration is felt only by individual people at rest in houses, 
specially on upper floors of buildings. 
he vibration is weak and is felt indoors by a few people. People 
t rest feel a swaying or light trembling. 
The earthquake is felt indoors by many people, outdoors by very 
few. A few people are awakened. The level of vibration is not 
ightening. Windows, doors and dishes rattle. Hanging objects 
e earthquake is felt indoors by most, outdoors by few. Many 
sleeping people awake. A few run outdoors. Buildings tremble 
throughout. Hanging objects swing considerably. China and 
glasses clatter together. The vibration is strong. Top heavy objects 
pple over. Doors and windows swing open or shut. 
Felt by most indoors and by many outdoors. Many people in 
buildings are frightened and run outdoors. Small objects fall. 
Slight damage to many ordinary buildings e.g.; fine cracks in 
plaster and small pieces of plaster fall. 
ost people are frightened and run outdoors. Furniture is shifted 
and objects fall from shelves in large numbers. Many ordinary 
buildings suffer moderate damage: small cracks in walls; partial 
ollapse of chimneys. 
urniture may be overturned. Many ordinary buildings suffer 
mage: chimneys fall; large cracks appear in walls and a few 
uildings may partially collapse. 
e twisted. Many ordinary 
few collapse completely. 
Practically all structures above and below ground are heavily 
damaged or destroyed. 
Available from http://www.earthquakes.bgs.ac.uk/hazard/ems1 .htm 
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Appendix3 
Scientific Alert Indicative Phenomena Volcano Status 
Level 
0 Typical background surface activity; Usual dormant, or 
seismicity, deformation and heat flow at quiescent state. 
low levels. 
1 Apparent seismic, geodetic, thennal or Initial signs of possible 
other unrest indicators. volcano unrest. No 
eruption threat. 
2 Increase in number or intensity of unrest Confirmation of volcano 
indicators (seismicity, deformation, heat unrest. Eruption threat. 
flow etc). 
3 Minor steam eruptions. High-increasing Minor eruptions 
trends of unrest indicators, significant commenced. Real 
effects on volcano, possibly beyond. possibility of hazardous 
eruptions. 
4 Eruption of new magma Sustained high Hazardous local eruption 
levels of unrest indicators, significant in progress. Large scale 
effects beyond volcano. eruption now possible. 
5 Destruction with major damage beyond Large hazardous volcanic 
active volcano. Significant risk over 
eruption in progress. 
wider areas 
Available from http://www.gns.cri.nz 
